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LEAVING THE CHISHOLM TRAIL
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
[For example,]
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.1
PROLOGUE
John Hancock was dying. In less than three weeks' time,
Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor Samuel Adams would lead the
state and the country in mourning the passing of one of the great
men of the American Revolution.2 This day, however, despite his
rapidly declining health, Governor Hancock presided over a special
session of the Massachusetts legislature, which he had called only
weeks earlier.3 A crisis had emerged that Hancock was convinced
threatened both the state and the Union and required immediate
legislative attention.4 Months earlier, the Supreme Court in
Chisholm v. Georgia5 had determined that individuals could sue
Georgia in federal court without its consent.6 Although this decision
had not spurred the state to action, Massachusetts had just received
notice that it too was being sued in federal court.' In broadsides
printed and distributed throughout the state, Hancock sent out the
call for the members of the Massachusetts Assembly to return to
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; U.S. CONST. amend XI.
2. See, e.g., His Excellency John Hancock, Esquire, Governor, and Commander in Chief
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Is No More, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 16, 1793
(reporting on the death of Hancock and printing an extended eulogy of a man whose "name
shall live forever").
3. See Proclamation by John Hancock, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), July 9, 1793, reprinted
in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1800:
SUITS AGAINST THE STATES 387-89 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994) [hereinafter 5 DHSC].
4. See John Hancock's Address to the Massachusetts General Court, INDEP. CHRON.
(Boston), Sept. 18, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 416-19.
5. 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419 (1793).
6. Id. at 479 (Jay, C.J., concurring).
7. See Proclamation by John Hancock, supra note 3, at 387-88.
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Boston.' There, in the old statehouse where the Declaration of
Independence was first proclaimed to the people of the United
States, Hancock's assistants led the weakened revolutionary to the
front of the hall.? Reaching his seat, Hancock sat down, too ill to
read his own address.1" Instead, Hancock offered his apologies and
had his Secretary of State read the speech to the assembly.11
"Gentlemen," the Secretary read,
The suit commenced by WILLIAM VASSAL [against the state
of Massachusetts] ... must be decided on principles very interest-
ing to its welfare as a state.
I cannot conceive that the People of this Commonwealth,
when they, by their Representatives in Convention, adopted the
Constitution of a General Government, expected that each State
should be held liable to answer on compulsory civil process, to
every individual resident in another State or in a foreign
kingdom. Three Judges of the United States of America, having
solemnly given it as their opinion, that the several States are
thus liable, the question then has become highly important to
the people.12
The Massachusetts Assembly, Hancock advised, had but three
choices. First, they might agree with the result in Chisholm and
"make such provision for defending against the suit "1.... 3 If, on
the other hand, they believed that the Supreme Court in Chisholm
had erroneously construed Article III, then they should draft an
amendment to the Constitution declaring "a more unexceptionable
construction."' 4 Finally, even if the Assembly concluded that the
Supreme Court had followed "the letter of the Constitution," they
might nevertheless seek an amendment in order to "secure [to] the
8. See id. at 388.
9. See LORENZO SEARS, JOHN HANCOCK: THE PICTURESQUE PATRIOT 321 (1912).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. John Hancock's Address, supra note 4, at 416. As did many others in the months
following Chisholm v. Georgia, Hancock incorrectly numbered the Justices in the majority
(there were four in the majority). See infra Part II.A.5.
13. John Hancock's Address, supra note 4, at 417.
14. Id.
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states severally, in the enjoyment of that share of sovereignty,
which it was intended they should retain and possess."15
Although Hancock demurred in taking an express position on the
matter, his opinion was clear: Chisholm's interpretation of Article
III was fundamentally at odds with the state's expectation of
retained sovereignty under the federal Constitution:
[T]here are certain inherent principles in the Constitution ...
which can never be surrendered, without essentially changing
the nature, or destroying the existence of the Government.
A consolidation of all the States into one Government, would
at once endanger the Nation as a Republic, and eventually
divide the States united, or eradicate the principles which we
have contended for. 16
It was John Hancock's last public appearance; he died days later. 7
Within a week of Hancock's speech, the Massachusetts legisla-
ture issued a report that declared that allowing an individual to sue
a nonconsenting state was "dangerous to the peace, safety and
independence of the several States, and repugnant to the first
principles of a Federal Government," and resolved to seek an
amendment that would "remove any clause or article ... which can
be construed to imply or justify a decision that a State is compella-
ble to answer in any suit by an individual or individuals in any
Court of the United States."' 8 On the day after Hancock's death,
Lieutenant Governor Samuel Adams sent the Massachusetts
resolves to the governors of the other states, inviting them to join
Massachusetts in establishing the proper construction of Article
III. The receipt of these resolves triggered a cascade of similar
resolves from state legislatures around the country.2" By the time
15. Id.
16. Id. at 418-19.
17. See SEARS, supra note 9, at 321, 323.
18. Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court (Sept. 27, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 440.
19. Letter from Samuel Adams to the Governors of the States (Oct. 9, 1793), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 3, at 442-43.
20. See infra Part II.C.2.d.
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Congress began its next session, the introduction of an amendment
was a foregone conclusion.
Toward the end of the previous session, Massachusetts Senator
Caleb Strong had submitted an amendment removing the power
of federal courts to hear suits by individuals against the states
-essentially Governor Hancock's third "alternative."21 Now, after
months of public debate and the broad circulation of his own
state's resolves,22 Strong amended his earlier proposal and added
language that transformed the amendment from a removal of a
previously granted power to a declaration of how to construe Article
III: "The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any Suit in Law or Equity, commen[ced] or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State or
by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign State."23 Congress adopted
Strong's proposal without changing a single word and the amend-
ment was ratified in less than a year.24 And so it came to pass that
Massachusetts, in response to the case of Vassal v. Massachusetts ,25
led the country in adopting the Eleventh Amendment-the first
stand-alone Amendment to the Constitution and the second of only
two constitutional provisions that declare the proper method of
construing the original Constitution.26
21. See Resolution in the United States Senate (Feb. 20, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3,
at 607-08.
22. See infra Part II.C.2.
23. Resolution in the United States Senate (Jan. 2, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 613
(emphasis added) (alteration in original).
24. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 600-01.
25. See id. at 352 (describing the case, which was ultimately dismissed).
26. The other provision is the Ninth Amendment, which reads, "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
1582 [Vol. 50:1577
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INTRODUCTION
The above account differs somewhat from the traditional story
of the Eleventh Amendment. Scholars and courts generally attri-
bute the Eleventh Amendment to the "profound shock"27 caused by
the Court's analysis of Article III in Chisholm v. Georgia and the
need to reverse the results of that particular case.2" Although
commentators differ in their choice of the most persuasive opinion
in Chisholm,29 there is general agreement that the Eleventh
Amendment reflects a public reaction to the issues discussed in
that one particular case.3° In fact, even though the Supreme
Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence has long emphasized
Chisholm,31 Eleventh Amendment scholars often criticize the mod-
ern Supreme Court for not emphasizing Chisholm enough. 2 For
27. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 96 (1922)
("[Chisholm] fell upon the country with a profound shock. Both the Bar and the public in
general appeared entirely unprepared for the doctrine upheld by the Court ...."); see also Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) ("[Chisholm] created such a shock of surprise throughout
the country that, at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution was almost unanimously proposed, and was in due course adopted by the
legislatures of the States.").
28. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment:
A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1034 (1983) ('The [Elleventh [A]mendment was
passed in the 1790's in order to overrule a particular case-Chisholm v. Georgia.") (footnote
omitted); John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1680 (2004) ("No one questions that the nation
adopted the Eleventh Amendment in response to Chisholm.").
29. Scholars today tend to emphasize the opinions of the majority, particularly those of
Chief Justice Jay and Justice Wilson. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State?
Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1733-34 (2007); Fletcher,
supra note 28, at 1056; John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1925 (1983); Manning, supra note 28,
at 1744. Since Hans v. Louisiana, on the other hand, the Supreme Court has emphasized the
dissenting opinion of Justice Iredell. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12; see also Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 727 (1999) (noting the Supreme Court's traditional agreement with Justice Iredell's
dissent in Chisholm).
30. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 332 (2005) ('To
appreciate the impulse animating this (the Eleventh) Amendment, we need to understand
the first constitutionally significant case ever decided by the Supreme Court, Chisholm v.
Georgia."); see also supra note 28.
31. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 719-20; Hans, 134 U.S. at 11-12.
32. Randy Barnett, for example, has recently called on academics to add a full dis-
cussion of Chisholm to the basic constitutional law curriculum. See Barnett, supra note 29,
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example, scholars regularly disparage the modem Supreme Court's
reliance on Hans v. Louisiana because that case expanded state
sovereign immunity doctrine well beyond the text of the Eleventh
Amendment and the specific factual circumstances in Chisholm.33
Expanding Eleventh Amendment doctrine beyond Chisholm, they
argue, uncouples the doctrine from the text of the Constitution and
introduces a concept of sovereignty literally foreign to the founding
generation's embrace of popular (as opposed to state) sovereignty.34
In sum, the long-standing and voluminous debate over the Eleventh
Amendment generally assumes that this particular Supreme Court
case is somehow central to our understanding of the clause.
This Article contends that the modern emphasis on Chisholm v.
Georgia as the generative source of the Eleventh Amendment is
historically incorrect. Public debate regarding the key issues be-
hind the Eleventh Amendment had been underway long before
the Court handed down its decision in Chisholm.35 Although the
decision added urgency to this debate, the actual opinions in the
case had little impact due to their public unavailability for
months after the decision was handed down.36 Nor was it Georgia
that took the lead in protesting the perceived violation of state
sovereignty and organizing support for a constitutional amendment.
That role fell to Massachusetts, a New England state that had been
at 1729-31.
33. See AMAR, supra note 30, at 336 (describing how the modern Court "stretches" the
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment); Fletcher, supra note 28, at 1063 ("The most plausible
interpretation of the [E] leventh [A] mendment thus appears to be that it was designed simply
and narrowly to overturn the result the Supreme Court had reached in Chisholm v. Georgia.");
Manning, supra note 28, at 1680-81 ("Although this text is open to more than one plausible
interpretation, one thing about it is quite clear: It cannot bear the meaning assigned to it by
Hans v. Louisiana, which initiated the strongly purposive approach to the Amendment that
governs its interpretation to this day." (footnote omitted)).
34. For scholarship generally critical of the state sovereign immunity doctrine of Hans v.
Louisiana, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1426-27
(1987) (arguing that sovereign immunity is inconsistent with the Framers' vision of
federalism); Barnett, supra note 29, at 1756; Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and
Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 537 (1978); Fletcher,
supra note 28, at 1063; Gibbons, supra note 29, at 1894; Manning, supra note 28, at 1680-81;
Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1342, 1345 (1989); James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory"Account
of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1269, 1271-73 (1998).
35. See infra Parts I.B-C.
36. See infra notes 390-95 and accompanying text.
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engaged in a public debate on the issue of state sovereign immunity
for over a year prior to Chisholm"v and whose legislature success-
fully spearheaded the effort to secure an amendment in reaction to
the state being sued in Vassal v. Massachusetts.38
Leaving the deeply rutted trail of Chisholm-based interpretations
of the Eleventh Amendment allows for a much better view of the
principles that informed the debate over state suability. When the
first cases were filed against the states in federal court, critics
immediately noticed that such suits called into question the very
idea of retained state sovereignty.39 Because a sovereign could not
be sued without its consent, compelled suits against the states
reduced these bodies to the level of nonsovereign corporations.4 °
Although it was possible to read Article III to allow such a result,
doing so violated the promises made by Federalists in the state
conventions that federal powers, including the powers granted
under Article III, would be narrowly construed in order to preserve
the independent sovereign character of the states.41 Alexander
Hamilton, James Madison, James Iredell, Rufus King, John
Marshall, and others all assured the conventions that delegated
power would be strictly construed to avoid just such a result.42
Pressure to make these promises an express part of the Constitution
ultimately led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights with the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments, according to James Madison, preventing
any "latitude of interpretation" of federal power. 43 When federal
courts accepted jurisdiction over individual suits against the states,
this triggered both a sense of betrayal and a concern that these suits
would serve as a precedent leading to the feared "consolidation" of
the states.4 Chisholm was just one (and not the first) of a number
37. See infra Part I.C.1.
38. See infra Parts II.C-D; see also 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 596, 598.
39. See infra Part I.C.
40. See JAMES SULLIVAN, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA (1791), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 21, 29, 31; Letter from an
Anonymous Correspondent, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Mar. 3, 1791, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 20-21.
41. See infra Parts I.B.1-2.
42. See infra Parts I.B, II.C.2.b.
43. James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (June 8, 1789), in
JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 486 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) [hereinafter WRITINGS].
44. See, e.g., John Hancock's Address, supra note 4, at 419.
20091 1585
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of cases filed in federal court that fueled this debate.45 It was mere
historical accident that Chisholm was the first to generate an actual
decision by the Supreme Court, and the Court's discussion of the
issue in Chisholm played a minor role at best in the movement to
amend the Constitution.
Not until Massachusetts faced its own suit in federal court did the
state issue the call for other states to join her in adding an amend-
ment to the Constitution that would preserve the sovereignty of the
states and restore the interpretation of Article III that Federalists
had promised the ratifiers in the state conventions.46 State after
state responded to Massachusetts's call and issued their own
resolves declaring that all such suits against the states conflicted
with the "first principles" of federal government and could not be
reconciled with the promised retained sovereignty of the states. 47
Despite Madison's successful effort to produce a bill of rights, the
broad generalities of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were not
enough. As Georgia Governor Edward Telfair put it, "Notwithstand-
ing, [the fact that] certain amendments have taken place in the
federal constitution," the state legislatures had the duty to propose
their own amendments to the Constitution "so as to make it more
definite. 48
Modifying his own original proposal, Massachusetts Senator
Caleb Strong reworded the proposed amendment so it now declared
that Article III "shall not be construed" to allow individual suits
against the states. 49 The final wording reflected months of public
debate and the resulting state resolutions, almost all of which called
for an amendment that marked not a substantive change, but the
restoration of an original understanding of the Constitution.0
Article III, like all delegations of sovereign power, was to be strictly
construed in order to preserve the retained sovereign authority of
the people in the several states.51
45. See infra Part I.C.
46. See infra Part II.C.
47. See infra Part II.C.2.d.
48. Edward Telfair's Address to the Georgia General Assembly, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 4,
1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 234.
49. Resolution in the United States Senate (Feb. 20, 1793), supra note 21, at 613.
50. See infra Part II.C.2.
51. See infra Parts I.B.2, II.C.2.b.
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Following a brief section on the scholarly literature, Part I of this
Article delves into the original debates regarding the proper
construction of federal power. Long before the first suit was filed
against a state in federal court, the ratifying conventions saw the
possibility from afar and discussed the issue as part of the general
debates over the proposed Constitution.52 Although most accounts
of the Eleventh Amendment assume that nothing came of these
discussions, in fact, the calls for limited construction of Article III
merged with more general calls for narrow construction of dele-
gated federal power.53 Refuting claims that the Constitution would
consolidate the states, Federalist proponents of the Constitution
promised that the federal government would have only expressly
delegated powers, meaning that federal power, including Article III,
would be narrowly construed, thus preserving the states' independ-
ent sovereign existence.54 Delivering on these Federalist promises
to the states, James Madison drafted a bill of rights, with the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments serving as rules of construction limiting the
power of the federal government to interfere with the sovereign
independence of the states.55
Part II sifts through the historical record regarding the state
suability debate, which emerged almost immediately after the
ratification of the Constitution. From the very first suit (filed
against the state of Maryland),56 essays appeared in newspapers
throughout the country challenging such suits as irreconcilable
with the concept of retained state sovereignty.57 Chisholm itself was
just one of a number of such suits and, even though it was the
first to result in a Supreme Court decision, the opinions and
particular facts in that case did not matter.58 It was the concept of
an individual compelling a state to answer in federal court that
drove the debate.59 When an individual filed suit against the state
of Massachusetts, the Governor and state legislature issued a set of
resolutions calling for a coordinated effort by all the states to secure
52. See infra Part I.B.1.
53. See infra Part I.B.2.
54. See infra Part I.B.2.
55. See infra Part I.B.4.
56. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing Van Staphorst v. Maryland).
57. See infra Part II.B.
58. See infra Part II.C.2.
59. See infra Part II.C.2.
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an amendment restoring the proper (and originally promised)
construction of Article 11.60
In a brief concluding section, I consider how this history relates
to the modern debates regarding the Eleventh Amendment and
state sovereign immunity. I address in particular the four great
modern myths of the Eleventh Amendment: (1) that the Eleventh
Amendment emerged as a reaction to the Supreme Court's decision
in Chisholm; (2) that none of the Justices in Chisholm, including
dissenting Justice James Iredell, presented an extended constitu-
tional defense of state sovereign immunity; (3) that Hans v.
Louisiana established a doctrine of state sovereign immunity that
cannot be derived from the text of the Eleventh Amendment; and (4)
that the sovereign immunity doctrine of the modern Supreme Court,
like other Federalist doctrines of limited federal power, departs from
the text and original understanding of the Constitution.
I. STATE SUABILITY BEFORE CHISHOLM
A. Historical Scholarship and the Eleventh Amendment
Modern scholarship on the Eleventh Amendment has come in
waves. The first occurred in the 1980s as scholars made a concerted
effort to dislodge Hans v. Louisiana as the proper guide to state
sovereign immunity. Legal historians such as Akhil Amar, William
Fletcher, and John Gibbons rejected the view that the Eleventh
Amendment illustrated the Founders' commitment to a broader
concept of state sovereignty, and insisted that the Amendment
simply removed a limited category of cases from the jurisdictional
provisions of Article III-the so-called diversity theory of the
Eleventh Amendment.6' Reflecting the modern Supreme Court's
own focus on the original meaning of the Amendment, these initial
revisionist accounts were heavily invested in an originalist approach
60. See Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court, supra note 18, at 440.
61. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 34; Fletcher, supra note 28; Gibbons, supra note 29; Vicki
C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98
YALE L.J. 1 (1988); see also JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987); Carol F. Lee, Sovereign Immunity and
the Eleventh Amendment: The Uses of History, 18 URB. LAW. 519 (1986); David L. Shapiro,
Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984).
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to constitutional interpretation. During the 1990s, neo-revisionist
accounts emerged that insisted the words of the Amendment went
beyond pure diversity concerns even while repeating the revision-
ists' historically based criticism of Hans.62 Most recently, some
scholars have produced counter-revisionist accounts that provide a
degree of support for Hans and the general idea of state sovereign
immunity.63 These efforts, however, continue to follow the general
argument that Hans wrongly expanded sovereign immunity doc-
trine beyond the specific issue before the court in Chisholm v.
Georgia.
64
Although differing in significant ways, all of these accounts
have deepened our appreciation of the Eleventh Amendment.
Akhil Amar, for example, seems to have correctly called attention to
the critical role popular sovereignty played at the time of the
founding and the need to reconcile any account of the Eleventh
Amendment with the Founders' commitment to sovereign people.65
The textualism of the neo-revisionists forced a renewed apprecia-
tion of the actual words of the Eleventh Amendment and the
importance of matching our jurisprudence with the actual text of the
Amendment. Finally, scholarly work in the past few years has
drawn renewed attention to the historical debates that surrounded
the adoption of the Amendment. This is especially appropriate
given that a great deal of historical evidence has come to light
62. See Marshall, supra note 34; Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of
Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1559 (2002); Pfander, supra note 34; Michael B.
Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme
Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 819, 868-70 (1999).
63. See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law
and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. L. REv. 1027, 1027-28 (2002); Nelson, supra note 62, at 1565-
66. In his important article, Professor Nelson develops the idea that courts generally lacked
personal jurisdiction over states qua states, and that the Founders would not have read the
phrase "cases and controversies" in Article III to include individual suits against noncon-
senting states. Id. at 1565. His article is one of the few to seriously investigate the newly
expanded historical record surrounding the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and, for that
reason alone, is an important addition to the literature. As I develop below, although I agree
with Professor Nelson that Article III properly construed would not allow such suits against
the states, my argument is more originalist than textual: the ratifiers of both the original
Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment embraced this reading as a matter of limited
construction of delegated federal power, as opposed to a consensus regarding the textual
meaning of "cases and controversies."
64. See Barnett, supra note 29, at 1741; Manning, supra note 28, at 1674-80.
65. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 34, at 1440-41.
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since the 1980s, which involves not only the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment,66 but also the general understanding of sov-
ereignty and the construction of delegated power at the time of the
founding.67
In fact, the very methodology of historical constitutional scholar-
ship has changed in the last few decades. The Supreme Court's use
of history in its reading of the Eleventh Amendment has placed a
premium on historical investigation of the text. As an interpretive
method, however, originalism has evolved in significant ways since
the initial wave of historical scholarship during the 1980s. At that
time, originalism generally involved the search for the original
intentions of the Framers.68 Relevant evidence according to this view
included whatever information revealed the motivations of those
actors primarily involved in the drafting of the text. This included
the (originally) secret discussions at the Philadelphia Convention,
private letters and correspondence, and the various political and
economic factors that likely influenced the various positions of
the Framers. The search for "original intent" came under heavy
scholarly fire, however, as critics challenged the ability of modern
historians to identify the private intentions of the Framers, as well
as the very concept of identifying a single aggregated "intent" of any
group at the time of the founding. Most of all, there appeared to be
no normative justification for privileging the private intentions of
the Framers, regardless of how the text was understood by the
public at large.
Conceding the legitimacy of such criticism, the most influential
practitioners of originalism today focus their efforts on discovering
the likely original public understanding of the text.69 This grounds
66. See generally 5 DHSC, supra note 3.
67. See Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 895 (2008); Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment,
Popular Sovereignty, and "Expressly" Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889
(2008) [hereinafter Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission]; Kurt T. Lash, The Lost
Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEx. L. REV. 597 (2005); Kurt T. Lash, The Lost
Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331 (2004) [hereinafter Lash, The
Lost Original Meaning].
68. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 143-60 (1990).
69. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); RANDY E.
BARNErr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 109-13 (2004);
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL
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the originalist endeavor on the normative theory of popular
sovereignty-the right of the people to debate and determine for
themselves the content of their fundamental law. Even if a precise
original meaning cannot be identified, the effort allows various
alternative readings to be identified as more or less likely in light of
the available evidence. In terms of Eleventh Amendment scholar-
ship, this means the essential effort is to recover the likely public
understanding of those who exercised the sovereign authority to
accept or reject the proposed amendment: the ratifiers in the state
assemblies. It is this focus on the ratifiers that is generally missing
from earlier accounts and that I hope to recover in this Article.
Finally, almost all historical accounts of the Eleventh
Amendment focus narrowly on debates involving state sovereign
immunity and Article III. I argue that the relevant debate involved
not only the construction of federal judicial power, but also the
construction of federal power in general. Understanding how this is
so requires placing the particular history of the Eleventh Amend-
ment in the broader context of the early debates over the proper
interpretation of federal power-indeed, the Amendment itself was
initially delayed due to a belief that the Amendment ought to
address the construction of federal power in general." Establishing
how the Eleventh Amendment fit within this wider context requires
a broad canvas, and a longer Article than I might otherwise prefer
to write. In the end, however, I hope to establish how the Eleventh
Amendment fit within the original understanding of its siblings, the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, as well as within the Madisonian
concept of a federal government in which both national and local
governments were to be sovereign within their respective spheres.
B. The Roots of the Eleventh Amendment
The initial debates regarding state suability occurred during the
debates over ratification of the Constitution and continued unabated
throughout the first years of the Constitution. As such, discussions
of state suability were unavoidably caught up in the general debates
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); see also Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original
Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 292-94 (2007).
70. See infra note 420 and accompanying text.
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regarding delegated federal power and the retained sovereignty of
the people in the states. It is essential therefore to locate our search
for the original understanding of the Eleventh Amendment within
the overall context of a country in the midst of establishing a new
and untested national government, one that would exist alongside
state governments that had previously enjoyed the same sovereign
powers as independent nations.
1. The Original Debates Regarding Delegated Federal Power
71
According to the Declaration of Independence, when the colonies
officially severed their ties with Great Britain, they became a
collection of "free and independent states" with all the rights of an
individual sovereign nation.72 Sovereignty in the United States,
however, had a particular meaning. In England, the locus of
sovereignty over the centuries had moved from the royal head of
state to the English people themselves-they alone were the fount
of all legitimate governmental power v.7  As the people's official
representative, Parliament was viewed as an accurate representa-
tion of "the People" and therefore could exercise all the authority of
the official sovereign, including the establishment or alteration of
fundamental law.74 In the United States, however, the struggles
with the British Parliament had resulted in a different view of
popular sovereignty, one in which the people existed wholly apart
from their representatives in government.75 Only the people could
71. Portions of this historical overview draw heavily from my related work on the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments. See generally Kurt Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth
Amendment, 93 IOWA L. REV. 801 (2008); Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission, supra
note 67; Lash, The Lost Original Meaning, supra note 67.
72. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776) ("That these United
Colonies are, and of right ought to be, Free and Independent States ....") (emphasis added);
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II ("Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence ...."); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787,
at 319 (1969); see also Nelson, supra note 62, at 1577 (noting that although the states had
conceded a degree of foreign relations power to the national Congress, they remained
"sovereign and independent States").
73. WOOD, supra note 72, at 344.
74. Amar, supra note 34, at 1431.
75. WOOD, supra note 72, at 383; see also EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE:
THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTYIN ENGLAND ANDAMERICA 281 (1988); SEAN WILENTZ, THE
RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 32 (2005).
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establish fundamental law, for example by meeting in a specially
called constitutional convention. In such conventions, the people
exercised their sovereign authority to debate and adopt written
constitutions that both delegated and limited the authority of their
government representatives.76
The unique American theory of a sovereign people distinct from
their government evolved during the period between the Revolution
and the adoption of the federal Constitution,v and continued to
evolve in critical ways after that.78 Nevertheless, by 1787 sovereign
power was broadly accepted as residing in the collective people of
the several states.79 State constitutions during this early national
period reflected evolving notions of the separation of powers as well
as a broad belief in the retained rights of the people, natural and
otherwise.' The need to form a league with other states, however,
called into play a new kind of retained right. Under Article II of the
Articles of Confederation, each state "retain[ed] its sovereignty,
freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and
right, which [was] not by [the] Confederation expressly delegated to
the United States in Congress assembled.""1 Although the Articles
used the language of states' rights, the term was commonly under-
stood as referring to the retained rights and powers of the people in
their respective states.82
The proper construction of delegated power predictably became
a major issue when the members of the Philadelphia Convention
submitted a draft constitution which created a new and vastly more
powerful federal government.83 Staunch Antifederalists opposed the
76. See generally WOOD, supra note 72, at 306-43.
77. Id. at 344-89.
78. See generally CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2008).
79. Amar, supra note 34, at 1446.
80. See WOOD, supra note 72, at 446-53.
81. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II.
82. See WOOD, supra note 72, at 354-63 (discussing the preconstitutional era embrace of
popular sovereignty); see also James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800),
in 4 DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 546-47 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891) [hereinafter ELUO'S DEBATES] (explaining
that the term "states" in the Tenth Amendment and in the Virginia Resolutions "means the
people composing those political societies, in their highest sovereign capacity").
83. See Lash, The Lost Original Meaning, supra note 67, at 351-52.
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idea on principle.' But even moderates who might otherwise have
supported the creation of a centralized government for certain
purposes balked at provisions which seemed to open the door to
unlimited federal interference with local matters believed best left
to state control.85 Making matters worse, unlike the Articles of
Confederation, the proposed Constitution lacked any reference to
the retained rights and powers of the people in the states.8" Instead,
open-ended provisions like the Necessary and Proper Clause raised
the specter of a national government so vast that the people in the
states (including their legislatures and courts) would be "consoli-
dated" and cease to exist as independent sovereign entities.87
To this, the Federalists responded that Congress would be limited
to just those powers "expressly" enumerated in the document, with
all nondelegated powers and rights reserved to the separate and
independent sovereign states.88 In doing so, the Federalists echoed
the general principle of the law of nations whereby delegated
sovereign powers must be narrowly construed to include only those
ancillary powers necessarily or clearly incident to the express
enumeration. Charles Pinckney, in a speech defending the proposed
Constitution before the South Carolina House of Representatives in
January 1788, claimed:
The distinction which has been taken between the nature of a
federal and state government appeared to be conclusive-that in
the former, no powers could be executed, or assumed, but such
as were expressly delegated; that in the latter, the indefinite
84. See id. at 351-53.
85. See id. at 351-55.
86. See id. at 353-56.
87. Representing a common theme among Antifederalist writers, "Brutus" warned:
How far the clause in the 8th section of the 1st article may operate to do away
all idea of confederated states, and to affect an entire consolidation of the whole
into one general government, it is impossible to say.... A power to make all laws,
which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution, all powers
vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, or any
department or officer thereof, is a power very comprehensive and definite, and
may, for ought I know, be exercised in such a manner as entirely to abolish the
state legislatures.
Brutus No. 1 (Oct. 18, 1787), in 2 HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 367
(1981).
88. See WOOD, supra note 72, at 524-32 (discussing Federalist assurances that the
Constitution would not result in a consolidation of the states).
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power was given to the government, except on points that were
by express compact reserved to the people. 9
Newspaper editorials defending the proposed Constitution echoed
this same idea of expressly delegated power. In Massachusetts,
Federalist editorials declared that under the proposed Constitution,
"each State still retains its sovereignty in what concerns its own
internal government, and a right to exercise every power of a
sovereign State, not expressly delegated to the government of the
United States ...."90
In New Jersey, similar editorials insisted that "in America
(thanks to the interposing providence of God!) the people hold all
power, not by them expressly delegated to individuals, for the good
of the whole."91 Virginia's Alexander White published To the Citizens
of Virginia, in which he declared that "should Congress attempt to
exercise any powers which are not expressly delegated to them,
their acts would be considered as void, and disregarded."92
It is important to emphasize that these declarations of ex-
pressly delegated powers came from advocates of the proposed
Constitution,98 not the ultimately unsuccessful Antifederalists, as
commonly assumed.94 A narrow interpretation of delegated author-
ity, in other words, emerged as a promise by those most interested
89. Charles Pinckney, Speech Before the South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan.
16, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 82, at 259-60. Pinckney's speech was reprinted
in its entirety in South Carolina and Pennsylvania newspapers. See House of Representatives
January 17, 1784, CITY GAZETE & DAILY ADVERTISER (Charleston), Jan. 25, 1788, at 2;
Speech of Mr. C. Pinckney, PA. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER (Phila.), Feb. 21, 1788, at 2.
90. Observations on the Federal Constitution, and the Alterations that Have Been Proposed
as Amendments, MASS. MERCURY (Salem), June 30, 1789, at 1; see also Editorial, Federal
Constitution, MASS. MERCURY (Salem), Jan. 15, 1788, at 1 ("The constitution defines the
powers of Congress; & every power, not expressly delegated to that body, remains in the
several state legislatures.").
91. Delaware State Convention, N.J. J. (Elizabethtown), Dec. 19, 1787, at 2.
92. Alexander White, To the Citizens of Virginia, WINCHESTERVA. GAZE'rrE, Feb. 29,1788,
reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION:
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES 438 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 1988) [hereinafter DHRC].
93. For additional discussion of the Federalists' use of "expressly delegated powers" in
support of the proposed Constitution, see WOOD, supra note 72, at 539-43. As Wood
illustrates, the concept of expressly delegated power was inextricably linked to the emerging
concept of popular sovereignty. See id. at 542-43.
94. See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE
DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828, at 221-23 (1999).
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in ratifying the Constitution. In the state ratifying conventions, for
example, Federalists repeatedly insisted that the federal govern-
ment would have only expressly delegated powers."s
In the North Carolina Convention, Federalist Archibald Maclaine
insisted that "[t]he powers of Congress are limited and enumer-
ated.... It is as plain a thing as possibly can be, that Congress can
have no power but what we expressly give them."" The President of
the Convention, Governor Samuel Johnston, agreed: "Congress
cannot assume any other powers than those expressly given them,
without a palpable violation of the Constitution."97 Former member
of the Philadelphia Convention and future Supreme Court Justice
James Iredell linked the principle of expressly delegated power to
the people's retained sovereignty:
Of what use, therefore, can a bill of rights be in this Constitu-
tion, where the people expressly declare how much power they
do give, and consequently retain all they do not? It is a declara-
tion of particular powers by the people to their representatives,
for particular purposes. It may be considered as a great power
of attorney, under which no power can be exercised, but what is
expressly given. Did any man ever hear, before, that at the end
of a power of attorney it was said the attorney should not
exercise more power than was there given him?98
In Federalist 39, Madison's 'Publius" insisted that "[the federal
government's] jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects
only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty over all other objects."99 In a speech delivered to the
House of Representatives while the Bill of Rights remained pending
in the states, James Madison reminded the assembly that the
proponents of the Constitution had assured the states that "the
general government could not exceed the expressly delegated
95. See, e.g., supra note 83 and accompanying text.
96. Archibald Maclaine, Remarks Before the Convention of the State of North Carolina
(July 28, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 82, at 140-41.
97. Id. at 142.
98. Id. at 148-49. In spite of the Federalists' best efforts, a majority of the Convention
remained unconvinced and voted against the proposed Constitution 184 to 84. See id. at 250.
North Carolina ultimately ratified only after Congress drafted and circulated for ratification
a proposed bill of rights. See Chronology, 1786-1790, in 13 DHRC, supra note 92, at xl-xlii.
99. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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powers."' ° Writing shortly after the adoption of the Bill of Rights,
Madison again declared that "[wihen the people have formed a
Constitution, they retain those rights which they have not expressly
delegated."'' 1
No less a nationalist than Alexander Hamilton embraced the
same principle of expressly delegated power. Writing in the
Federalist Papers, Hamilton declared, "[A]s the plan of the conven-
tion aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State
governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which
they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively
delegated to the United States."'0 2 Hamilton assured the New York
Ratifying Convention that "whatever is not expressly given to the
federal head, is reserved to the members. The truth of this principle
must strike every intelligent mind."'0 3 According to Hamilton, the
sovereign people of the states "have already delegated their
sovereignty, and their powers to their several governments; and
these cannot be recalled, and given to another, without an express
act.",0 4
This repeated insistence of "expressly" delegated power runs
contrary to modern accounts of federal authority. In McCulloch v.
Maryland,°5 Chief Justice Marshall famously rejected Maryland's
claims that Congress had only expressly enumerated power,
pointing out that the Framers of the Tenth Amendment had rejected
an attempt to add the term "expressly" to the Clause.0 6 According
to Marshall, this implied that the Framers intended Congress to
have broad discretion in choosing those means it thought necessary
and proper to advancing enumerated ends.'0 7 The actual historical
record, however, suggests a very different approach to delegated
federal power. Although Congress might have both express and
implied powers, the attendees of the state conventions were assured
100. Debates Continued, FED. GAZETrE & PHILA. DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 12, 1791, at 2
(emphasis added).
101. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794).
102. THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 99, at 198.
103. 22 DHRC, supra note 92, at 1982 (reporting the remarks of Alexander Hamilton to the
Ratifying Convention of New York on June 28, 1788).
104. Id. at 1983 (emphasis added).
105. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
106. Id. at 406-07.
107. Id. at 420.
2009] 1597
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
that all delegated power would be strictly construed in order to
preserve the retained sovereignty of the people in the states. 08
"Expressly delegated power" in other words, was understood not as
a denial of all nonenumerated powers, but as a rule of strict
construction for those powers which were enumerated.
For example, in the Virginia Convention Edmund Randolph
conceded that Congress would have incidental powers, but insisted
that these powers would be limited to those means that were
"necessary for the principle thing."'9 According to Roger Sherman,
a member of the Philadelphia Convention from Connecticut, "The
powers vested in the federal government are clearly defined, so that
each state will retain its sovereignty in what concerns its own
internal government, and a right to exercise every power of a
sovereign state not particularly delegated to the government of the
United States.""'  The New York Convention went so far as to
include the following declaration along with their notice of ratifica-
tion:
[E]very power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said
Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United
States, or the departments of the government thereof, remains
to the people of the several states, or to their respective state
governments, to whom they may have granted the same."'
The Rhode Island Convention also included the same declaration
along with its notice of ratification." 2
In short, we have numerous examples of Federalists insisting that
Congress would have no more than expressly delegated power,
meaning that whatever incidental powers were included in the
express delegation, they would involve only those means "clearly
108. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
109. Edmund Randolph, Debate in the Virginia Convention (June 17, 1788), in 10 DHRC,
supra note 92, at 1338, 1347.
110. Roger Sherman, A Citizen of New Haven, II, NEW HAVEN GAZEI"E, Dec. 25, 1788,
reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: PUBLISHED DURING ITS
DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 238 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1970) (1892)
(emphasis added). According to Herbert Storing, this was a "rather typical description of the
Constitution." Herbert Storing, The "Other" Federalist Papers: A Preliminary Sketch, 6 POL.
ScI. REVIEWER 215, 222 (1976).
111. See 1 ELLIO'S DEBATES, supra note 82, at 327 (emphasis added).
112. See id. at 334.
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implied" or "necessarily incident" to the enumerated power. This
rule of strict construction of delegated power flowed from the
fundamental principle of popular sovereignty: all powers delegated
from a sovereign authority must be strictly or narrowly construed.
Such were the assurances of the advocates of the Constitution, and
they were made throughout the states in every available medium,
including newspapers, pamphlets, public speeches, and legislative
debate. All of this occurred, moreover, prior to the adoption of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The restrictions in the Bill of Rights
were to be added ex abundanti cautela.
2. Strict Construction and Article III
Just as narrow or strict construction of federal power played a
critical role in the Federalist defense of the Constitution in general,
it also became a critical component of the Federalist defense of
Article III. As written, the Article appeared to authorize suits in
federal court brought against states by out-of-state residents.
Section 2, for example, authorized federal courts to hear suits
"between a State and citizens of another State." '113 A suit brought by
an out-of-state resident against a state for recovery of debt clearly
falls within the literal terms of the text. A commonly accepted
principle, however, was that a sovereign was presumptively immune
from civil process."1 Article III thus appeared to suggest that states
were no longer sovereign under the proposed Constitution, and
would be treated no differently than ordinary corporations .whose
very existence was at the sufferance of a superior authority.
In the Virginia Ratifying Convention, George Mason warned that
Article III would allow every individual claim to be "tried before
the Federal Court" and questioned whether the "sovereignty of the
State [was] to be arraigned like a culprit, or private offender?" '15
In response, James Madison conceded "that this part [of the
Constitution] does not stand in that form, which would be freest
113. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
114. See Amar, supra note 34, at 1469.
115. 10 DHRC, supra note 92, at 1406 (remarks of George Mason in the Virginia
Convention, June 19, 1788).
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from objection. It might be better expressed."" 6 Nevertheless,
Madison insisted that
it is not in the power of individuals to call any State into Court.
The only operation it can have, is, that if a State should wish to
bring suit against a citizen, it must be brought before the
Federal Court .... It appears to me, that this can have no
operation but this-to give a citizen a right to be heard in the
Federal Court; and if a State should condescend to be a party,
this Court may take cognizance of it."7
This is a straightforward example of what later became known as
the principle of strict construction. As applied in the context of
federal-state relations, this principle indicated that interpreters
should, when possible, narrow their interpretation of a term other-
wise capable of broad interpretation in order to preserve the
presumed sovereign status of the states. In the case of Article III,
the text conceivably allows federal courts to hear all suits between
states and individuals, including suits brought by individuals
against the states. The text is nevertheless construed to encompass
only those cases in which a state is a plaintiff or has consented to be
sued by an individual.
Antifederalist Patrick Henry, in his effort to derail ratification,
derided Madison's narrow construction of Article III as "perfectly
incomprehensible" and in conflict with the "clear expressions" of
the text."' In response to Henry's efforts to use a broad construction
of Article III as a reason to reject the Constitution, future Supreme
Court Chief Justice John Marshall stood in support of Madison's
116. Id. at 1409 (remarks of James Madison in the Virginia Convention, June 19, 1788).
117. Id. at 1414 (remarks of James Madison in the Virginia Convention, June 20, 1788).
Eleventh Amendment scholars occasionally dismiss or minimize Madison's comments in the
Convention regardingArticle III. Calvin Johnson, for example, claims Madison"misdescribed"
Article III. See CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING
OF THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 269 (2005). John Gibbons, on the other hand, believes that
Madison's argument was "ambiguous" in regard to state sovereign immunity. See Gibbons,
supra note 29, at 1906. As we shall see, the ratifiers found nothing ambiguous about
Federalist promises made regarding Article III and, according to the principles of originalism,
it is their understanding that comprises the legally binding original understanding of the
Constitution-whether "misdescribed" by Madison or not.
118. 10 DHRC, supra note 92, at 1422-23 (remarks of Patrick Henry in the Virginia
Convention, June 20, 1788).
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limited reading of Article III. He claimed that a narrow construction
of Article III would be appropriate given the special situation of the
states:
With respect to disputes between a State, and the citizens of
another State, its jurisdiction has been decried with unusual
vehemence. I hope that no Gentleman will think that a State
will be called at the bar of the Federal Court .... It is not rational
to suppose, that the sovereign power should be dragged before
a Court. The intent is, to enable States to recover claims of
individuals residing in other States. I contend this construction
is warranted by the words. But, say they, there will be partiality
in it if a State cannot be defendant-if an individual cannot
proceed to obtain judgment against a State, though he may be
sued by a State. It is necessary to be so, and cannot be
avoided." 9
At the same time Madison and Marshall were defending Article III
in Virginia, Alexander Hamilton was raising the same defense to
Article III in New York. The day after Marshall delivered the above
remarks in the Virginia Convention, Alexander Hamilton published
the first installment of Federalist No. 81. Apologizing that the
subject "may rather be a digression from the immediate subject of
this paper," Hamilton's "Publius" thought it appropriate to "take
occasion to mention here a supposition which has excited some
alarm upon very mistaken grounds."' 0 Hamilton continued:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to
the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general
sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption,
as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the
government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there
is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it
will remain with the States and the danger intimated must be
merely ideal .... The contracts between a nation and individuals
119. Id. at 1433 (Remarks of John Marshall in the Virginia Convention, June 20, 1788).
Edmund Randolph, who ultimately would represent individuals in suits against the states,
believed that Article III authorized such suits, but argued that reciprocal suits between states
and individuals were a matter of justice. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 3.
120. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 99, at 487.
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are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no
pretensions to a compulsive force.121
Hamilton based his argument on a rule of construction derived
from the nature of retained sovereignty. Sovereigns are presumed
to be immune from suit by individuals unless they consent; absent
an express delegation in the body of the Constitution, the people of
the several states are presumed to retain this aspect of sovereign
power.'22 In other words, even though Article III could be construed
to authorize such suits in federal courts, it nevertheless ought
not to receive such a construction absent express language to
the contrary.'23 As Hamilton explained to the New York Ratifying
Convention:
Whatever is not expressly given to the federal head is reserved
to the members. The truth of this principle must strike every
intelligent mind .... [The people] have already delegated their
sovereignty and their powers to their several governments; and
these cannot be recalled and given to another, without an
express act. 1
24
Along with its notice of ratification, the New York Convention
appended a declaration which explained that it did so "[u]nder
the impression[]" that "the judicial power of the United States, in
cases in which a State may be a party, does not extend to criminal
121. Id. at 487-88. As they have with Madison's above remarks, antisovereign immunity
scholars struggle with Hamilton's statement in Federalist 81. See, e.g., Gibbons, supra note
29, at 1912 ("Reading [Hamilton] to acknowledge the existence of a general principle of state
sovereign immunity extending even to claims arising under federal law-as the profound
shock school does-wrenches this isolated statement from its context."). As explained below,
the contemporary readers of Federalist 81 had no problem understanding its promise of a
narrow construction of Article III in order to preserve the retained sovereign rights of the
states.
122. Alexander Hamilton, Speech on the Senate of the United States (June 24, 1788), in
2 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 78 (Fed. ed., 1904) [hereinafter HAMILTON WORKS].
123. Id.
124. Debates in the Convention of the State of New York (June 28, 1788), in HAMILTON
WORKS, supra note 122, at 77-78 (remarks of Alexander Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIST
No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 99, at 198 ("[The plan of the convention aims only
at a partial union or consolidation, [therefore] the State governments would clearly retain all
the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively
delegated to the United States.").
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prosecutions, or to authorise any suit by any person against a
State.' 25
In Massachusetts, in response to Antifederalist concerns that
individuals might haul nonconsenting states into federal court,
Federalist Rufus King apparently delivered a two-hour speech
explaining why Article III "could not possibly bear [this] con-
struction.'' 126 "On the strength of this gentleman's opinion, [Article
III] was assented to but by a small majority."'27 According to
"Brutus," "[W]hen deliberating on that very clause of the Federal
Constitution, respecting the judiciary power, ... apprehensions were
said to be groundless by the advocates of the Constitution, and the
jealousies of the Members on that subject, were laughed at, and
treated as ridiculous by KING and others.' 28
All of these claims about Article III rely on a narrow construction
of the text. Article III could be read broadly (or simply literally).
Nevertheless, the text should not, and would not, be read so broadly
at the expense of the retained sovereign authority of the states. The
record is not unanimous in this regard; Edmund Randolph ex-
pressed his belief that Article III ought to be read to allow suits by
individuals against the states.129 Such views, however, are a decided
minority. 3 ° Denials of such power were far more common, and
most common of all was the declaration that strict construction
would apply to Article III just as it would apply to the rest of the
Constitution.
125. See Declaration of Rights and Form of Ratification, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., July
29, 1788, reprinted in 18 DHRC, supra note 92, at 297, 300.
126. Democrat, MASS. MERCURY (Boston), July 23, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note
3, at 393, 395 n.3.
127. Marcus, MASS. MERCURY (Salem), July 13, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3,
at 389-90.
128. Brutus, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), July 18, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at
392; see also Account of William Martin's Speech in the Massachusetts House of
Representatives, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 23, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3,
at 434 ("[Iff the article did convey the meaning as determined by part of the Judiciary [in
Chisholm], it was not the intention of the [Massachusetts Ratifying] Convention, nor was it
understood to be so construed ...." (footnote omitted)).
129. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 82, at 207 (remarks of Edmund Randolph)
("I admire that part [of the Constitution] which forces Virginia to pay her debts.").
130. Despite Randolph's position, Virginia majorities supported an amendment reversing
the decision in Chisholm. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY 58 (1972).
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3. Retained "Powers, Jurisdiction and Rights" Popular
Sovereignty and the Declarations and Proposals of the State
Ratifying Conventions
However plausible Federalist claims of expressly delegated power
might be, text in the Constitution suggested a very different
construction of federal power. If, for example, delegated federal
power would be limited to only expressly enumerated subjects (thus
rendering a bill of rights both unnecessary and "dangerous"), why
then did the Framers find themselves compelled to add a list of
rights in Article I, section 9? This list of enumerated rights seemed
to imply that the Framers themselves feared unduly broad construc-
tions of federal power. In the end, relying purely on the unexpressed
principle of expressly delegated power was not enough to satisfy
those in the state conventions who remained on the fence regarding
the proposed Constitution. Instead, most delegates agreed with the
Virginian Antifederalist George Mason who insisted, "[W]e must
have such amendments as will secure the liberties and happiness
of the people on a plain, simple construction, not on a doubtful
ground."'' James Madison and the Federalists ultimately conceded
the point; limitations on the construction of federal power needed to
be made an express part of the national Constitution. Relying on
Federalist promises that a bill of rights would be among the items
on the agenda of the new Congress, most states decided to ratify
the Constitution, but did so declaring their understanding of the
document and submitting a list of suggested amendments.'32 These
declarations and proposed amendments addressed the construction
of federal power in general as well as the specific powers delegated
under Article III.
133
131. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 82, at 271; see also Letters of Centinel (II), in 2
STORING, supra note 87, at 147 ("Mr. Wilson tells you, that every right and power not
specifically granted to Congress is considered as withheld. How does this appear? Is this
principle established by the proper authority? Has the Convention made such a stipulation?
By no means.") (footnote omitted).
132. Eight states submitted proposed amendments, all of which included provisions
declaring the retained sovereignty of the people and limiting the construction of delegated
federal power. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS 674-75 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
133. See id.
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Because the discussion of the Eleventh Amendment tends to
revolve around the language of "state sovereign immunity," it
carries the modern rhetorical baggage of nineteenth and twentieth
century battles over civil rights. It is far more common today to see
states' rights equated with violations of individual rights than with
the protection of rights. This modern conceptual divide between the
rights of the states and the rights of the people was not shared by
the generation that drafted and adopted the Constitution and the
first eleven Amendments. It is important to understand this before
moving forward, because it will help explain how the founding
generation linked the underlying principles of the Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Amendments.
The interlocking concepts of popular sovereignty and the retained
rights and powers of the states is seen most easily in the declara-
tions and proposed amendments that accompanied the state notices
of ratification. These are worth quoting if only because the concepts
today are generally treated as being at odds with one another. The
founding generation, however, saw them as inextricably linked. In
Massachusetts, for example, the convention recommended "[t]hat it
be explicitly declared that all powers not expressly delegated [to
Congress] ... are reserved to the several states, to be by them
exercised."'34 According to Samuel Adams, such a provision by itself
was "a summary of a bill of rights."'35
A number of states' proposed amendments illustrated the
assumed connection between the people's retained rights and
the states' reserved powers. The New York Ratifying Convention
declared that it had ratified the Constitution on the following
understanding:
That all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived
from, the people ....
[Ti hat every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the
said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United
States, or the departments of the government thereof, remains
134. THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT 353 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989) [hereinafter THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE]. New Hampshire proposed essentially the same amendment. See id. at 355.
135. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 82, at 131.
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to the people of the several states, or to their respective state
governments, to whom they may have granted the same ....36
Similarly, North Carolina's Convention declared that "all power is
naturally vested in, and consequently derived from, the people," and
also proposed an amendment which ensured "[t]hat each state in the
Union shall respectively retain every power, jurisdiction, and right,
which is not by this Constitution delegated to the Congress of the
United States.' 37 The Virginia Convention likewise declared "[t]hat
all power is naturally invested in, and consequently derived from,
the people," and proposed an amendment which ensured that "each
state in the Union shall respectively retain every power, jurisdic-
tion, and right, which is not by [the] Constitution delegated to the
Congress of the United States, or to the departments of the federal
government."'38 Rhode Island declared that "every other power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the ... Constitution clearly
delegated to the Congress of the United States, or to the depart-
ments or government thereof, remain to the people of the several
states, or their respective state governments, to whom they may
have granted the same.' 39
All of these declarations and proposed amendments reflect the
common assumption that reserving all nondelegated powers and
rights to the states was itself a path to individual liberty. As Samuel
Adams, an eventual supporter of the Constitution, wrote to Richard
Henry Lee:
I mean my friend, to let you know how deeply I am impressed
with a sense of the Importance of Amendments; that the good
People may clearly see the distinction, for there is a distinction,
between the federal Powers vested in Congress, and the sover-
eign Authority belonging to the several States, which is the
Palladium of the private, and personal rights of the Citizens.14°
136. THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 134, at 356.
137. Id. at 364, 367 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 380, 383.
139. Id. at 374.
140. Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Aug. 24, 1789), in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 286 (Helen
E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
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Preserving local liberty required limiting the powers of the federal
government. This was thought to be accomplished through the
above declarations and promised amendments, which limited the
federal government to those powers "clearly" or "expressly" dele-
gated under the Constitution. Conventions such as South Carolina's
were even more explicit and declared "that no section or paragraph
of the said Constitution warrants a construction that the states do
not retain every power not expressly relinquished by them, and
vested in the general government of the Union."141 As the Maryland
Convention explained, by declaring that "Congress shall exercise no
power but what is expressly delegated by this Constitution, ... the
exercise of constructive powers [would be] wholly prevented. 142
There was as much concern regarding the powers and jurisdiction
of the judiciary under Article III as with the other delegated powers
of the federal government.143 In addition to the examples cited
above, New York declared its understanding that "the judicial power
of the United States, in cases in which a state may be a party, does
not extend to criminal prosecutions, or to authorize any suit by any
person against a state.'1 44 And, just to add an exclamation point,
New York declared that "the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
the United States ... is not in any case to be increased, enlarged, or
extended, by any faction, collusion, or mere suggestion.'' 4' Rhode
Island made the same declarations. 46 North Carolina suggested
altering the language of Article III by omitting the reference to suits
between a state and out of state citizens.'47 Pennsylvania's proposed
amendment, although rather verbose, contained the same dual sen-
timents of popular sovereignty and retained state rights-including
jurisdictional rights:
141. THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 134, at 379 (emphasis added).
142. 1 ELLIO'rS DEBATES, supra note 82, at 550 (emphasis added).
143. "Jurisdiction," of course, was a term that could apply to the general notion of national
versus local areas of responsibility. As the examples in the text show, however, the concept
also included concerns about the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
144. THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 134, at 359.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 377. Although Rhode Island placed its statement about the judiciary in its list
of proposed amendments, it prefaced its statement with the words, "It is declared by the
Convention, that the judicial powers of the United States, in cases in which a state may be
a party, does not extend ...." Id.
147. Id. at 368.
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That Congress shall not exercise any powers whatever, but such
as are expressly given to that body by the Constitution of the
United States; nor shall any authority, power, or jurisdiction, be
assumed or exercised by the executive or judiciary departments
of the Union, under color or pretence of construction or fiction;
but all the rights of sovereignty, which are not by the said
Constitution expressly and plainly vested in the Congress, shall
be deemed to remain with, and shall be exercised by, the several
states in the Union, according to their respective constitutions;
and that every reserve of the rights of individuals, made by the
several constitutions of the states in the Union, to the citizens
and inhabitants of each state respectively, shall remain invio-
late, except so far as they are expressly and manifestly yielded
or narrowed by the national Constitution.14
Again, all of the above declarations and proposed amendments
reflect a widespread concern about unduly broad construction of
federal authority. Some, such as New York and Rhode Island,
declared their express understanding that Article III would be
narrowly construed. Other conventions suggested particular
amendments, such as those that sought to remove any language in
Article III that might be read to allow individual suits against the
states in federal court. Most state conventions also embraced a
broad approach in which all delegated federal power would be lim-
ited to just those subjects expressly enumerated in the Constitution.
This included, of course, the powers delegated under Article III.
Finally, the declarations and proposed amendments generally
declared the ultimate sovereignty of the people in the states and
their sovereign right to all nondelegated powers.
One could dismiss the appended declarations and proposals by
the state conventions as self-serving attempts to "control" the later
interpretation of the Constitution. A number of scholars, in fact,
have written off limited-government proponents in the state conven-
tions as constitutional "losers" whose views need not be taken into
account in determining the original meaning of the Constitution.
149
It is important to remember, however, that these statements re-
148. Id. at 371-72.
149. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Turning Losers into Winners: What Can We Learn, If
Anything, from the Antifederalists?, 79 TEX. L. REv. 849, 854 (2001) (reviewing CORNELL,
supra note 94).
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flected assertions and promises the advocates of the Constitution
made in their effort to convince the ratifying conventions to support
the Constitution. It was Hamilton, after all, who wrote in the
Federalist Papers that "the State governments would clearly retain
all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were
not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States."'5 ° It was
the pseudonymous constitutional advocate "Centinel" who likewise
assured the states that under the proposed Constitution "we retain
all our rights, which we have not expressly relinquished to the
union."'' Ratifier reliance on such statements is an important
consideration in determining the original understanding of powers,
jurisdiction, and rights delegated under the original Constitution.
In fact, good reason exists to believe the state conventions
reasonably relied on these statements regarding a limited construc-
tion of federal power, and that their expectations became a part of
the Constitution itself. As James Madison later explained, the first
ten Amendments-in particular the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments--codified the promises that the Federalists had made in the
state conventions that the federal government had only expressly,
meaning narrowly construed, delegated powers.
4. The Bill of Rights and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
Recent discoveries have significantly expanded the body of
available historical evidence relating to the enactment of the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments.'52 In brief, this evidence suggests that,
contrary to modern assumptions, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
were understood as working together to limit federal interference
with the retained right to local self-government.'53 The Amendments
were, in other words, federalist, in that they were understood to
preserve the distinction between national and local governments.
Having seen how the amendments proposed by the states simulta-
150. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 99, at 198.
151. The Centinel, Letter to the Editor, Some Objections to the New Constitution
Considered, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland), Dec. 13, 1787, at 1.
152. See generally Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, supra note
67; Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, supra note 71; Lash, The
Original Meaning of an Omission, supra note 67.
153. See sources cited supra note 67.
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neously sought to preserve the retained rights of the people and the
states, this may come as no surprise. Given that this represents a
significant revision of the common understanding of the Ninth
Amendment, however, many readers may want to consider this new
body of evidence for themselves.' For the purposes of this Article,
I will concentrate on the statements of the man who initially drafted
the Bill of Rights, James Madison. The additional evidence referred
to simply supports Madison's own explanation of the origins and
purposes of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Madison initially opposed the addition of amendments listing
limitations on government power.'55 Like most Federalists, he
believed that the principle of enumerated power would sufficiently
constrain the operations of the federal government.156 He also
agreed with those who warned that adding a list of rights might be
read to carry the negative connotation that any right not specifically
enumerated had been "assigned" into the hands of the federal
government. 15 7 Ultimately convinced that amendments were both
necessary (to avoid a second convention) and proper (federal power
might be broadly interpreted in a manner affecting retained rights),
Madison presented to the First Congress a list of proposed amend-
ments to the Constitution.' The list reflected Madison's choice of
those amendments most commonly suggested by the state conven-
tions and that Madison believed best comported with the original
vision of the Constitution.
59
An obvious choice was the proposal that ultimately became our
Tenth Amendment: "the powers not delegated by this constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively."6 ° Confident that the Constitution itself already reflected
the principle of enumerated federal power, Madison was not sure
154. In addition to the sources cited in note 152, see Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the
Ninth Amendment, supra note 67; Lash, The Lost Original Meaning, supra note 67.
155. See Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, supra note 67, at 901.
156. Id. at 920.
157. Id. at 910-11.
158. Id. at 920.
159. See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 21, 1789), in 5 THE
WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON, 1787-1790, at 417-18 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904) (explaining that
Madison collected the state proposals and "exclude[ed] every proposition of a doubtful &
unimportant nature').
160. SeeJames Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June
8, 1789), in WRITINGS, supra note 43, at 437, 444.
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this Amendment was completely necessary."'6 Nevertheless, almost
every state convention had asked that the principle be expressly
added to the Constitution and Madison saw no harm in doing so. 162
The Ninth Amendment was more critical. Madison found most
plausible the problem of implied enlargement of federal power due
to the addition of a bill of rights. 6 ' The worry was that all rights not
specifically listed in the text would be presumed to be within the
scope of congressional power.'" This would effectively transform the
national government into one of general (as opposed to enumerated)
power and betray the Federalist promises of narrowly construed
enumerated power. Madison addressed this concern in his draft of
what ultimately became our Ninth Amendment:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to
diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the
people; or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution;
but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted
merely for greater caution. 165
Although the "enlarged powers" language was removed by the time
the Amendment was sent to the states,'66 Madison insisted that
the final draft limited the construction of federal power every bit
as much as the first. Securing retained rights, Madison insisted,
amounted to the "same thing" as preventing "extended" federal
power. 167
161. See Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, supra note 67, at 920.
162. Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments, supra 160, at
445.
163. See Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, supra note 67, at 920-
21.
164. Id.
165. Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments, supra 160, at
443.
166. The final draft of the Ninth Amendment reads: 'The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
167. Letter from James Madison, Jr. to Pres. George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), in 5
DOCUMENTARY HIsToRYOF THE CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1786-1870,
at 221-22 (1998) ("If a line can be drawn between the powers granted and the rights retained,
it would seem to be the same thing, whether the latter be secured by declaring that they shall
not be abridged, or that the former shall not be extended.').
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Although scholars have long associated the Ninth Amendment
with retained individual natural rights,168 the Amendment does not
limit the "other rights" retained by the people to just individual
rights. "Rights" at the time of the founding included everything from
the individual freedom of speech, to the right of local majorities to
pass municipal laws, to the collective right of the people to revolu-
tion.169 Under the Ninth Amendment, none of these rights were to
be denied or disparaged by an enlarged construction of federal
power simply because they did not make the cut in Madison's list of
particular amendments.
Most importantly, though often missed in historical Ninth
Amendment scholarship, is the fact that all retained rights were, by
definition, federalist in nature; they were left to the control of the
people in the individual states. For example, even though the First
Amendment prohibited the federal government from establishing a
religion, states were free to do so. 7° Indeed, their right to establish
religion was confirmed by the Tenth Amendment, which reserved
to the states or the people therein all powers not delegated to the
federal government.' 7 ' Likewise, when Madison protested the en-
actment of the Sedition Acts, he complained that Congress had
violated the First Amendment's protection of the individual right to
free speech and the Tenth Amendment's protection of the right of
the states to regulate all matters pertaining to speech.'72 As rights
retained from federal control, speech remained under the collective
control of the people in the states, who in turn, could enshrine these
rights in the state constitution, or leave them to the control of the
local legislature. Consider once again the declaration of the New
York Ratifying Convention-it contains one of the clearest examples
of the federalist nature of retained rights:
168. For recent discussions of the individual natural rights protected under the Ninth
Amendment, see BARNETT, supra note 69; DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE
"SILENT" NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON'T KNOW THEY
HAVE (2007).
169. For a discussion of the various rights existing at the time of the founding and their
likely place in the Ninth Amendment, see Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth
Amendment, supra note 67, at 908-10.
170. Id. at 911.
171. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 32-33
(1998).
172. See James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts, in WRITINGS, supra note
43, at 608, 644-51.
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[Elvery power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said
Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United
States, or the departments of the government thereof, remains
to the people of the several states, or to their respective state
governments, to whom they may have granted the same...."'
This "federalist" reading of the Ninth Amendment might seem
counterintuitive, given the commonly held modern assumption that
the Amendment justifies federal invalidation of state laws abridging
retained rights.'74 Although the scope of the Ninth Amendment may
have been altered by later Amendments (such as the Fourteenth
Amendment), Madison's expressly declared view of the original
Ninth Amendment was distinctly federalist. Madison not only
understood the Ninth Amendment as working alongside the Tenth
in limiting the power of the federal government to interfere with the
sovereign people in the states, but he also insisted that these two
Amendments were the textual expression of promises Federalists
had made to the ratifiers in the state conventions ensuring that
federal power would be strictly construed.175
5. Madison's Speech Opposing the Bank of the United States
In a speech delivered to the House of Representatives while
the Bill of Rights remained pending before the states, Madison
explained the origin and meaning of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.' 76 The occasion for his speech was Madison's opposi-
tion to a bill establishing the First Bank of the United States.'77
Although nationalists like Alexander Hamilton believed that
delegated federal power could be construed broadly enough to
173. THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 134, at 356.
174. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
175. During the drafting of the Tenth Amendment, Madison joined others in the House in
rejecting an attempt to add the term "expressly" to the text of the Amendment. I have written
in depth on the significance of this rejection. See Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission,
supra note 67. In brief, Madison feared the term might be read to deny Congress all incidental
powers, no matter how necessary or clearly associated with the delegation. As his public
speeches make clear, he did not reject the general concept of "expressly delegated power"
properly understood. Id.
176. James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in
WRITINGS, supra note 43, at 480.
177. Id. at 480-81.
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authorize the bill, Madison was convinced the matter was beyond
the properly interpreted scope of delegated federal authority.'
Madison's speech is important not only for its discussion of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, but also because his approach to
interpreting the Constitution-an approach he claimed found
expression in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments-was shared by
Justice Iredell and formed the basis of Iredell's rejection of state
suability.1
79
In his speech, after some brief remarks regarding the merits of
incorporating a bank, James Madison laid out the proper rules of
constitutional interpretation:
[1] An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the
Government cannot be just.
[2] In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the
instrument, if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper
guide.
[3] Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable
evidence of the meaning of the parties.
[4] In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only
the degree of its incidentality to an express authority, is to be
regarded, but the degree of its importance also; since on this will
depend the probability or improbability of its being left to
construction." °
These rules are developed and applied in the main body of
Madison's speech. Preserving the "characteristic of the government"
under rule [1] involved maintaining a federal government of
'limited and enumerated powers."'8 ' The "parties to the instrument"
referenced in rule [2], whose understandings are a proper guide to
constitutional interpretation, are the state ratifying conventions.'82
The promises made to those conventions about the limited nature
of federal power are the "contemporary and concurrent expositions"
178. Id. at 482.
179. See infra Part II.A.4.c.
180. Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank, supra note 176, at 482.
181. Id. at 485.
182. Id. at 489.
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of rule [3].183 Finally, rule [4] is an interpretive rule that Madison
derives from the Constitution itself: the more important the power,
the more likely the parties would have expressly listed it in the
text rather than leave such an important matter to implication."
As we shall see, the application of this particular rule became one
of Justice James Iredell's grounds for dissent in Chisholm v.
Georgia."5
Madison argued that deriving the power to charter a bank as
necessary and proper to borrowing money would open the door to an
unlimited list of implied powers and required a "latitude of interpre-
tation ... condemned by the rule furnished by the constitution it-
self."'186 The manner in which the Founders enumerated powers in
the Constitution established an implicit "rule" requiring the express
enumeration of all "great and important power[s]."187 Declaring that
"[i]t cannot be denied that the power proposed to be exercised is an
important power,"18 Madison then listed a number of significant
aspects of the bank charter, including the fact that the "bill gives a
power to purchase and hold lands" and that "[iut involves a monop-
oly, which affects the equal rights of every citizen." '189 To Madison,
these effects established that the power to charter a bank was a
"great and important power" that required express enumeration."9
In the final section of his speech, Madison addressed the original
understanding of federal power represented to the conventions that
ratified the Constitution. He reminded the House that the original
objection to a bill of rights had been due to fear that this would
"extend[ ]" federal power "by remote implications." '191 Federalists had
183. Id. at 488-89.
184. Id. at 486-87.
185. See infra Part II.A.4.c.
186. Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank, supra note 176, at 486.
187. Id. at 487 ('CThe examples cited, with others that might be added, sufficiently inculcate
nevertheless a rule of interpretation, very different from that on which the bill rests. They
condemn the exercise of any power, particularly a great and important power, which is not
evidently and necessarily involved in an express power."); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1956
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (noting Madison's observation during the debates over the bank bill
that "[tihe power of granting charters ... is a great and important power, and ought not to be
exercised unless we find ourselves expressly authorized to grant them').
188. Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank, supra note 176, at 487.
189. Id. at 487-88.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 488.
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assured the state conventions that the Necessary and Proper Clause
would not be interpreted to give "additional powers to those enumer-
ated."'192 Madison "read sundry passages from the debates" of the
state conventions in which "the constitution had been vindicated by
its principal advocates, against a dangerous latitude of its powers,
charged on it by its opponents."'' These state conventions had
agreed to ratify the Constitution only on the condition that certain
explanatory amendments would be added that expressly declared
what the Federalists claimed were principles already implicit in the
structure of the Constitution.' Madison then referred the House to
the proposals submitted by the state conventions which sought to
guard against the constructive extension of federal power: 'The[se]
explanatory declarations and amendments accompanying the
ratifications of the several states formed a striking evidence,
wearing the same complexion. 9 ' He referred those who might doubt
on the subject, to the several acts of ratification."
Finally, Madison declared that the proper rule of interpretation,
one implied in the structure of the Constitution and promised by the
Federalists to the state conventions, found textual expression in the
proposed Ninth and Tenth Amendments: The explanatory amend-
ments proposed by Congress themselves, at least, would be good
authority with [the state proposals]; all these renunciations of power
proceeded on a rule of construction, excluding the latitude now
contended for. These explanations were the more to be respected, as
they had not only been proposed by Congress, but ratified by nearly
three-fourths of the States. 9 6 He read several of the articles
proposed, remarking particularly on the 11 th and 12th [the 9th and
10th Amendments] the former, as guarding against a latitude of
interpretation-the latter, as excluding every source of power not
within the constitution itself.'97 Summing up his argument, Madison
linked these amendments and their attendant rule of construction
to the preservation of state autonomy.198
192. Id. at 489.
193. Id. (emphasis added).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Ratification was still pending in Virginia.
197. Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank, supra note 176, at 489.
198. Id. at 489-90 ("In fine, if the power were in the constitution, the immediate exercise
of it cannot be essential-if not there, the exercise of it involves the guilt of usurpation, and
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Madison's speech provides us with an outline of what he viewed
as the proper rules of constitutional interpretation-rules that
reflected the expectations of the state conventions. The arguments
put forward to justify the bank relied upon an unduly broad reading
of federal power. The state conventions had been assured there
would be no such "latitudinary" readings of delegated federal power;
the conventions had ratified the Constitution with the express
understanding that this would be the case, and they secured the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments to ensure this would not be the case.
They had demanded Amendments to ensure this would be the case,
a demand that was met by the adoptions of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. According to Madison, these Amendments made
federal promises-and ratifier expectations--of strict construction
of delegated power an express part of the Constitution.
Although a divided Congress passed the bank bill, the issue of
federal power to establish the bank remained disputed for de-
cades.199 Indeed, as we shall see, the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment may well have been delayed due to an effort to broaden
the Amendment to encompass both the bank controversy and the
issue of state suability. Because support for the bank was divided
along regional lines, it was difficult for opponents of the bank to
establish a sufficiently broad-based coalition against the charter. °°
State suability, on the other hand, affected states both in the North
and the South, making an effective response to a decision like
Chisholm far easier and much more likely. We now turn to the
subject of state.
establishes a precedent of interpretation, leveling all the barriers which limit the powers of
the general government, and protect those of the state governments.").
199. See Michael W. McConnell, John Marshall and the Creation of a National Government,
27 J. SUPREME CT. HIST. 273, 278 (2002) ("It may be fairly said that, as of 1819 ... the status
of the Bank of the United States was the longest-running and most hotly contested question
in American politics.").
200. Opposition to Hamilton's fiscal policies, including his funding program and the
creation of the national bank, had, as Sean Wilentz puts it, "a strong sectional character,
pitting the North against the South." WILENTM, supra note 75, at 46.
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C. Pre-Chisholm Suits Against the States
1. Beginnings: Van Staphorst and the Debate in Massachusetts
It did not take long for the new Supreme Court to consider the
issue of state suability. The issue presented itself in the very first
case entered on the Court's inaugural docket, Van Staphorst v.
Maryland.2"' The case involved a long-standing contract dispute
between the Dutch Van Staphorst brothers and the state of
Maryland." 2 Frustrated at the state's unwillingness to offer
satisfactory terms, the Van Staphorsts filed suit against the state
in the Supreme Court of the United States, and the case was
scheduled to be heard in February 1791.2o Their own lawyer
advised them to settle because a "suit against a state cannot avail
.... The State is not an individual-The States being individually
Sovereign.""2 4 Although the Maryland legislature did not contest the
case, its acquiescence was based on its conclusion that allowing the
case to go to trial "may deeply affect the political rights of this state,
as an independent member of the union.""2 5 Accordingly, Maryland
eventually came to terms with the Van Staphorsts and settled out
of court.206
Van Staphorst generated the first significant public discussion of
state suability since the ratification of the Constitution in 1788. An
observer at the opening proceedings of the new Supreme Court was
startled to find the Court hearing a case brought by "a Foreigner,
against the state of Maryland."2' 7 The observer's shocked reaction
predates Chisholm by two years and initiates a theme that would be
heard throughout the states until the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment:
201. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791).
202. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 16.
203. Id.
204. Letter from Pierce Butler to Messrs. Van Staphorsts and Hubbard (Sept. 23, 1791),
in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 34.
205. MD. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORT OF THE COMMITEE OF WAYS AND MEANS (1791),
reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 35.
206. 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 20.
207. Letterfrom anAnonymous Correspondent, INDEP. CHRON. (Phila.), Feb. 1791, reprinted
in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 20-21.
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Should this action be maintained, one great national question,
will be settled;-that is, that the several States, have relin-
quished all their SOVEREIGNTIES, and have become mere
corporations, upon the establishment of the General Govern-
ment: For a Sovereign State, can never be sued, or coerced, by
the authority of another government.2"
Looking on from the state of Massachusetts, the state attorney
general, James Sullivan, shared the same troubled reaction and
published his remonstrance against such suits in a pamphlet
titled Observations Upon the Government of the United States of
America. 9 To Sullivan, the issue of "[wihether the separate states,
as states, are liable to be called to answer before any tribunal by
civil process" necessarily involved the subsidiary question of
"[w]hether we are an assemblage of republics, held together as a
nation by the form of government of the United States, or one great
republic, made up of divers[e] corporations?"'2 10 In cases involving
independent republics, there was no recourse for injustice except by
negotiation and, ultimately, the sword.21' If states then could be
subjected to suits in federal court, this had to mean that legally,
states were no different than mere "corporations"--an idea with
troubling implications:
A corporation cannot be corporally punished, or be imprisoned,
but it may be disenfranchised, and lose its privileges for a
[misuse] of them. This is called a civil death. But this process of
punishment carries with it the full and complete idea of subordi-
nation to a superiour power, which is quite inconsistent with
every idea of any kind of sovereignty.212
Although Article III could be construed to authorize suits brought
by foreigners against the states, this was not a necessary construc-
tion. The party diversity provisions of Article III could be under-
stood to apply only in cases in which states appeared as plaintiffs,
208. Id. at 21.
209. SULLIVAN, supra note 40, at 21.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 27.
212. Id. at 29.
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as opposed to defendants.213 A strict construction of Article III was
appropriate because it preserved the independent sovereign exis-
tence of the states:
If the paragraphs above recited, by having the construction
which I have given them, can be fully satisfied, and be rendered
consistent with the other parts of the system they belong to; and
if a contrary, or more enlarged construction would render them
incompatible with, and derange the whole system, and compel
us to affix new meanings to the language of it, then I think I
may conclude that my construction is right.
214
Written only a few months after Madison's speech opposing the
First Bank of the United States, Sullivan's Observations adopts
some of the same rules of constitutional construction, in particular
the need to strictly construe federal power in order to avoid an
"interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the govern-
ment. 215 Sullivan laid out the general defense that would be
repeated time and again over the coming months: subjecting states
to suits by individuals without their consent rendered the states no
different than "corporations" and could not be reconciled with the
promise of retained state sovereignty.216 This was not a necessary
construction of Article III and violated the promise that federal
power would be narrowly construed wherever it threatened the
independence of the states.
Sullivan's Observations triggered an extended response by
"Hortensius," who argued that the plain meaning of the text allowed
such suits, and that requiring states to pay their debts to individu-
als was simply a matter of justice." 7 Justice, however, apparently
only went so far. Although the text of Article III also speaks of suits
in which the national government is a party, this should not be
213. Id. at 26.
214. Id. at 26-27.
215. See Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank, supra note 176, at 482.
216. See SULLIVAN, supra note 40, at 29.
217. See HORTENSIUS, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME
FEDERAL COURT, OVER THE SEVERAL STATES, IN THEIR POLITICAL CAPACITY. BEING AN ANSWER
TO OBSERVATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: BY JAMES
SULLIVAN, ESQ. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS (1792), reprinted in 5
DHSC, supra note 3, at 36, 39.
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construed to mean that the country itself could be sued in federal
court. The United States was, after all, a sovereign nation and,
according to Hortensius, "no suit can be brought against a nation." '218
States, however, could not claim the same sovereign immunity: "As
the simultude does not hold between the United States, in their
national capacity, and any one of the states in its individual, the
conclusion that therefore the latter cannot be sued, is utterly
unwarranted by the premises."2 ' This was not a rejection of
sovereign immunity per se; it was a rejection of the retained
sovereignty of the states. Or, as Hortensius phrased it, although
states might be sovereign as to "state objects," they could not
"contend for the absurdity of equal sovereignty" which would grant
them the same prerogatives of immunity naturally bestowed on the
national government.22 °
Sullivan's Observations and Hortensius's response were extended
and nationally distributed dissertations on the subject of state
sovereign immunity under Article III. The basic arguments were
thus being debated in the public sphere long before Chisholm. The
rapidity with which Sullivan produced his Observations, and the
broad readership it received, suggests a segment of the public was
well aware of what was at stake in cases like Van Staphorst. More
cases soon emerged, and the public debate intensified accordingly.
2. Justice Iredell and Oswald v. New York
A leader of the Federalist Party in North Carolina and a sup-
porter of the original Constitution, Justice James Iredell was the
youngest of the Justices on the Supreme Court in 1793,221 and he
would write the lone dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia.222 Credited by
the Supreme Court in Hans v. Louisiana with expressing the
country's general sentiment regarding state suability,223 Iredell's
opinion in Chisholm has been downplayed by revisionist scholars in
218. Id. at 53.
219. Id. at 53-54.
220. Id. at 39, 40.
221. Charles F. Hickox, III & Andrew C. Laviano, James Iredell and the English Origins
of American Judicial Review, 23 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 100, 109 (1994).
222. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
223. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890).
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favor of the extended constitutional remarks by Wilson and Jay. '24
The general approach has been to present Iredell as only briefly
touching, or avoiding altogether, the constitutional issue of whether
Article III abrogated state sovereign immunity. It turns out,
however, that Iredell drafted opinions in two separate cases that
both addressed the constitutional issue at length, including one for
Chisholm. His opinion in Chisholm, in fact, incorporated sections of
an essay he had written in conjunction with an earlier case, Oswald
v. New York.2 '
Oswald had its roots in New York's hiring of John Holt to
serve as state printer in the years immediately following the
Revolution.226 After Holt died, the administrator of his estate,
Eleazer Oswald, sued the state of New York in the Supreme Court
of the United States for Holt's unpaid services. 7 The suit was filed
in February 1791, with the case eventually scheduled to be heard
during the February 1792 term. 8 Even before the Court had the
chance to hear the case, a widely-published article raised the cry
about "the important question" before the Court regarding
"[w]hether a state can be compelled to appear and answer to a
Process" issued by the Supreme Court.229 Governor George Clinton
and the state legislature ignored the original summons, leading
Oswald to seek a writ of distringas compelling New York to
respond.2 '30 At this point Justice Iredell sketched his initial thoughts
about the power of the federal courts to hear individual suits
against nonconsenting states.
Iredell's Observations on State Suability seems to have been
originally planned as an opinion in Oswald. 3' Because the Court
ultimately dismissed Oswald's motion on other grounds,232 Iredell
224. See supra note 27.
225. See James Iredell's Observations on State Suability (Feb. 11-14, 1792), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 3, at 76-77 (editor's note).
226. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 57.
227. Id. at 57-58.
228. Id. at 60.
229. Id. (citing PA. GAZETrE (Phila.), Feb. 1, 1792).
230. Id.
231. James Iredel's Observations on State Suability, supra note 225, at 76-77 (editor's
note).
232. It was not clear that federal diversity jurisdiction was appropriate due to the failure
of Oswald to establish his status as a resident of Pennsylvania and not New York. See 5
DHSC, supra note 3, at 61. Oswald's attorney withdrew his motion for a writ of distringas,
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saved his notes and incorporated some of the passages into his later
opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia.233 Iredell's essay begins by address-
ing an apparent deficiency in the motion-Article III authorizes
suits between a state and a citizen from another state, but there
was reason to believe the plaintiff in this case was a resident of New
York.234 If that were so, then the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear
the case.2 35 Nevertheless, because state suability would likely arise
in another case, and because the "great question" came before the
Court "judicially" even if not "necessarily," Iredell continued his
observations in order to "state [his] sentiments on the subject as
clearly and fully as [he was] able. 236
'The question," Iredell wrote, "comes to this-What Controversy
of a civil nature can be maintained against a State by an Individ-
ual"?2 3v Answering this question required identifying the "principles
the Courts of the United States are bound to determine in [the]
execution of the various parts of their Jurisdiction."" These prin-
ciples depend on the nature of the case before the Court and the
area of law which the Court must consult in rendering a decision.
Here Iredell listed three general areas of law: "(1) The Law of
Nations, (2) The Acts of Congress, and (3) The Laws of the par-
ticular States."239 Beginning with the Law of Nations, Iredell
placed construction of the Constitution within the same category
as construction of treaties between foreign powers.24° This was ap-
propriate because the Constitution "form[ed] out of several inde-
pendent Governments a new one composed of definite Powers."24'
In every area "where authority has been surrendered to the Gen.
Government by the States by that Constitution, the States as such
have no right to exercise their Sovereignty separately.'242 "In every
instance where authority has not been so surrendered," however,
but later refiled after having more clearly established Oswald's Pennsylvania citizenship. Id.
233. James Iredell's Observations on State Suability, supra note 225, at 76-77 (editor's
note).
234. Id. at 76-79.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 79.
237. Id. at 81.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 82.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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"the Separate states remain sovereign & independent: for they have
done nothing to divest that sovereignty." '243 The "true construction"
of the Constitution was required "to determine in any particular
instance ... whether the Sovereignty of the State be or not be
retained.244
As far as the Acts of Congress were concerned, Congress had not
provided a statutory process for a suit against a state and the
Court lacked the power to create "new laws for new cases"--meaning
cases unheard of under state law before the adoption of the
Constitution.245 Some had argued the law of corporations applied,
but treating a sovereign state as no more than a corporation raised
serious constitutional issues.246 Although some degree of state
sovereignty had been "abridged by the Constitution of the U.S.," it
remained the case that "whenever considered as a State, it is a
Sovereign power." '247 And how could corporate law-based judgments
be enforced against a sovereign power? "[A] corporation may be
dissolved, by a forfeiture of its Charter, through negligence or abuse
of its Franchises .... Is there any authority in the U.S. to dissolve
one of the American States? God forbid no Man will pretend such a
thing. 248
Iredell concluded that states could not be treated as dependent
corporations, as they retained all independent sovereign powers not
delegated to the United States:
[W]hat right have we to proceed against any one of the States,
by applying Law applicable to dependent Corporate Bodies, the
mere creatures of Governmental Authority, to a State Sover-
eignty, dependent in no particulars whatever on the United
States but in certain cases voluntarily and solemnly surren-
dered? & in every other particular retaining all the attributes of
and real power of Sovereignty and Independence.
I presume therefore no general Law as to Corporations will
apply to this case.249
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 85.
246. See id. at 87.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 88.
249. Id.
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Iredell believed that compelling a state to defend itself in a suit
for recovery of debt was analogous to similar suits against corpora-
tions. In this, both advocates and opponents of state suability were
in agreement. Treating a state like a corporation, however, was
incompatible with the idea of retained sovereignty, at least as
sovereignty was understood according to the Law of Nations. And
this was a critical point: the states ought to be treated as independ-
ent sovereign entities because the Constitution itself was created
through the exercise of independent delegations of sovereign power
by the people in the several states. Like Vattel, Iredell's rules of
construction presumed that a sovereign people would not delegate
power in a manner destructive of sovereignty itself.25 °
Again, proponents of state suability did not generally deny
Iredell's basic conclusions. Instead, the conclusions were embraced
as positive outcomes-yes, suing a state was analogous to suing a
corporation and, yes, such a suit denied the states any claim to
"equal sovereignty" with that of the national (or any other) govern-
ment. To proponents, however, this was both a just and reasonable
reading of Article III.251 To opponents, on the other hand, such a
reading betrayed the ratifiers' understanding that Article III would
be narrowly construed in order to preserve the retained sovereignty
of the states.2
Political infighting between the Governor and the state legisla-
ture would result in the New York legislature authorizing a defense
of the Oswald case in federal court.253 This did not, however, suggest
legislative agreement with Oswald's reading of Article III. When
presented with the proposed Eleventh Amendment, New York was
the first state to ratify.25 4
250. See supra text accompanying notes 221-27; infra text accompanying notes 324-27.
251. See, e.g., HORTENSIUS, supra note 217, at 36-39.
252. See George Clinton's Address to the New York Legislature (Jan. 7, 1794), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 3, at 93 ("[The Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm] involves so essentially the
sovereignty of each state, that no observations on my part can be necessary to bespeak your
early attention to the subject matter of them. It may be proper, however, to suggest, that our
Convention, when deliberating on the Federal Constitution, in order to prevent the Judiciary
of the United States from extending itself to questions of this nature, expressly guarded
against such a construction, by their instrument of ratification.").
253. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 624.
254. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 625.
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3. Hollingsworth v. Virginia: The Indecision of Virginia
Governor Henry Lee
Hollingsworth v. Virginia,255 had its roots in the rampant land
speculation that took place in the decades after the Revolution.256
The case involved a dispute between the state of Virginia and the
Indiana Company-a group of land speculators that included
Supreme Court Justice James Wilson 25 -over a disputed section of
land in western Virginia.25" Although initially stymied by a power-
less national Congress and a recalcitrant Virginia legislature, the
Indiana Company looked forward to the adoption of the federal
Constitution and the new possibilities it would bring for their
claim.259 Article III in particular appeared to empower the new
federal courts to hear and enforce claims brought by individuals
against the states.26 ° Thus, soon after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, the state rather predictably found itself facing a suit in federal
court brought by the Indiana Company.26'
In August of 1792, the Supreme Court approved a subpoena
ordering Virginia Governor Henry Lee and Attorney General James
Innes to appear before the Court on February 4, 1793, or face a $400
fine.262 Innes, a member of the Virginia Ratifying Convention who
advocated the adoption of the Constitution, considered the suit to
involve an "attempted usurpation" by the federal court that
threatened the "Sovereignty of the State. 263 Unsure of what to do,
Governor Lee referred the matter to the Virginia Assembly, which
passed a resolution declaring that the Supreme Court had no
jurisdiction over the suit and that a state could not be "made a
defendant. 264 The Assembly left it to the Governor's discretion,
however, to determine how best to respond to the suit that had
255. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
256. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 274.
257. Id. at 282 n.50.
258. Id. at 274.
259. Id. at 280.
260. See id.
261. Lawyers for the Company were William Lewis and William Rawle. See id. at 282.
262. Id.
263. Letter from James Innes to Henry Lee (Jan. 22, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at
324.
264. Proceedings of the Virginia House of Delegates (Dec. 18, 1792), in 5 DHSC, supra note
3, at 322.
1626 [Vol. 50:1577
LEAVING THE CHISHOLM TRAIL
already been initiated before the Court.2 65 Still unsure of whether
the matter was "merely of a judicial nature" or instead "involv[ed]
important constitutional doctrine ,' '26 Governor Lee traveled to
Philadelphia where he witnessed the oral arguments in Chisholm
v. Georgia and was present when the Court delivered its judg-
ment in the case on February 18, 1793.267 During this same period,
Lee wrote to Virginia Senators James Monroe and John Taylor,
suggesting "the propriety of introducing an amendment to the
constitution of the [United] States explanatory of the rights of the
[federal] judiciary."2" Having been among the few to hear the
Justices' opinions in their entirety, Lee returned to Virginia dis-
tracted (as always) by personal financial matters and still uncertain
about what to recommend to the Virginia House of Delegates.269
II. CHISHOLM AND THE MASSACHUSETTS ROAD TO AMENDMENT
A. Chisholm v. Georgia
It should be clear by now that Chisholm did not explode like a
bombshell on an unsuspecting public. The issue of state suability
had long been the subject of debate prior to the Court's decision in
February 1793.270 Chisholm was just one of many suits against the
states pending before the Supreme Court.2 7 1 Nor did the decision
shock the state legislatures into immediate action. Virginia
Governor Lee attended the oral presentation of the Justices'
opinions and subsequently left town to take care of some personal
financial matters, still unsure of how Virginia should respond to its
own suit pending before the Court.272 Georgia took no official action
265. Id.
266. Letter from Henry Lee to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates (Nov. 14,
1792), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 320-21.
267. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 284.
268. Letter from Henry Lee to James Wood (Mar. 3, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 332.
269. See id. at 332 ("All these matters I shall soon have the pleasure of communicating on
my return which will not be so soon as I desire, in as much as private business of magnitude
to myself must detain me here ...."). For a discussion of Henry Lee's financial woes and their
impact on his political career, see Kurt T. Lash & Alicia Harrison, Minority Report: John
Marshall and the Defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 435, 468 (2007).
270. See supra Part I.C.
271. See supra Part I.C.
272. See supra notes 262-69 and accompanying text.
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on the Chisholm decision until much later in the year.273 In fact, it
turns out that there was little public discussion of the actual
opinions in Chisholm, if for no other reason than they were difficult
(and expensive) to obtain." 4 The original report of the Court's
decision was hopelessly incorrect275 and publication of the full
opinions was delayed due to copyright concerns.7 6 For months,
governors and state legislatures did not appear to know how many
Justices had actually voted with the majority. 7
None of this mattered to the public debate. The fact that a
majority of the Supreme Court had actually ruled that states were
subject to such suits was important, but the particular facts and full
opinions in the case were of little moment. Unlike today, in 1793,
few people viewed the opinions of five Justices in Philadelphia as
presumptively authoritative constructions of the Constitution. One
of the major contributions to constitutional theory over the last
decade has been the growing appreciation of the role the "people out
of doors" played in the early construction and interpretation of the
Constitution.2 7' The basic insight of works like those of Professors
Larry Kramer and Christian Fritz is that the people in the early
republic expected that they would play a role in liquidating the
meaning of the document.279 More than half a century would pass
before the Supreme Court established a significant cultural role in
determining the "true" meaning of the Constitution.2"' If anything,
the people considered themselves the court of last appeal, and it was
their construction of the Constitution that counted.
This is not to say, however, that we should ignore the opinions
in Chisholm. The opinions of the Justices did play some role in
the public debate. Also, whatever their contemporary impact, the
opinions illustrate the interpretive choices before the Court and the
273. The Chisholm decision was handed down in February, but the Georgia legislature did
not take up the issue until November. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 134, 234-35.
274. Id. at 231 n.1.
275. See infra Part II.A.5.
276. A Citizen of the United States, NATL GAZETrE (Phila.), Aug. 3, 1793, reprinted in 5
DHSC, supra note 3, at 231.
277. See infra note 374 and accompanying text.
278. See FRITZ, supra note 78; LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
279. See FRITZ, supra note 78; KRAMER, supra note 278.
280. In the first decades of the Constitution, the people and their governments played out
a great many battles in terms of daily oversight. See FRITZ, supra note 78.
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reasons that divided opponents from supporters of state suability.
Finally, if for no other reason, the constitutional views of Justice
James Iredell deserve more study than they heretofore have
received. A common canard--one repeated in even the most recent
literature on the Eleventh Amendment-is that Iredell had little to
say about the constitutional issue before the Court.28' In fact, the
Justice had been considering the question for months and prepared
at least two essays on the subject, one which went unreported but
may have been delivered orally when the Justices delivered their
opinions in Chisholm."2
1. Prequel: Farquhar v. Georgia
The background controversy in Chisholm involved the estate of
South Carolina merchant Robert Farquhar, who had delivered goods
to the state of Georgia but had never been paid.28 The initial suit,
Farquhar v. Georgia, was filed in the United States Circuit Court
for the District of Georgia where it was heard by Justice James
Iredell (riding on circuit) and District Judge Nathaniel Pendleton.2"
Georgia Governor Edward Telfair, through his attorneys, argued
that, as a "free, sovreign [sic] and independent State," Georgia
"cannot be drawn or compelled, nor at any Time past hath been
accustomed to be, or could be drawn or compelled ... before any
Justices of the federal Circuit Court for the District of Georgia or
before any Justices of any Court of Law or Equity whatever." '285
In his circuit court opinion, Justice Iredell took the position that,
absent express language to the contrary, the term "controversies"
should be read to include only those controversies involving states
that were permitted at common law prior to the adoption of the
Constitution.286 Unlike courts in other countries that have "prima
facie" jurisdiction over all causes except for "special exceptions," the
federal courts of the United States had no powers except those
281. See infra notes 330-32 and accompanying text.
282. See supra Part I.C.2; infra Part II.A.4.c-d.
283. 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 127.
284. Id. at 128-29.
285. Plea to Jurisdiction (Oct. 17, 1791), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 143.
286. James Iredell's Circuit Court Opinion (Oct. 21, 1791), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 148,
151.
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specifically delegated to them under the Constitution and autho-
rized by the federal Congress.287 This created two problems: under
Article III, it seemed to Iredell that the Supreme Court had
exclusive jurisdiction over cases wherein a state was a party, and,
in any event, Congress had not provided lower federal courts with
jurisdiction to hear such claims against a state.2s Iredell concluded
that the suit should be dismissed; Judge Nathaniel Pendleton, for
unknown reasons, agreed.289
Apparently having written his uncle about the case, Judge
Pendleton received a reply in which Edmund Pendleton confessed
his surprise that some "respectable Opinions" believed that states
could be sued by a "Citizen of another State":
I have been taught by all writers on the Subject, that there is no
Earthly Tribunal before whom Sovereign & independent Nations
can be called & compelled to do justice, either to another Nation
at large or it's individual Citizens. Nor can I conceive any Idea
of a proper process to bring a state into Court, or do Execution
of its Judgment.... This being the general law of Nations, how
are the United States to be distinguished from others as to this
point? Altho' confederated for certain purposes, each remains a
Sovereign & independt State to every purpose, not conceded to
the General Government by the Federal Constitution."
Edmund Pendleton, the man who had presided over the Virginia
Ratifying Convention, believed that the disputed passage in Article
III referred only to cases in which a state is a plaintiff.29' Nor could
congressional statutes be read to impliedly authorize such suits.
Following Madisonian rules of construction, Pendleton wrote that
"a suit [against] a Sovereign State" was "a privilege of too much
importance to be granted away in so loose a manner. If Congress
had meant to have authorized such a suit, they would surely have
directed the mode of proceeding. 29
2
287. Id. at 151-52.
288. Id. at 153-54.
289. Id. at 155.
290. Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Nathaniel Pendleton (May 21, 1792), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 3, at 157.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 157-58.
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2. Chisholm in the Supreme Court
Complying with Iredell's reading of Article III, Chisholm took his
case directly to the Supreme Court, where he filed suit in early
1792.293 The word quickly spread that the Supreme Court was
scheduled to hear a case involving "questions of magnitude" that
"may affect the interests of states and individuals."294 In December
of 1792, the Georgia House of Representatives passed resolutions
declaring that allowing suits like Chisholm's to go forward "would
effectually destroy the retained sovereignty of the states, and would
... render them but tributary corporations to the government of the
United States. '295 The House's opinion was that Article III did not
grant the federal courts the power "to compel states to answer to
any process" in a case commenced by an individual against a
state.296 The "contrary construction thereof ... is totally repugnant
to the smallest idea of sovereignty. 297 The House further resolved
that "the state of Georgia will not be bound by any decree or
judgment of the said supreme court subjecting the said state to
any process" in such a case, "but will consider the same until an
explanatory amendment of the said constitution takes place as
unconstitutional and extrajudicial, and that the same will and ought
to be ipso facto void, and to be holden for none." '298 The resolves were
transmitted to the state's federal representatives so that they might
"apply for an explanatory amendment accordingly.""29
Despite being given multiple opportunities to do so,3"0 the State
of Georgia declined to appear before the Supreme Court and pre-
sent its argument on either jurisdiction or the merits of the case.
On the day of oral arguments, the Court went so far as to invite
any member of the Bar in attendance to offer an argument in
opposition to Chisholm's suit.'' The offer was met with silence
293. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 130-31.
294. GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.), Aug. 6, 1792, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 158.
295. Proceedings of the Georgia House of Representatives, AUGUSTA CHRON., Dec. 14, 1792,
reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 161.
296. Id. at 161-62.
297. Id. at 162.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. E.g., Summons (Feb. 8, 1792), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 155.
301. See Letter from George Morgan to Alexander McKee (Feb. 20, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra
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from the audience.0 2 Thus, on February 5, 1793, Edmund Randolph,
Attorney General of the United States but acting as private counsel
for Chisholm, presented his argument to the Court without
rebuttal. °3
3. Randolph's Argument
Randolph's oral argument in Chisholm hewed closely to the text
of Article III and stressed the good policy of allowing individuals the
opportunity to seek justice against the states in federal court.0 4
Recognizing that the appropriate rule of construction turned on the
issue of delegated sovereign power, Randolph refuted the idea that
the Constitution received its power from the people of the states.
According to Randolph, the Constitution "derives its origin immedi-
ately from the people"--meaning a single national people. 35 Far
from exhibiting concerns about state sovereignty, the people of the
United States had placed serious restrictions on state authority,
such as the ex post facto law.3 6 Allowing states to sue individuals
but not allowing individuals to sue the states prevented the full
vindication of these restrictions and, in fact, placed the states on a
higher level than the people themselves.0 7 Randolph insisted,
however, that nothing in his argument suggested that the people
could sue the national government. °8
4. The Opinions of the Justices
The Justices delivered their opinions in Chisholm orally from the
bench on February 18, 1793.309 The opinions of Blair and Cushing
were short and focused on the text of Article III. The words of
Article III clearly allowed suits between a state and a party from
note 3, at 222.
302. Id.
303. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 419 (1793); see also Letter from George
Morgan, supra note 301, at 222.
304. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419-22.
305. Id. at 423.
306. Id. at 422.
307. Id. at 422-23.
308. Id. at 425.
309. See infra note 391.
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out-of-state; this case involved a suit between a state and a party
from out-of-state; ergo, jurisdiction was shown. 31' The opinions of
Justices Wilson and Jay were more substantial and are better
known.
a. The Opinion of James Wilson
The fact that Justice James Wilson wrote anything at all is
surprising, at least from the perspective of modern judicial ethics.31'
The same issue of state suability presented in Chisholm was also
before the Court in Hollingsworth v. Virginia-a case in which
Wilson had a direct financial interest in the Court's rejecting any
claim of state sovereign immunity.31 2 Wilson nevertheless used
the occasion to issue an extended dissertation on sovereignty
and the law of nations. In words that would be ruefully repeated by
Chisholm's critics, Wilson opened his opinion by announcing the
"important" issue before the Court in terms unmistakably critical of
state sovereignty:
This is a case of uncommon magnitude. One of the parties to it
is a State; certainly respectable, claiming to be sovereign. The
question to be determined is, whether this State, so respectable,
and whose claim soars so high, is amenable to the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of the United States? This question, impor-
tant in itself, will depend on others, more important still; and,
may, perhaps, be ultimately resolved into one, no less radical
than this--"do the people of the United States form a Nation?'"13
310. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 466-67 (Cushing, J., concurring); id. at 450-51 (Blair, J.,
concurring). According to Justice Blair, reading Article III in a narrower manner would itself
violate the Constitution. Id. at 451.
311. Governor Lee was, in fact, in attendance when Wilson read his opinion from the bench
in Chisholm. See Letter from Henry Lee to James Wood (Mar. 3, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note
3, at 332.
312. 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 504-06. Throughout his life, Justice Wilson exhibited the
unfortunate tendency of issuing legal opinions in matters in which he had a direct financial
conflict of interest. For example, while deeply in debt to the Bank of North America, he
published his pamphlet supporting Congress's power to charter the Bank of the United States.
1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 21-22 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). For additional
discussion of cases in which Wilson had a personal interest, see WARREN, supra note 27, at
99 n.2.
313. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 453 (Wilson, J., concurring) (second emphasis added).
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Georgia insisted it occupied the same position as any other sover-
eign nation whose retained rights must be preserved through the
properly narrow construction of delegated sovereign power.314
Justice Wilson, however, rejected any analogies to the law of
nations. 315 Rather than a compact between sovereigns, Wilson
viewed the Constitution as forming a single consolidated nation."6
To him, the State's claims rested on a feudal conception of sover-
eignty which, although "degrading to man," nevertheless "still
retains its influence over our sentiments and conduct, though the
cause, by which that influence was produced, never extended to the
American States."3 17 Despite Wilson's rather provocative statements
regarding the very idea of state sovereignty (and those who
embraced it), in the end his position on state suability rested
entirely on what he viewed as the plain meaning of the text.318
Given its harsh language, extensive distribution of Wilson's full
opinion in Chisholm most likely would have only inflamed public
sentiment against the majority's decision. Not surprisingly, despite
the fact that Justice Wilson's supporters widely reprinted his work
in newspapers during this period, neither they nor the supporters
of state suability saw any advantage to publishing his opinion in
Chisholm.319
b. The Opinion of John Jay
Although every bit the nationalist that was Wilson, John Jay
presented his position in far less strident tones. ° Jay's key point,
however, remained the same: was federal power derived from a
single, undifferentiated national people (thus obviating the need for
a narrow construction), or was it delegated by the independent,
314. Id. at 257.
315. Id. at 253 ("From the law of nations little or no illustration of this subject can be
expected. By that law the several States and Governments spread over our globe, are
considered as forming a society, not a nation.").
316. Id. at 457.
317. Id. at 457-58.
318. According to Wilson, "this doctrine [of state suability] rests not upon the legitimate
result of fair and conclusive deduction from the Constitution: [i]t is confirmed, beyond all
doubt, by the direct and explicit declaration of the Constitution itself." Id. at 466.
319. The short synopsis of the Justice's opinion published by "S.B." did not mention
Wilson's dramatic and derogatory descriptions of the concept of state sovereignty.
320. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 469-79 (Jay, C.J., concurring).
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sovereign people of the several states?32' Setting the tone for all that
follows, Jay argued that a single national people preceded the
states, and it was from this undifferentiated people that the
Constitution came into being.322 Passing over the historical accuracy
of Jay's account,323 his underlying assumption about the document
is clear: the Constitution emerged from a single national people.324
The guiding purposes of the document are found in the opening
preamble, particularly the declared intent to "establish Justice"
and "insure domestic Tranquility." '325 Rejecting calls for a limited
construction, Jay insisted that Article III be "construed liberally."32
To Jay, this meant that jurisdiction over the states should be
broadly construed in the absence of language expressly stating
otherwise.327 This is precisely the opposite of the rule of strict
construction that excludes application of federal power against the
states unless called for by express enumeration or unavoidable
implication.328 Finally, Jay carefully distinguished the case of the
national government from that of the states: although states could
be compelled to answer in federal court, the same reasoning did not
apply to suits against the United States.329
c. The Dissent of James Iredell
The rise of revisionist Eleventh Amendment scholarship has led
inevitably to a rise in scholarly appreciation for the nationalist
321. Id. at 470-71.
322. Id.
323. Julius Goebel describes the above argument as exhibiting "the lamentable standards
of American judicial historiography." JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 1 THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 732 (1971).
324. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 476-78.
325. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
326. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 476-77.
327. Id. at 477 (noting that had the Framers intended to limit suits in which a state was
a party to those in which the state appeared as a plaintiff, "it would have been easy to have
found words to express [that intention]").
328. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 33-34 (1824).
329. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 478 ("[I]n all cases of actions against States or individual
citizens, the National Courts are supported in all their legal and Constitutional proceedings
and judgments, by the arm of the Executive power of the United States; but in cases of actions
against the United States, there is no power which the Courts can call to their aid. From this
distinction important conclusions are deducible, and they place the case of a State, and the
case of the United States, in very different points of view.").
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opinions of men like James Wilson and John Jay, and a diminished
appreciation for Justice James Iredell and his Chisholm dissent.33 °
The same scholars who criticize Hans's reading of the Amendment
as representing a background principle of constitutional interpreta-
tion also tend to minimize the constitutional dimensions of Iredell's
opinion.3 ' As one commentator put it, Iredell's comments on the
Constitution amounted to no more than a minute in an argument of
an hour and a half. 32 Even the most recent scholarly accounts
presume that the U.S. Reports contain a full discussion of Iredell's
views and that he did not commit himself on the constitutional
issue.333 It turns out, however, that Iredell's views on the constitu-
tional question of state sovereignty were far more extensive than
the version presented in the U.S. Reports. We know, for example,
that Iredell had been composing his thoughts on the constitutional
issue for some time prior to his Chisholm opinion.334 We also now
know that Iredell drafted extensive remarks on the constitutional
issue of state sovereignty for Chisholm which are not published in
the official opinion but may have been delivered as part of his oral
remarks.335
I will address these extended remarks in a moment. First,
however, it is worth noting that even if one focuses on only the
commonly published version of his dissent, one finds principles of
constitutional construction which contradict the nationalist views
of Jay and Wilson and which lead inevitably to the strict construc-
tion of Article III. Consider, for example, Iredell's explanation for
330. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 29, 1731-35 (holding up the opinions of Wilson and Jay
as best representing the original "individualist" conception of popular sovereignty); Jeremy
M. Sher, Note, The Renewed Significance of James Wilson's Writings on Popular Sovereignty
in the Wake of Alden v. Maine, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 591, 593-94 (2005).
331. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 117, at 267 ("Justice James Iredell, dissenting, did not
reach the constitutional issue ..... ); Lee, supra note 63, at 1084 ("[Iredell] avoided the tough
constitutional question and found his answer in the common law ...."); John V. Orth, History
and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1147, 1155-56 (2000) ("Justice Iredell
certainly spent by far the largest part of his dissent in Chisholm looking for legislative
authorization for the exercise of jurisdiction over suits against states.").
332. Orth, supra note 331, at 1150 ("In a dissent taking at least an hour and a quarter to
deliver, Iredell's 'extra-judicial' comments on the constitutional question occupied barely a
minute at the very end.").
333. See Manning, supra note 28, at 1679-80.
334. See supra Part I.C.2.
335. See James Iredell's Observations on 'This Great Constitutional Question," (Feb. 18,
1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 186.
1636 [Vol. 50:1577
LEAVING THE CHISHOLM TRAIL
why common law suits against the sovereign in England are
analogous to suits against the American states:
Every State in the Union, in every instance where its Sover-
eignty is not delegated to the United States, I consider to be as
completely Sovereign, as the United States are in respect to the
Powers surrendered. The United States are Sovereign as to all
the Powers of Government actually surrendered: Each State in
the Union is Sovereign as to all the Powers reserved. It must
necessarily be so, because the United States have no claim to
any authority but such as the States have surrendered to them:
Of course, the Part not surrendered must remain as it did
before."'
Several critical assumptions about state and federal power are
contained in this brief statement. Iredell describes the federal gov-
ernment as having derived its powers from the sovereign states,
with all nondelegated power retained by the same. This has
implications not only for the application of the common law to the
states, but also for the construction of delegated federal power.
Most of all, it directly contradicts the description of the federal
Constitution as having been derived from a sovereign national
people as provided by Justices Wilson and Jay. When Iredell spoke
of sovereign states, this was a shorthand reference to the sovereign
people in the several states. Like most of the Founders, Iredell
embraced the concept of popular sovereignty-a concept that
applied first and foremost to the collective people of a state.8 7
336. James Iredell's Supreme Court Opinion (Feb. 18, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at
164, 172 (footnote omitted).
337. In Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 54 (1795), Iredell wrote:
In such governments, therefore, the sovereignty resides in the great body of the
people, but it resides in them not as so many distinct individuals, but in their
politic capacity only....
I conclude, therefore, that every particle of authority which originally resided
either in Congress, or in any branch of the state governments, was derived from
the people who were permanent inhabitants of each province in the first
instance, and afterwards became citizens of each state; that this authority was
conveyed by each body politic separately, and not by all the people in the several
provinces, or states, jointly, and of course, that no authority could be conveyed
to the whole, but that which previously was possessed by the several parts; that
the distinction between a state and the people of a state has in this respect no
foundation, each expression in substance meaning the same thing; consequently,
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Iredell's rejection of the common law of corporations is explicitly
based on the constitutional status of the sovereign states and the
prior and continued existence of a separate sovereign people within
the states:
A Corporation is a mere Creature of the King, or of Parliament
.... It owes its existence, its name, and its laws ... to the authority
which creates it. A State does not owe its origin to the
Government of the United States, in the highest or in any of its
branches. It was in existence before it. It derives its authority
from the same pure and sacred source as itself. The voluntary
and deliberate choice of the People .... A State, though subject in
certain specified particulars to the authority of the Government
of the United States, is in every other respect totally independ-
ent upon it. The People of the State created The People of the
State can only change-Its Constitution.338
Finally, there is Iredell's telling reference to the Law of Nations.
Although some scholars have noted Iredell's reference, no Eleventh
Amendment scholar appears to have investigated Iredell's meaning,
much less considered its critical role in Iredell's theory of constitu-
tional interpretation. In fact, Iredell's reference ties together his
claims in the North Carolina Ratifying Convention about the proper
interpretation of federal power, his discussion of the Law of Nations
in his Oswald Observations, and his view of the proper construction
of Article III in his draft opinion for Chisholm.339
In the following passage, Iredell criticizes Randolph's use of the
Law of Nations to support the general policy of state suability:
No part of the Law of Nations can apply to this case, as I
apprehend, but that part which is termed 'The Conventional
Law of Nations"; nor can this any otherwise apply than as
that one ground of argument at the bar, tending to shew the superior
sovereignty of Congress, in the instance in question, was not tenable, and
therefore that upon that ground the exercise of the authority in question can not
be supported.
Id. at 93-94.
338. James Iredell's Supreme Court Opinion, supra note 336, at 183 (footnote omitted); see
also GOEBEL, supra note 323, at 729-30 (describing this section of Iredell's opinion as "an
explicit recognition of the transfer of royal prerogatives to the states').
339. See supra notes 231-49 and accompanying text.
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furnishing rules of Interpretation, since unquestionably the
People of the United States had a right to form what kind of
Union, and upon what terms they pleased, without reference to
any former examples.' °
At first glance this is an exceedingly odd statement. It begins with
a reference to a body of law common to all nations, and ends with a
reference to the people's sovereign right to ignore all former (and
foreign) examples and create a completely unique republic. How
exactly does a rule of interpretation furnished by the "Conventional
Law of Nations" relate to the people's right to form a Union wholly
unlike any other nation?
Part of the answer can be found by revisiting Iredell's discussion
of the Law of Nations that he wrote some months earlier in
conjunction with the Oswald case. 341' There, Iredell listed three
categories of the Law of Nations: necessary, conventional, and
customary.342 The only applicable area to Iredell involved the
Conventional Law of Nations, or "that part of the Law of Nations
which applies to the construction of the Treaties the United States
have with foreign Powers."" At this point in his manuscript, Iredell
likely planned to insert a definition from Emmerich de Vattel's The
Law of Nations.3" Published in 1752, Vattel's Le Droit des Gens345
deeply influenced the founding generation and his treatise would
continue to be well-cited in legal scholarship and judicial opinions
for the next one hundred years346-indeed, up until today. 1 7 In his
section on the proper construction of treaties, Vattel explained
that, because sovereigns are presumed to have retained all sover-
eign powers not expressly delegated away, delegations of sovereign
340. James Iredell's Supreme Court Opinion, supra note 336, at 184-85.
341. James Iredell's Observations on State Suability, supra note 225, at 76.
342. Id. at 81.
343. Id. at 82.
344. Id. at 82 nn.7-8.
345. See E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS: OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS (1st Am. ed., Campbell
1796) (1757).
346. For a discussion of Vattel's influence on the founding generation, see DANIEL GEORGE
LANG, FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE BALANCE OF
POWER (1985); see also FRANCIS STEPHEN RUDDY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
ENLIGHTENMENT: THE BACKGROUND OF EMMERICH DE VATTIEL's LE DROIT DES GENS (1975).
347. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2795 n.10 (2008).
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power must be strictly construed. 4 Thus, when Iredell linked the
proper construction of the Constitution to the Conventional Law of
Nations, he grounded it on commonly accepted principles of inter-
national law.
This rule of construction had important implications when it
came to the subject of retained sovereignty. In his Oswald essay,
Iredell stressed that Vattel's rule was appropriate because the
Constitution "form[ed] out of several independent Governments a
new one composed of definite Powers."'349 In every area "where
authority has been surrendered to the Gen[eral] Government ....
the States as such have no right to exercise their Sovereignty
separately."35 "In every instance where authority has not been so
surrendered," however, "the separate States remain sovereign &
independent: for they have done nothing to divest that sover-
eignty."35' Although other sovereigns might have permitted suits
against themselves for recovery of debt, whether the people of the
United States had done so was a matter of constitutional construc-
tion-a construction that took into account the people's right to form
whatever manner of government, and governmental liability, they
pleased. As Iredell put it, "true construction" of the Constitution
required determining "in any particular instance ... whether the
Sovereignty of the State be or be not retained." '352
Vattel wrote that delegated authority required a clear or express
delegation.353 Absent such a clear statement, the sovereign presum-
ably retained power. 5 4 In the published version of his Chisholm
dissent, Iredell adopted this same point about strict construction
and the presumed retention of all power not clearly delegated away:
I think every word in the Constitution may have its full effect
without involving this consequence ["a compulsive Suit against
a State for the recovery of money"], and that nothing but express
348. See DEVAIrEL, supra note 345, at 63 (discussing the duty of self-preservation); see also
id. at 333, 335-36 (discussing the need to narrowly construe "odious" delegations of sovereign
power).
349. James Iredell's Observations on State Suability, supra note 225, at 82.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. DE VA"rEL, supra note 345, at 333, 335-36.
354. Id.
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words or insurmountable implication (neither of which, I
consider, can be found in this case) would authorise [sic] the
deduction of so high a power.35
Iredell stressed the need to apply strict construction (a clear
statement rule) in any case involving a claimed delegation of a
"high power." '356 In his speech on the Bank of the United States,
James Madison embraced this same rule of construction-a rule
that Madison claimed had been promised to the ratifiers of the
Constitution.357 In fact, in his draft notes for his Chisholm opinion-
notes which have gone almost completely unnoticed in Eleventh
Amendment scholarship-Iredell laid out almost the identical rules
of construction.358
d. James Iredell's Observations on "This Great Constitutional
Question"
In the vast scholarship on the Eleventh Amendment, I have been
able to locate but a single citation to Iredell's Observations on "This
Great Constitutional Question."359 Prepared in conjunction with his
opinion in Chisholm, the Observations may have been delivered
orally along with the rest of his opinion.36 The essay was not widely
available until published in 1994 as part of the fifth volume in the
Documentary History of the Supreme Court, which might account
for its omission in the traditional canon of Eleventh Amendment
historical materials.
Just as Madison opens his speech on the Bank of the United
States with the general rules of constitutional interpretation,361
Iredell states the proper rules of constitutional construction in the
opening passages of his Observations:
355. James Iredell's Supreme Court Opinion, supra note 336, at 185 (emphasis added).
356. Id.
357. See supra Part I.B.5.
358. See James Iredell's Observations on 'This Great Constitutional Question," supra note
335, at 186.
359. Nelson, supra note 62, at 1578 n.86. Almost all scholarly analysis of Chisholm and
Iredell's Opinion either omits or is simply unaware of Iredell's extended comments on the
constitutional question before the court. See, e.g., GOEBEL, supra note 323, at 729-30.
360. See James Iredell's Observation on 'This Great Constitutional Question," supra note
335, at 186 (editorial note).
361. See supra note 180 and accompanying text; infra note 363 and accompanying text.
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I conceive before any authority can be deemed to be conveyed
under this great Instrument, the words must be either clear &
express for that purpose, or carry with them a fair and reason-
able implication.
That in proportion to the greatness & importance of the
surrender, ought to be the requisite of greater clearness in the
expression.
That where every word can be fully satisfied, without
implying a grant of a very high authority, that authority ought
not to be understood to be conveyed.
That when consequences ensue from one construction,
inconsistent with the known basis on which the Constitution
was formed & adopted, that construction shall not be received,
if there be another at least equally natural, & more consistent
with the principles of the Constitution, which can take place.362
Compare Iredell's rules with those of James Madison in his speech
against the Bank of the United States:
[1] An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the
Government cannot be just.
[2] In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the
instrument, if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper
guide.
[3] Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable
evidence of the meaning of the parties.
[4] In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only
the degree of its incidentality to an express authority is to [be]
regarded, but the degree of its importance also; since on this will
depend the probability or improbability of its being left to
construction.3 63
Both Madison and Iredell required that any claimed power fit with
the overall principles of the Constitution and claimed that one
could find these principles in the original understanding of the
ratiflers (Iredell's "known basis" upon which the Constitution was
362. James Iredell's Observations on "This Great Constitutional Question," supra note 335,
at 187.
363. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1896 (1834).
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adopted)." 4 Most importantly, both men insisted that the more
important the power, the greater need for an express delegation of
authority, for it was unlikely that important matters would have
been 'left to construction.""3 5 Madison believed that this rule of
strict construction, particularly when it came to important powers,
became an express part of the Constitution through the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments. 66 Iredell found the rule in the commonly
accepted Law of Nations of Emmerich de Vattel.a6 ' St. George
Tucker believed that both men were correct.368
Attorney General Randolph, of course, had applied a very
different rule of construction. According to Randolph, the Framers
of Article III twice had the opportunity to clarify that the provision
did not allow suits by individuals against the states.36 9 Because they
did not do so when they had a chance suggested that they thought
such power was appropriate. 370 From Iredell's perspective, however,
this flipped the proper rule of construction on its head. If a power
did not exist before the Constitution was enacted, one simply could
not say the power "continue[d] unless excluded.'371 Instead, Iredell
claimed that the rule should be that the power "did not exist, if not
conveyed by this Instrument., 372 And here, Iredell fairly erupted,
[I]f ever there was a case, where the Convention should have
spoken out explicitly, if they meant what [was] ascribed to
them__this certainly was the case_ Where whole Sovereignties
364. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1896 (1834); James Iredell's Observations on "This Great
Constitutional Question," supra note 335, at 187.
365. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1896 (1834); James Iredell's Observations on "This Great
Constitutional Question," supra note 335, at 186-87.
366. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1901 (1834).
367. James Iredell's Observations on State Suability, supra note 225, at 82.
368. See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, in 1
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA, app. d at 146, 151 (1803) (citing Vattel and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in
support of the general rule of strict construction of federal power).
369. James Iredell's Observations on 'This Great Constitutional Question," supra note 335,
at 188-89.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 189.
372. Id.
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are to be brought to a Bar of Justice in the very same manner,
& without any distinction, as single Individuals."'
Observations on "This Great Constitutional Question" should put
to rest once and for all the notion that Justice Iredell avoided taking
a position on the constitutional issue of state suability and retained
state sovereignty. Not only do his notes for the Chisholm and
Oswald cases present a carefully thought out and constitutionally
based opposition to individual suits against the states, but his
interpretive approach also matched that of James Madison and
embraced the very rule of construction that Madison and the
Federalists promised the ratifiers in the state conventions.
5. The Reporting of Chisholm v. Georgia
Newspaper accounts of Chisholm were immediately and hope-
lessly botched. The day after the Justices delivered their opinions,
Philadelphia's Dunlap's American Daily Advertiser published a
short account of the case that incorrectly stated the issues before the
Court, presented the wrong facts (describing instead the facts from
a different case), and radically misstated the conclusion of the
majority.374 According to the paper, the Court had to decide not only
whether an individual could sue a state, but also whether the
United States was subject to such suits.375 The report went on to
describe the facts from a different case arising out of Georgia,376
Georgia v. Brailsford.37 ' Finally, although correctly stating that the
case was decided four to one in favor of the attorney general's
position, the reporter describes the majority as concluding "[t]hat
every individual of any state has the natural privilege of suing
either the United States or any state whatever in the Union, for
redress in all cases where he can prove a just claim, a loss, or an
injury [having] been sustained, and vice Versa."37 The erroneous
373. Id.
374. Supreme Court of the United States, DUNLAP'S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER (Phila.), Feb.
19, 1793, at 3.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792).
378. Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 374, at 3.
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report was picked up and published in other newspapers around
the country.379
Two days later, the Supreme Court clerk, Samuel Bayard, sent
the Advertiser a corrected account of the case along with a summary
of the opinions "which will be found accurate, though by no means
so full as [he] could wish," and which Bayard thought might "give
umbrage to the Advocates of 'State Sovereignty."' 3 ° Taking the
Justices' opinions in the order delivered, Bayard first described
Iredell's opinion:
In an argument of one hour and a quarter, he maintained the
negative of this question, he considered the states as so many
separate independent sovereignties. He relied much on the books
of English jurisprudence in proof that no sovereign could now be
sued unless with consent of the same-He was aware that the
states had transferred certain prerogatives of their sovereignty
to the United States, but whatever they had not clearly trans-
ferred were certainly retained-the right of commencing a suit
against the states he did not think clearly vested in the govern-
ment of the United States, nor recognized by the judiciary law
past in pursuance of the 3d. article of the constitution-Judge
Iredell referred to many authorities, and on a variety of grounds
declared his opinion to be against the motion of the attorney
general."'
Note that Clerk Bayard understood Iredell as having made a
constitutional as well as statutory argument;382 if anything, Iredell's
statutory argument is underplayed. Bayard's emphasis on the
constitutional side of Iredell's dissent may indicate that Iredell
379. See, e.g., Domestic Occurrences: Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, February 19, Supreme
Court of the United States, SPOONER'S VT. J., Mar. 11, 1793; New York, February 27, NEWPORT
MERCURY (Newport), Mar. 4, 1793; Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, February 19, Supreme Court
of the United States, MIRROR (Concord), Mar. 11, 1793; Philadelphia, Feb. 19: Supreme Court
of the United States, DIARY or LOUDON's REG. (N.Y.), Feb. 20, 1793; Philadelphia, February
19, Supreme Court of the United States, PROVIDENCE GAzETrE & COUNTRY J., Mar. 2, 1793;
Philadelphia, February 27, PA. J. & WKLY. ADVERTISER, Feb. 27, 1793; INDEP. GAZETTEER &
AGRIc. REPOSITORY (Phila.), Feb. 23, 1793; N.Y. J. & PAThOTIc REG., Feb. 27, 1793.
380. See DUNLAP'S AM. DAILYADVERTISER (Feb. 18, 1783), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 217,
220 n.1; S.B., For the American Daily Advertiser, DUNIAP'S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER (Phila.),
Feb. 21, 1793, at 3.
381. DUNLAP'S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER, supra note 380, at 218.
382. Id.
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did in fact include his Observations on "This Great Constitutional
Question" in his oral remarks on the case. Note also that Bayard
twice refers to Iredell's rule that delegated sovereign power must
be "clearly transferred" or "clearly vested." 3' Bayard apparently
understood this to be central to Iredell's argument.
Turning to Justice Wilson, Bayard reported that Wilson "took a
very broad and enlarged view of the question, which he thought
would again resolve itself into a question of no less magnitude than
whether the people of the United States formed a nation.... [H]is
argument was elegant[,] learned, and contained principles and
sentiments highly republican. ""' Bayard's reports of Justices
Cushing and Blair were similarly brief. 85
On the other hand, Bayard's account of his employer's opinion
was effusive and fairly detailed in comparison with the others:
Chief justice Jay delivered one of the most clear, profound and
elegant arguments perhaps ever given in a court of judicature,
he took a view of the United States previous to the late revolu-
tion, when we were the subjects of a sovereign after our inde-
pendence[;] he considered the people as becoming individually
sovereign. In this capacity they formed the present government,
he then examined the reasons of adopting the present constitu-
tion as expressed in the preamble to the same, he examined the
distribution of powers which they had made in this instrument,
more particularly those of the judiciary department, among
which ... was that of compelling the appearance of a state in the
supreme court of the United States, even at the suit of an
individual of another state, he commented on the wisdom and
sound policy of this arrangement, and concluded in favour of the
attorney general's motion in the present cause. 86
Despite Bayard's obviously partisan presentation of the opinions,
it seems he correctly understood the key difference between Jay and
the dissenting Iredell: the proper interpretation of federal power
turns on the nature of the sovereign who delegated the power in the
first place. If delegated from a national people, then the interpreta-
383. Id.
384. Id. at 219.
385. Id. at 218-19.
386. Id. at 219-20.
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tion of this power should reflect national principles. If delegated
from separate state level sovereigns, on the other hand, then the
interpretation should favor these independent entities.
Sometime later, the Philadelphia printing house of T. Dobson,
which had also recently printed the lectures of James Wilson,38 '
published a pamphlet containing the opinions of the Justices and
the arguments of Attorney General Randolph."' It is unclear who
arranged for this publication, or when it first appeared. There is
reason to think the persons involved sought to capitalize on the
public interest in the case; the price was steep and there may have
been an effort to copyright the opinions in order to prevent their
being published in the local newspapers.389 In any event, the
publication does not appear to have reached many people, and by
the summer of 1793, the Massachusetts legislature found itself
having to make special arrangements just to get its own copy of
the opinions. 9 ° Several months had passed since the decision was
handed down before Jay's opinion first appeared in public newspa-
pers.391 Boston's Columbian Centinel published Justice Cushing's
387. See JAMES WILSON, AN INTRODUCTORYLECTURE TO A COURSE OFLAW LECTURES (1791).
388. CASE DECIDED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN FEBRUARY, 1793: IN
WHICH Is DISCUSSED THE QUESTION "WHETHER A STATE BE LIABLE To BE SUED BY A PRIVATE
CITIZEN OF ANOTHER STATE?," at A (T. Dobson 1793).
389. The original pamphlet cost fifty cents, which generated complaints about its being
placed out of the reach of the ordinary citizen. See A Citizen of the United States, NAT'L
GAZE'rrE (Phila.), Aug. 3, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 231-32.
390. See A CASE DECIDED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN FEBRUARY,
1793: IN WHICH IS DISCUSSED THE QUESTION, "WHETHER A STATE BE LIABLE To BE SUED BY
A PRIVATE CITIZEN OF ANOTHER STATE" (Adams & Larkin 1793). According to the publication
notes, the publication was "ordered ... to be printed, for the use of the Members of the
[Massachusetts] Legislature." Id.; see also Letter from an Anonymous Correspondent, INDEP.
CHRON. (Boston), Apr. 4, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 228 (indicating that the
Massachusetts legislature would soon get copies of the opinion "so that it will not be forgotten,
or worked out of sight at the next session").
391. Individual opinions did not appear in newspapers until after the matter had been the
subject of numerous newspaper articles and Governor Hancock had issued his call for a
special session of the Massachusetts General Court to address Vassal's suit against the state.
See supra Prologue. Seeing the tenor of public sentiment clearly moving against state
suability, proponents made an effort to publish the opinions in Chisholm that they believed
were most helpful to their cause. Apparently the effort was designed to have some impact on
the September meeting of the Massachusetts General Court, for the publications appear in
a wave just prior to that meeting and then stop immediately afterwards. For example, on July
23, the Salem Gazette published the "one national people" section of Chief Justice John Jay's
opinion with the following introductory note:
The [Chisholm] decision has excited great apprehension in some, as striking at
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short opinion in mid-July.392 These two appear to have been the only
opinions printed in any of the nation's newspapers and they seem
to have all appeared in the period just prior to the special session
of the Massachusetts General Court.393 Even with the sporadic
the root of individual State Sovereignty; and the subject was taken up in the last
session of the Legislature of this Commonwealth, but nothing decisive acted
upon it. The attention of the citizens of Massachusetts will now be more closely
drawn to this subject, since the State has been made a party-defendant in the
above Court, at the suit of a foreign individual, by a writ served upon the
Governor and Attorney General. Many pieces have already appeared in the
public papers on the subject, some of which, at least, are addressed more to the
passions than the reason. It is fortunate for the citizens of the United States,
who are ever desirous of examining the real merits of any important question,
that the Judges, before whom this was argued for several days, have permitted
the opinions they gave upon it to be published. From them we have selected, for
the information of our readers, that of Mr. Jay; who appears to have investigated
the subject with great coolness, candor, and regard to the rights of the citizens;
has placed it in a variety of views; and considered it not only on constitutional;
but on rational grounds.
Chief Justice Jay, SALEM GAZETTE, July 23, 1793, at 3; see also Chief Justice Jay's Opinion on
the Question-"Whether a State Be Liable To Be Sued by a Private Citizen of Another State,"
GAZETTE U.S. (Phila.), Aug. 10, 1793, at 497 (publishing a longer version of the same passage
without an introduction); Chief Justice Jay's Opinion on the Question-"Whether a State Be
Liable To Be Sued by a Private Citizen of Another State," GAZETTE U.S. (Phila.), Aug. 17, 1793,
at 505 (publishing the concluding portion of the opinion); Chief Justice Jay, MIRROUR
(Concord), Aug. 12, 1793, at 4 (publishing an introduction and another passage of the opinion);
Chief Justice Jay, On the Question "Whether a State Be Liable To Be Sued by a Private Citizen
of Another State?," MONITOR (Litchfield), Aug. 14, 1793, at 1 (publishing a longer version of
the opinion, but stopping short of the passage dealing with the literal interpretation of Article
III); Chief Justice Jay's Opinion on the Question-"Whether a State Be Liable To Be Sued by
a Private Citizen of Another State," CARLISLE GAZETrE & REPOSITORY OF KNOWLEDGE, Sept.
4, 1793, at 1 (publishing the first half of Jay's opinion with the remainder in subsequent
issues dated September 11 and 18, 1793).
392. See Veritas, COLUMBIAN CENTINEL (Boston), July 17, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 390-91; see also Judge Cushing, DUNLAP'S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER (Phila.), July 24,
1793, at 3 (including introduction by Veritas about the same underlying principle at issue in
Vassal); Judge Cushing, GAZETTE U.S. (Phila.), July 27, 1793, at 481 (same); Judge Cushing,
AM. MERCURY (Hartford), July 29, 1793, at 1 (same).
393. It appears no one was interested in discussing Justice Wilson's opinion except for
opponents who used his arguments as reasons to support an amendment rebuking the Court's
construction of Article III. See, e.g., Account of William Martin's Speech in the Massachusetts
House of Representatives, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 23, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 434-35 (quoting Wilson's opinion and describing it "as containing a meaning
derogatory to the dignity of every state in its distinct capacity"); Charles Jarvis's Speech in
the Massachusetts House of Representatives, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 23, 1793, reprinted
in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 436, 439 (quoting Wilson's question of "whether the people of the
United States form a nation" and replying that the real issue is "whether we are to be a
state").
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publication of Jay and Cushing's opinions, in late summer of 1793
supporters of state suability complained to local newspapers about
the failure to make all of the opinions available to the public at
large. 394 As late as September, people remained unclear about either
the specific arguments in the opinion or even how many Justices
had voted in favor of state suability. 95
It did not matter. Although the decision triggered more vigorous
discussion, the precise nature of the Justices' opinions was irrele-
vant.396 The issue was whether a state could be compelled to appear
before a federal court at the behest of an individual. The Supreme
Court had said yes and that was enough to further fuel the ongoing
debate.
B. General Response to the Decision
Although some supported the majority's decision, the reaction in
the main was broadly, and strongly, negative. The decision was
"generally reprobated here by Gentlemen of the first information,"
wrote Philadelphia resident William Few to Georgia Governor
Telfair.397 The underlying principles of the case were "so incompati-
ble" with "the intentions of the Framers of the Constitution that
[they] must be resisted;" otherwise they would "evidently tend to
394. See A Citizen of the United States, NAT'L GAzETTE (Phila.), Aug. 3, 1793, reprinted in
5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 231, 231-32 (complaining that the copyrighted fifty cent version
prevented broad dissemination of the opinion). No newspaper appears to have printed any
portion of Wilson's opinion in Chisholm. The same was true for Blair's and Iredell's opinions,
which like Wilson's, appeared only in pamphlet form.
395. See Brutus, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), July 18, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note
3, at 392 (claiming that "two of the Associate Judges have decided in favor of their own
jurisdiction"); John Hancock's Address, supra note 4, at 416 (declaring that "[t]hree Judges
of the United States of America, having solemnly given it as their opinion, that the several
States are thus liable"). As the notes explain in the opening Guide to Editorial Method, in 5
DHSC, supra note 3, at xxiv, there was no official reporter for the Supreme Court at this time.
Although Dallas eventually published his Report in 1798, he took "substantial liberties" in his
reporting of Supreme Court cases. See id. at xxiv-xxv.
396. Even once some of the Justices' opinions began to appear in newspapers, the public
debate rarely addressed the actual opinions. The exception was the particular contempt the
public heaped on Justice Wilson's presumption of a nation composed of a single national
people. See supra note 393.
397. Letter from William Few to Edward Telfair (Feb. 19, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3,
at 221.
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exterminate the small remainder of State sovereignties."'98 John
Wereat had spoken with "New-England Delegates who were
unanimously of opinion that an explanation of that part of the
Constitution should be made."" Massachusetts Representative (and
High Federalist) Theodore Sedgwick reportedly declared that "he
could not have beleived that any professional Gentleman would
have risqued his reputation on such a forced construction of the
clause in the Constitution."400 An anonymous writer to the Boston
Independent Chronicle reminded readers that when Article III had
been discussed in convention, Federalists had dismissed warnings
about suits against the states "as an absurdity in terms."4 ' Now,
the writer sardonically noted, "the Chief Justice has made that to be
right, which was at first doubtful, or improper."4 °2
Despite the broad opposition to the decision, the Georgia state
government did not immediately respond. Having been served
with the order of the Court, Governor Telfair instead appears to
have authorized counsel to represent Georgia at the Supreme
Court's next term in August.4 3 At that time, the Court granted
Georgia's motion to postpone further argument on the matter
until February 1794.404 The state of Georgia took no further
action until that fall, and did so only after having received the
call from Massachusetts to join with other states in supporting a
constitutional amendment. The road to the Eleventh Amendment
thus leads us to Massachusetts.
C. Vassal v. Massachusetts and the Call for Amendment
A Loyalist who eventually ended up living on the outskirts of
London, William Vassal fled Boston at the outbreak of hostilities
with England.4"' Vassal claimed Massachusetts had unconstitution-
398. Id.
399. Letter from John Wereat to Edward Telfair (Feb. 21, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3,
at 222-23.
400. Id. at 223.
401. Letter from an Anonymous Correspondent, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Apr. 4, 1793,
reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 228.
402. Id.
403. 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 135.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 352.
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ally confiscated his property and belongings under state antiloyalist
laws, and he spent years in court seeking both the return of his
property and proceeds on the sale of his belongings."' In early 1793,
Vassal gave up seeking justice from the Massachusetts legislature
and brought suit against the state in the Supreme Court of the
United States.40 7 The suit was never argued; Massachusetts refused
to appear in court to defend itself, and the case was finally dis-
missed in 1797.40 Although the Supreme Court never heard the
case, Vassal's suit put into motion a series of events that culminated
in Massachusetts leading the country in adopting the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution.
Massachusetts had already proven itself quick to perceive a
threat to the state's autonomy in suits like Vassal's. Two years
earlier, Massachusetts Attorney General James Sullivan had
published his Observations upon the Government of the United
States, prompting the first extended public discussion on whether
Article III authorized individual suits against the states.4 9
Sullivan's Observations were written in response to a case brought
against the state of Maryland. 4" Now, with Massachusetts facing its
own suit in federal court, the response was swift indeed. Less than
one week after Vassal filed suit,4" and only one day after the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Chisholm,412 Massachusetts
Congressman Theodore Sedgwick proposed the following amend-
ment to the Constitution:
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant, in
any of the judicial courts, established, or which shall be estab-
lished under the authority of the United States, at the suit of
any person or persons, whether a citizen or citizens, or a
foreigner or foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate,
whether within or without the United States. 413
406. Vassal claimed the confiscation amounted to an unconstitutional ex post facto law and
a violation of the peace treaty with Great Britain. See id. at 361.
407. Id. at 352-64.
408. Id. at 352.
409. See supra notes 209-20 and accompanying text.
410. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing Van Staphorst v. Maryland).
411. Vassal filed suit on February 11, 1793. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 364.
412. Chisholm was decided on February 18, 1793. James Iredell's Supreme Court Opinion,
supra note 336, at 164.
413. See Proceedings of the United States House of Representatives, GAZETTE U.S. (Phila.),
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The next day, Massachusetts Senator Caleb Strong submitted his
own proposed amendment in the United States Senate: 'The
Judicial Power of the United States shall not extend to any Suits in
Law or Equity commenced or prosecuted against any one of the
United States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects
of any foreign State." '414
No recorded action was taken on Sedgwick's proposal in the
House. In the Senate, after defeating a motion to postpone its
consideration, "further consideration thereof was postponed." '415
Because both proposals were submitted with less than two weeks
remaining in the congressional session,416 it seems likely the
members thought the matter required more time to craft a proper
response. Some members wished to postpone the discussion in the
hope of generating support for broader declaration of limited federal
power. Virginia Governor Henry Lee had requested that Senators
James Monroe and John Taylor propose their own amendment on
the subject of state suability." ' The two Senators resisted, however,
explaining in a letter that it was too late in the session and that
they hoped to use the time between sessions to generate support for
a "more general" amendment that would address not only Article
III, but also "[tihe exercise of constructive powers" such "as [those]
exemplified in the establishment of the Bank" (among others).4"'
Senator Strong's proposal thus was too "partial."'419 In their opinion,
"the doctrine of constructive powers,... in the latitude contended for,
to convert the national Government from a limited into an unlimited
one, should be suppressed in its infancy. 42°
Feb. 19, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 605-06. There is no record of such a
motion in either the House Legislative Journal or the Annals of Congress. Id. at 606 n.2. Due
to the fact that Sedgwick's motion was reported in two different newspapers, including one
recording a second to Sedgwick's motion to introduce the amendment, however, the reports
seem credible. Id. at 605-06.
414. Resolution in the United States Senate, supra note 21, at 607-08.
415. Id. at 608 n.1.
416. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 598 n.6.
417. Letter from James Monroe and John Taylor to Henry Lee (Feb. 20, 1793), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 3, at 606.
418. Id. "Among other" issues of concern at the time included the widespread resentment
to Hamilton's funding program. Id.
419. See Letter from James Monroe and John Taylor to Henry Lee (Mar. 2, 1793), in 5
DHSC, supra note 3, at 608.
420. Id.; see also Letter from Mercy Otis Warren to George Warren (Oct. 16, 1793), in 5
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In March, the Massachusetts House of Representatives appointed
a committee to study the Chisholm decision and to report its
potential impact on the state.42' The Committee was unable to
procure a copy of the decision, however, and postponed issuing their
report until the next session. By that time, the Committee had
managed to get a copy of the Justices' opinions, 423 and in June 1793,
the Joint Committee of the Massachusetts General Court published
a series of resolutions in Boston's Independent Chronicle:
3. Resolved, That the idea of a Federal Government necessarily
involves the idea of component parts, consisting of distinct and
separate Governments.
4. Resolved, That a Government being liable to be sued by an
individual Citizen, either of that, [or] of any other Government,
is inconsistent with that sovereignty which is essential to all
Governments, and by which alone any Government can be
enabled, either to preserve itself, or to protect its own members.
5. Resolved, That the article in the Constitution which extends
the Judicial Power to controversies between a State and the
Citizens of another State as applied by the Judges of the
Supreme Judicial Court in the case aforesaid, is in its principle
subversive of the State Governments, inconsistent with the
[ease] and safety of the body of Free Citizens; and repugnant to
every idea of a Federal Government, and therefore it is
6. Resolved, That the Senators of this Commonwealth ... be, and
they hereby are instructed, and the Representatives requested,
to use their utmost influence that the article in the Federal
Constitution, which refers to controversies between a State and
the Citizens of others States, be either wholly expunged from
the Constitution, or so far modified and explained as to give
DHSC, supra note 3, at 444 (overhearing that the initial attempt to amend the Constitution
was delayed in the hopes of adding to it an additional amendment "exclud[ing] all holders in
the bank from a seat in Congress"). Some scholars have attributed the delay as an indication
that the issue was of no moment to Congress. See Gibbons, supra note 29, at 1927. The issue,
however, had already been the subject of substantial debate and, as the text indicates, the
delay could just as likely reflect the lateness of the date and the efforts by men like Monroe
and Lee to secure a broader restriction on federal power.
421. Report of a Joint Committee of the Massachusetts General Court, INDEP. CHRON.
(Boston), June 20, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 230, 231 n.1.
422. Id.
423. See generally id.
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the fullest security to the States respectively against the evils
complained of ... more especially as this Legislature have the
fullest assurance, that the late decision of the Supreme Judicial
Court of the United States, hath given a construction to the
Constitution, very different from the ideas which the Citizens of
this Commonwealth en[tertained of it at the time it was
adopted.1424
The Joint Committee Report was scheduled to be discussed at the
next session of the legislature (the General Court) in January of
1794.425 Ailing Governor Hancock decided that the matter could not
wait and took the extraordinary step of calling for a special session
of the Legislature to be held in mid-September.426
1. Hancock's Address
On September 18, 1793, John Hancock addressed the
Massachusetts legislature special session and explained its three
options: (1) acquiesce, (2) add an amendment explaining the proper
construction of the Constitution, or (3) add an amendment removing
power granted under the original Constitution.427 Option two, by
declaring the proper construction of the Constitution, suggested that
the Court in Chisholm erred both in its reasoning and its result.
In the opening of his Address, Governor Hancock rejected the
idea that "the People of this Commonwealth, when they, by their
Representatives in Convention, adopted the Constitution of a
General Government, expected that each State should be held liable
to answer on compulsory civil process, to every individual resident
in another State or in a foreign kingdom."42 Although the Supreme
Court had decided otherwise, this was an issue that Hancock
could not "consider as settled., 429 Although Hancock declined to
take an official position on the issue, he nevertheless presented
424. Id. at 230-31.
425. Proclamation by John Hancock, supra note 3, at 387-88.
426. Id.
427. John Hancock's Address, supra note 4, at 416-17. The speech was published as a
broadside by Boston printers Adams and Larkin. Hancock's Secretary of State, John Avery,
delivered the actual speech for the ailing Hancock. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 366.
428. John Hancock's Address, supra note 4, at 416.
429. Id.
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an extended analysis of why the Supreme Court had erred in
Chisholm. Extending the judicial power in cases such as Vassal's
would reduce the states to "mere Corporations," under the central-
ized authority of the national government.43 ° Such a "consolidation
of all the States into one Government, would at once endanger the
Nation as a Republic, and eventually divide the States united, or
eradicate the principles which [they had] contended for."43'
Such weighty matters were not to be left in the hands of the
Supreme Court. Hancock conceded that when the Constitution was
first proposed, he "considered it as being by no means explicit in the
description of the powers intended to be delegated." '432 He trusted,
however, "that the wisdom of the People would very soon render
every part of it definite and certain." '433 Moreover, the idea that the
people should not engage in ensuring a proper interpretation of
their Constitution was a notion "inadmissible among a Free
People":434
If the People are capable of practising on a Free Government,
they are able, without disorders or convulsions, to examine, alter
and amend the systems which they have ordained.-And it is of
great consequence to the Freedom of a Nation to review its civil
Constitution, and to compare the practice under it, with the
principles upon which it depends. The tendency of every
measure, and the effect of every precedent, ought to be scrupu-
lously attended to, and critically examined. This is the business
of the Representatives of the People, and can never be by them
confided to any other persons.435
Following Hancock's speech, a joint committee was appointed to
consider the matter and, a week later, they issued a report that
weakly complained, "[I]t is not expedient that a State should be
suable by individual citizens of other States, or subjects of foreign
States," and that Massachusetts' representatives in Congress should
"use their influence to effect such alterations in the Constitution of
430. Id. at 418.
431. Id. at 419.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
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the U.S. as shall secure each State from being so suable."4 6 The full
assembly overwhelmingly rejected the report as failing to ade-
quately reflect the General Court's rejection of the Supreme Court's
construction of Article III."' After considering a resolution that
openly declared that the Court's decision in Chisholm reversed the
people's original understanding of the Constitution,43 the assembly
adopted a set of compromise resolutions that declared that the
decision in Chisholm was "unnecessary and inexpedient, and in its
exercise dangerous to the peace, safety and independence of the
several States, and repugnant to the first principles of a Federal
Government.""4 9 The General Court called upon their representa-
tives in Congress "to obtain such amendments ... as will remove any
clause or article of the said Constitution which can be construed to
imply or justify a decision that a State is compellable to answer in
any suit by an individual or individuals in any Court of the United
States."44 Finally, the assembly directed that its resolutions be sent
"to the Supreme Executives of the several States, to be submitted to
the consideration of their respective Legislatures." '441
The resolves adopted by the Massachusetts General Court did not
call for the removal of a delegated power. Instead, the resolves
sought to remove any clause that could be construed to allow
individuals to sue nonconsenting states-a concept "repugnant to
the first principles of a Federal Government." '442 By "federal," the
assembly meant a "confederated" as opposed to "consolidated"
government.44 The Massachusetts resolves did not expressly state
436. Report of a Joint Committee of the Massachusetts General Court, INDEP. CHRON.
(Boston), Sept. 23, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 424.
437. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 367.
438. See id. at 368.
439. Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court, supra note 18, at 440.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. In his 1800 treatise on the Constitution, Tunis Wortman explained the meaning of
"federal":
The term "Federal," which is usually and properly applied to our general
Constitution, is derived from the latin "Faedus," signifying a league. It implies
that each of the contracting States retains its existence and its sovereignty,
subject to the limitations imposed by the compact of Confederation, and is
evidently distinguishable from Consolidation, which would suppose that the
separate existence of each State was lost in the general body.
TuNIS WORTMAN, ATREATISE CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRYAND THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
1656 [Vol. 50:1577
LEAVING THE CHISHOLM TRAIL
that the Supreme Court grievously departed from the people's
original intentions in creating a federal government, but the
implication seems fairly clear. The problem was not a particular
delegated power, but the construction of any provision in a manner
so out of step with the Constitution's "first principles. 444
2. The Public Debate
Within days of Governor Hancock's call for a special session,
Massachusetts newspapers began to fill with commentary, some
objecting to an old man's folly,445 but most strongly supporting
Hancock's call to the people. Four basic themes emerged from this
broad public criticism of state suability. First, these suits effectively
reduced states to the status of mere corporations, thus threatening
a "consolidation" of the states under one national government.
Second, this result contradicted the ratifiers' understanding of the
Constitution as proposed and explained by its Federalist advocates.
Third, this betrayal of ratifier understanding violated the people's
retained sovereignty in both theory and effect. Fourth, the error
involved not a mistakenly granted power but an erroneous judicial
construction of Article III.
a. Consolidated States; Dependent Corporations
Perhaps the most pervasive theme in the literature opposing state
suability involved the implied reduction of states to the status of
dependent corporations. This was the very first issue raised in the
press following the docketing of Van Staphorst in 1791 .446 The same
210 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1800).
444. Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court, supra note 18, at 440.
445. See Letter to the Editor, GEN. ADVERTISER (Boston), July 17, 1793, reprinted in 5
DHSC, supra note 3, at 391 (praising in sardonic terms the governor and the public's
willingness to pay for "a scheme which seems to be the delight of his old age"); Letter to the
Editor, MASS. MERcuRY (Boston), July 26, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 402
("That the Governor of Massachusetts should be roused from his peaceful slumbers in the
chair of state, by the service of a bill in equity, is an offence so attrocious as calls for the whole
force of the Legislature to avenge the injury.").
446. See Letter from an Anonymous Correspondent, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Feb. 13-19,
1791, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 20-21 ("Should this action be maintained, one
great national question, will be settled;-that is, that the several States, have relinquished
all their SOVEREIGNITIES, and have become mere corporations, upon the establishment of
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point was picked up by James Sullivan in his Observations upon the
Government of the United States of America. "7 Indeed, to Sullivan,
this was the central issue in the debate over state suability.448 If
states could be sued without their consent then they, like corpora-
tions, were subject to punishment or penalty if they refused to
comply with the judgment of the federal courts. "But this process of
punishment carries with it the full and complete idea of subordina-
tion to a superior power, which is quite inconsistent with every idea
of any kind of sovereignty.""' 9 In his draft opinion for the Oswald
case, Supreme Court Justice James Iredell recognized the effort to
reduce states to mere "dependent Corporate Bodies" and rejected the
concept as irreconcilable with the retained sovereign authority of
the states.45 ° According to "Brutus," should the Massachusetts
legislature "acquiesce in the construction given to the federal
Constitution, ... [it would] seal [its] own extinction, as a legislative
body ... and [its] acts those of an unimportant subordinate corpora-
tion." '451 "Marcus" wrote in the Massachusetts Mercury that the
Court's decision in Chisholm was "truly alarming to every individ-
ual citizen" and would lead to "a direct consolidation of the govern-
ments of the Union into one." '452
Subjecting states to the same civil process as corporations, critics
claimed, led inevitably to a consolidation of the separate states and
the establishment of a single--and itself sovereign-national
the General Government: For a Sovereign State, can never be sued, or coerced, by the
authority of another government.').
447. SULLIVAN, supra note 40, at 21.
448. His observations were focused on the question "[wihether we are an assemblage of
republics, held together as a nation by the form of government of the United States, or one
great republic, made up of divers corporations?" Id.
449. Id. at 29.
450. James Iredell's Observations on State Suability, supra note 225, at 88 ("[A]
corporation may be dissolved, by a forfeiture of its Charter, through negligence or abuse of its
Franchises.... Is there any authority in the U.S. to dissolve one of the American States? God
forbid no Man will pretend such a thing."); see also "The True Federalist" to Edmund
Randolph, Number II, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Jan. 23 & 27, 1794, reprinted in 5 DHSC,
supra note 3, at 245 (quoting the Constitution's declaration that "Congress should guarantee
to every State in the Union, a Republican form of government" and pointing out that '"[a] form
of government' was never a mode of expression applied to the police of a town, parish, city or
other corporation").
451. Brutus, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), July 18, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at
392.
452. Marcus, supra note 127, at 389.
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government.453 Consolidation was more than a mere red shirt of
Antifederalists; Madison himself had stressed how a federalist
system could succeed where a single government could not-through
a division of powers between the national and state governments.454
Consolidation thus threatened the states and the liberties of the
national people as a whole. 455 As William Widgery put it in the
Massachusetts General Court, "[A]s the existence of the Federal
Government depends on that of the States, I think every true friend
453. In addition to the sources cited in the text, see 'The True Federalist" to Edmund
Randolph, Number IH, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Feb. 6, 1794, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note
3, at 254 (arguing that construing Article III to allow suits against the states "completely
comprises a consolidation of all the States into one government for every purpose of
Legislation and judicial procedure, and thereby excludes the nature of a Federal
Government"); Anti-Consolidation, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 19, 1793, reprinted in 5
DHSC, supra note 3, at 423-24 (quoting Hamilton's Federalist No. 81 denying the power of the
judiciary to destroy the "preexisting right of the State Governments"); Letter from Edmund
Pendleton to Nathaniel Pendleton (Aug. 10, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 232 ("[The
reasoning of Justice Wilson] is very reprehensible as tending to prove the Fedral to be a
consolodated Government for all America, & to Anihilate those of the States...."); Letter from
Samuel Adams to the Governors of the States (Oct. 9, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 443
("[l]t is easily discerned, that the power claimed [by the Supreme Court], if once established,
will extirpate the federal principle, and procure a consolidation of all the Governments.");
Letter from Henry Lee to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates (Nov. 13, 1793), in
5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 334 ("A consolidation of the States was expressly disowned by the
framers and by the adopters of the Constitution ....").
454. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 99.
455. One of the themes of Antifederalist writing had been the republican-based concern
that successful democracies must be relatively small in size. See HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT
THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 15 (1981). According to "Anti-Wizard":
[The claim that a] [s]tate should be obliged to do justice .... is only a subterfuge,
in order, the easier to ram down the throats of freemen, a consolidated
government and, to introduce a King, Lords and Commons with the
concomitants of a standing army: For, it is well known, that, if the sovereignty
of the States is annihilated, that such an army must be the consequence; for, the
immense territory of the United States cannot be otherwise governed.
Anti-Wizard, COLUMBIAN CENTINEL (Boston), Aug. 3, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note
3, at 404-05; see also John Hancock's Address, supra note 4, at 416, 419 ("A consolidation of
all the States into one Government, would at once endanger the Nation as a Republic, and
eventually divide the States United, or eradicate the principles which we have contended
for."); Letter from Henry Lee to the Virginia House of Delegates, supra note 453, at 334 ("[W]e
ought not to forget this important truth, that the duration of the General Government must
very much depend on the Strict adherence in practice to this fundamental principle on which
it was erected. A consolidation of the States was expressly disowned by the framers and by
the adopters of the Constitution....").
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to his country must be in favor of doing away all the State
Suability." '456
b. The Claim of Original Understanding
[T]his Legislature have the fullest assurance, that the late
decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of the United States,
hath given a construction to the Constitution very different from
the ideas which the Citizens of this Commonwealth en[tertained
of it at the time it was adopted.]45 v
Given the widespread assumption that a true sovereign could not
be sued without its consent, much of the debate regarding state
suability involved whether the states, by ratifying Article III, had
in fact consented to suits brought by individuals in federal court.
Here, proponents of state suability stressed what they claimed was
the plain meaning of the text: it was so clear that Article III
authorized such suits, ratification could only be taken to mean the
states had willingly consented to such suits.45 Some proponents
stated that to claim otherwise amounted to an implied admission of
rank stupidity or, at the very least, a concession that they had been
"duped & deceived." '459
456. William Widgery's Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, INDEP.
CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 23, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 430 ("It is therefore
high time to agree on measures, whereby to effect an amendment in the Federal Constitution,
in order that the Judicial Court may not construe it in a different manner from that which the
States intended; and in order to secure to the people of the United States the lasting blessings
of energetic Federal and State Governments, and as the existence of the Federal Government
depends on that of the States, I think every true friend to his country must be in favor of
doing away all the State Suability.").
457. Report of a Joint Committee of the Massachusetts General Court, supra note 421, at
230.
458. See, e.g., Letter from George Morgan to Alexander McKee, supra note 301, at 222
(praising Randolph's argument on the 'letter and spirit of the constitution"); Solon, INDEP.
CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 19, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 421 ("That jurisdiction
of such a cause is given by the People in the Federal Constitution, to the Judiciary of the
United States, is so clearly expressed, as not to admit of dispute.").
459. Account of John Davis's Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, INDEP.
CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 23, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 434 ("Would we
strengthen and confirm the doctrines of despots, as well as enemies of the Constitution, by
declaring to our sister States and to the world, that the people of this Commonwealth did not
comprehend the Constitution which they had adopted, or that they had suffered themselves
to be duped & deceived? ... [Hie could never give his assent to a resolution ... by which the
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To opponents of state suability, on the other hand, there was a
very real question of whether they had been duped. "Brutus"
reminded readers:
[A]pprehensions [about Article III voiced in the state ratifying
convention] were said to be groundless by the advocates of the
Constitution, and the jealousies of the Members on that subject,
were laughed at, and treated as ridiculous by King and others.
Their suspicions were considered by them, as visions and
chimeras of the brain, and as phantoms of a distorted imagina-
tion. But what do we now behold! These chimeras, these
phantoms, these visions, are no longer imaginary, but appear in
the bold colours of a demand, as founded on that very Constitu-
tion!
460
'Democrat" also reminded readers of the promises of Rufus King, a
"great civilian" who "rose; and, in an harangue, of two hours length,
endeavored to prove that, the article in debate, could not possibly
bear the construction put upon it by gentlemen. 46 1 William Martin
insisted that "the meaning as determined by part of the Judiciary
... was not the intention of the [Massachusetts Ratifying]
Convention," and as evidence pointed out that "there were several
gentlemen then present, who signified their remembrance, that Mr.
Sedgwick and Mr. Strong, both in Convention ... had declared their
minds to that purpose. '46 2 The powers granted under Article III:
[Wiould not have been consented to by this commonwealth, but
for Rufus King, Esq. who "pledged his honour," in the State
Convention, "that the Convention at Philadelphia never discov-
ered a disposition to infringe on the Government of an individual
State; and that in his opinion no Congress on earth would dare
dignity and reputation of the Commonwealth, for intelligence and consistency, might be
hazarded or impaired.").
460. Brutus, supra note 395, at 392.
461. Democrat, supra note 126, at 393, 395 n.3; see also Hampden, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston),
July 25, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 399-400 ('CThe objection was then, that
the clause might have the same construction which the Judges have now given it; but the
great Lawyers in the Convention declared, that no such construction could ever be made;
though some of them are now, the warm advocates of the power claimed by the Supreme
Judiciary.").
462. Account of William Martin's Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives,
supra note 128, at 434 (footnote and emphasis omitted).
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to invade the SOVEREIGNTY OF THIS COMMONWEALTH."
On the strength of this gentleman's opinion, the Article in the
Constitution was assented to but by a small majority.463
In The Federalist No. 81, 'Publius" declared that "[i]t is inherent
in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent."4" Because an "alienation of State
Sovereignty" required an express delegation, there was "no color to
pretend that the State governments would, by the adoption of that
plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts their
own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from
the obligations of good faith.""46 By 1793, it was well known that
Alexander Hamilton and current Chief Justice John Jay both
contributed to the essay that all sides considered to be the most
persuasive brief in favor of ratifying the Constitution.466 Seizing the
opportunity, opponents of state suability now reprinted key portions
of Federalist 81, along with introductions dripping with irony, in
support of their claim that the Constitution, properly construed, did
not allow individual suits against the states.467 "Anti-Consolidation,"
for example, introduced the Independent Chronicle's republication
of Federalist 81 by pointing out that its purported author was "a
gentleman who never has been suspected of indulging a predeliction
for too lax a system of government.""46
Underneath the sarcasm was a serious point. Some of the same
men who had swayed votes in the ratifying conventions with their
promise of a narrowly construed Article III, now either vocally (or
463. Marcus, supra note 127, at 389-90 (not referencing source of quotation).
464. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 99, at 487.
465. Id. at 488.
466. Anti-Consolidation, supra note 453, at 423.
467. See, e.g., id. at 423-24.
468. Id.; see also A Consistent Federalist, NAT'L GAZE=TE (Phila.), Sept. 18, 1793, at 371
(introducing the same section of Federalist No. 81 with the comment that the passage "was
considered by the friends of the Constitution as a candid construction of its several parts, at
the time it was adopted by the people"). The North Carolina Journal printed the same portion
of Federalist No. 81 alongside John Hancock's address to the special session of the
Massachusetts General Court. See The Speech of His Excellency the Governor to the General
Court, N.C. J., Oct. 23, 1793, at 1. In Georgia, the editors of the Augusta Chronicle reprinted
the same note and excerpt from the National Gazette immediately following Edward Telfair's
address calling for an amendment to make "more definite" the delegated powers of the federal
judiciary. See From the National Gazette, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 9, 1793, at 2.
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through silence) supported the Supreme Court's decision in
Chisholm. This was not a case of legislative embrace of inherently
vague terms, trusting that the courts would work out the meaning
throughout litigation. Instead, this involved a specific issue that had
been debated at ground zero of popular sovereignty: the state
ratifying conventions. It appeared now that these conventions may
have been, in at least some cases, intentionally misled in order to
gain support for ratification. The following passage from "the True
Federalist" (note the name) is a good example of what was a widely
felt sense of betrayal:
I am a firm friend to the federal government; I consider it as an
inestimable blessing to the country ... [b]ut I consider your
motion, and your arguments and opinions as subversive of it,
and as tending to establish a civil government for the United
States, which the citizens of those communities, have never
consented to. When the Constitution under consideration, was
proposed to the people of Massachusetts, some men, in whom the
people had placed confidence openly and solemnly declared, that
there never could be a construction given to it which would
render the States liable to be sued on a common civil process.
Some of them, for reasons very obvious to their fellow-citizens,
have altered their opinions, and others openly confess, that they
thought it best to deceive the people into the measure of
adopting the plan proposed. The idea of deceiving the people into
a measure, is much more criminal, in my opinion, than that of
subduing them by force; in the first, there is necessarily a
perfidious breach of trust, but in the last there is only open and
manly warfare. The first is predicated upon the tyrannical idea,
that the people are incapable of understanding what is best for
them, and most conducive to their own political happiness; but
in the last their is a hope of relief in revolution, to be gained at
one time or other, by a superior force.469
Perhaps most telling in regard to the claims of original under-
standing is the dog that did not bark. Not a single proponent of state
suability denied the reported promises of the Federalists (nor could
they, given such publicly available passages like Federalist 81), or
469. "The True Federalist"to Edmund Randolph, Number 1, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Jan.
16, 1794, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 242.
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claimed that the ratifiers intended federal courts to have the power
to compel states to defend against suits by private citizens. Instead,
the counterargument stressed the irrelevance of the debates and the
primacy of the text, regardless of original intent. This approach was
in considerable tension with the idea that the people retained the
sovereign power to debate and decide the scope of delegated power.
The possibility that the conventions were misled cut to the heart of
what the founding generation widely accepted as the legitimizing
source of law: the considered will of the people.
c. Popular Sovereignty
Citizens, rouse! Let us before the General Court comes together,
call Town Meetings and County Conventions on this business
and take the sense of the PEOPLE on a question as big with the
fate of our interest and liberties as any one that has agitated
the public mind since the peace with Britain.47 °
One of the most common objections to state sovereign immunity
doctrine is that it appears to graft a feudal concept of royal preroga-
tive onto a system of democratic popular sovereignty.471 Judge
Wilson stressed this point in his Chisholm opinion,472 and the
Supreme Court's later defenders did as well.473 The point was
directly undermined, of course, by the majority's acceptance of
national sovereign immunity-an obvious weakness to any claim
that the very concept of sovereign immunity was an unacceptable
affront to justice.474 Still, the argument that the people should be
able to hold their governments accountable at law carried consider-
able rhetorical force.
The concession of national sovereign immunity, however, signaled
that the underlying issue was less a matter of the injustice of
governmental immunity than it was an issue of which government
470. Marcus, supra note 127, at 390.
471. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 30, at 335.
472. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457-58 (1793) (Wilson, J., concurring).
473. See, e.g., GAZErrE U.S. (Phila.), Apr. 3, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 227
(mocking the states' complaint of the "clipping of the plumes of imperial sovereignty" and the
irony that Georgia had a suit against an individual before the same court at the same time).
474. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 478 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
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could claim such immunity and why. Nationalists viewed the
country as composed of a single mass of sovereign people who
happened to live in states. Federalists (meaning the theory, not the
political party), on the other hand, viewed the Constitution as
establishing a delicate balance between a newly created national
people (and government) and a group of sovereigns within the states
who retained all sovereign power not expressly delegated away
under the Constitution.475 Defenders of state sovereign immunity
thus viewed themselves as preserving the sovereignty of the people
who had adopted the Constitution.476 Edmund Pendleton, for
example, found Justice Wilson's reasoning in Chisholm to be
"reprehensible as tending to prove the Fedral to be a consolodated
Government for all America, & to Anihilate those of the States_ a
Principle, which, if established, would make that Constitution as
great a curse as [he had] hitherto thought it a blessing." '477
In a letter published in the Boston Independent Chronicle two
days before the special session, a writer reminded the assembly that
the sovereignty of the states was inextricably linked to the sover-
eignty of the people:
The consolidationists will be zealous that the States should
submit to prosecutions of this nature, but every real federalist,
will be anxious to retain that degree of sovereignty which was
unanimously acknowledged among the members of the
Convention (who were the voice of "The People') that the State
475. Madison's writings from the time of the Constitution's ratification until the end of his
life stressed this "balance" of state and national authority. In addition to sources cited
throughout this paper, see James Madison, Consolidation (Dec. 5, 1791), in WRITINGS, supra
note 43, at 498; James Madison, Government of the United States, NAT'L GAZETTE, Feb. 6,
1792, reprinted in WRITINGS, supra note 43, at 508-09; Letter from James Madison to William
Cabell Reeves (Mar. 12, 1833), in WRITINGS, supra note 43, at 863-66.
476. Nor could the concept of state immunity from suit be divorced from the idea of the
people's immunity from suits they had not authorized themselves. As Caleb Nelson has
pointed out, individuals who sue the states
are seeking money or resources that the people as a whole have gathered for use
in carrying out the people's business. Suits against a state need not be regarded
as suits against an impersonal (and therefore nonsovereign) government, but
can instead be seen as suits against the sovereign people of the state in their
collective capacity.
Nelson, supra note 62, at 1584.
477. Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Nathaniel Pendleton, supra note 453, at 232.
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in no instance could be sued by individuals before the Federal
Court.
47
The issue of state suability thus went straight to the sovereign right
of the people to establish fundamental law. Remarks in the state
conventions reflected "the opinions and intentions of 'the people."'479
"A Republican" continued:
[Ihf we are to conclude from the determinations of the Conven-
tion, [the people of Massachusetts] never adopted the Constitu-
tion upon any such acknowledgment [of state suability]; but on
the contrary, all the Members expressly declared themselves
opposed to the principle. If the decision of the Judges has a
tendency to give an operation to the Constitution, contrary to
what the Convention conceived, the Constitution as now
explained, is not the Constitution adopted by "THE PEOPLE" of
this Commonwealth.4 °
"A Republican's" rejection of judicial supremacy could not be
stronger. Whatever the interpretation of the United States Supreme
Court, the Constitution emanated from the people, and it was their
understanding which controlled.
d. Judicial Construction and the Resolves of the State
Assemblies
It is therefore high time to agree on measures, whereby to effect
an amendment in the Federal Constitution, in order that the
478. INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 16, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 415-16
(footnote omitted); see also A Consistent Federalist, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 23, 1793,
reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 425-26 ("[I]t was the unanimous opinion of [the
convention], that the State could not be suable before the Federal Court, it must [therefore]
be a strong argument that The People' of this Commonwealth are opposed to this measure.");
A Consistent Federalist, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Oct. 3, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 441 ("It seemed to be the prevailing opinion [of the special session] that no such
right [of an individual to sue a state] was ever meant to be surrendered to the Federal
Government, and that the voice of The People' was decidedly opposed to the measure.").
479. A Republican, The Crisis, No. XIII, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), July 25, 1793, reprinted
in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 395-96.
480. Id. at 396.
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Judicial Court may not construe it in a different manner from
that which the States intended ....
Following Governor Hancock's address, the Massachusetts
General Court referred the matter to a joint committee which
weakly reported back "[t]hat it is not expedient that a State should
be suable by individual citizens of other States, or subjects of foreign
States," and advised Massachusetts's representatives in Congress
to endeavor "to effect such alterations in the Constitution" as would
remove the "inexpediency. ' 482 The report said nothing about the
proper construction of the Constitution or whether the Supreme
Court had erred in Chisholm,48 ' and it was immediately rejected by
the House." 4 In its place, an overwhelming majority of the House
approved a new set of draft resolves which expressly declared the
Court had departed from the original understanding of the ratifiers
in the state convention and called for an amendment which
mandated the proper construction of Article III.485
House member John Davis objected to the General Court
presuming to know the original understanding of the people in
convention.4"6 Davis further warned the assembly against mandat-
ing the proper construction of the Constitution. Doing so "might
authorize a construction in some future instances, which would be
hostile to the rights and privileges of the people. We should be
extremely careful, therefore, how we encourage, and especially how
we insist on a construction of the Constitution, repugnant to the
plain sense and meaning of words." '487 To the vast majority of the
assembly, however, it was the Court's construction that threatened
the retained rights and privileges of the people, and they very much
wanted to authorize a different construction for this and future
481. William Widgery's Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, supra note
456, at 427, 430.
482. Report of a Joint Committee of the Massachusetts General Court, supra note 436, at
424.
483. See generally id.
484. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 367-68.
485. See id. at 368.
486. Account of John Davis's Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, supra
note 459, at 431, 433 ("[It] is not becoming now to declare, what was then the sense of the
people.").
487. Id. at 432.
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cases.4" Accordingly, although the language expressly declaring the
original sense of the people was removed, the language of compelled
construction was not:
Whereas a decision has been had in the Supreme Judicial Court
of the United States, that a State may be sued in the said Court
by a citizen of another State ....
Resolved, That a power claimed, or which may be claimed, of
compelling a State to be made a defendant in any Court of the
United States, at the suit of an individual or individuals, is in
the opinion of this Legislature unnecessary and inexpedient, and
in its exercise dangerous to the peace, safety and independence
of the several States, and repugnant to the first principles of a
Federal Government: Therefore
Resolved, That the [state's representatives in Congress]
obtain such amendments to the Constitution of the United
States as will remove any clause or article of the said Constitu-
tion which can be construed to imply or justify a decision that a
State is compellable to answer in any suit by an individual or
individuals in any Court of the United States. 489
The Massachusetts Resolutions concluded with a call for the
Governor "to communicate the foregoing Resolves to the Supreme
Executives of the several States, to be submitted to the consider-
ation of their respective Legislatures. '49 0 Although the final draft did
not expressly state that the Court's decision contradicted the
original understanding of the ratifiers, the implication was hard to
miss. The judgment in Chisholm was "repugnant to the first
principles of a Federal Government. '491' Not only was the Court's
construction "unnecessary and inexpedient," it was "dangerous to
the peace, safety and independence of the several States," '492 thus
highlighting the need to remove any possibility of any similar
constructions in the future.493 In his letter transmitting the resolves
to the governors of the several states, Samuel Adams was blunt:
488. See Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court, supra note 18, at 440.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id. (emphasis added).
493. See id.
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"[I]t is easily discerned," wrote Adams, "that the power claimed [by
the Supreme Court], if once established, will extirpate the federal
principle, and procure a consolidation of all the Governments." '494
i. Georgia
We know that to men like James Madison, the Bill of Rights
included provisions that sought to control the interpretation of
federal power, particularly the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.495 To
Georgia Governor Telfair, however, these recent Amendments
clearly were not enough. Having received the call from Massachu-
setts to join their efforts to secure yet another amendment, Gover-
nor Telfair declared that "[n]otwithstanding, certain amendments
have taken place in the federal constitution, it still rests with the
state legislatures, to act thereon as circumstances may dictate, so
as to make it more definite. '49" According to Telfair, "were [such]
actions admissible under such grievous circumstances, an annihila-
tion of [the United States's] political existence must follow. '497 Soon
after the Governor's address, a legislative committee issued its
report suggesting that "an Act of the Legislature of the state ought
to be passed, declaratory of the retained sovereignty thereof," and
that a notice should be sent to other states "requesting their
concurrence in a proposal for an explanatory amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, in the second section of the third
article. 498
ii. Virginia
Upon receiving Lt. Governor Samuel Adams's letter and the
accompanying resolutions of the Massachusetts legislature,499
494. Letter from Samuel Adams to the Governors of the States, supra note 453, at 442-43.
495. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
496. Edward Telfair's Address to the Georgia General Assembly, supra note 48, at 234.
497. Id. at 235.
498. Proceedings of the Georgia House of Representatives, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 9, 1793,
reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 235. Georgia also considered, but apparently never
passed, a bill declaring that anyone who entered the state attempting to enforce a judgment
in favor of Chisholm would be "hereby declared to be guilty of felony, and [should] suffer
death, without the benefit of clergy, by being hanged." Id. at 236.
499. See Letter from Henry Lee to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, supra
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Virginia's indecisive Governor Henry Lee finally reached a conclu-
sion: Chisholm was wrongly decided and an amendment was
necessary in order to restore the original understanding of Article
III. Addressing the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, Lee
laid out the constitutional case against the Court's reading of Article
III. Lee first pointed out that "[a] consolidation of the States was
expressly disowned by the framers and by the adopters of the
Constitution ... because it was evident to the whole people, that such
a political Union was by no means Suited to their circumstances."5"
Any attempt to determine "the meaning and extent of any power
delegated by the Constitution" had to refer to the "chief object" of
the Constitution, which is a confederation of the States and not a
consolidation."' ' These first principles by themselves called into
question the Court's decision in Chisholm:
If the right exercised by the supreme judiciary be constitutional,
then certainly consolidation and not confederation must be
acknowledged to be the influential principle of the constitution_
But that this is not the case may be proved by a comparison of
many parts of the constitution as well as for the reason before
alledged which in my judgement is of itself conclusive.
Admit that a State can be Sued and you admit the exercise of a
right incompatible with Sovereignty and consonant to consolida-
tion.50 2
In considering other provisions in the Constitution, Lee argued
that the same construction that permitted suits against states
would also permit individual suits against the national govern-
ment.50 3 Given, however, that everyone agreed that the federal
government could not be sued:
note 453, at 334, 338 & n.3 (indicating that he had "lately received" a letter from the
Lieutenant Governor regarding Massachusetts's decision to seek a constitutional
amendment).
500. Id. at 334-35.
501. Id. at 335.
502. Id.
503. Id.
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How then [could] it be inferred that the people in framing their
constitution should apply the same Words to the General
Sovereignty and to the State Sovereignty for any other purpose
but to manifest in the most unequivocal manner that they meant
that the two sovereigns both emerging from themselves should
be regarded in the same light by their own judiciary."'
Lee recommended that the assembly transmit to Congress a
Memorial containing their "disavowal of the right of the Judiciary
to call a State into Court" and instruct their Senators "to press the
passage of a law explaining and detailing the power granted by the
constitution to the Judiciary So far as States are affected." 50 5 If
successful, this "would forever crush the doctrine asserted by the
Supreme Judiciary of the Union respecting the Suability of a
State."5 6 The Virginia House of Delegates discussed Lee's letter to
the Speaker, and two days later passed the following Resolutions:
1. Resolved, That a state cannot under the constitution of the
United States, be made a defendant at the suit of any individual
or individuals, and that the decision of the Supreme Federal
Court, that a state may be placed in that situation, is incompati-
ble with, and dangerous to the sovereignty and independence of
the individual states, as the same tends to a general consolida-
tion of these confederated republics.
2. Resolved unanimously, That the Senators representing this
state in the Senate of the United States, be, and they are hereby
instructed, and the representatives requested to unite their
utmost and earliest exertions with the Senators and Representa-
tives from other states, coinciding in sentiment with this state,
to obtain such amendments in the constitution of the United
States, as will remove or explain any clause or article of the said
constitution, which can be construed to imply or justify a
decision, that a state is compellable to answer in any suit, by an
individual or individuals, in any court of the United States ....
504. Id.
505. Id. at 337.
506. Id.
507. Proceedings of the Virginia House of Delegates (Nov. 28, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note
3, at 338-39 (footnote omitted). The Resolves were subsequently sent to the Governors of the
several states. See id. at 339 n.3.
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Despite the concurrence of a strong majority of the Virginia Senate,
six state senators dissented."' 8 To this group, not only did the
resolutions "deny what the Constitution expressly warrant[ed],"
they also wrongly "censure[d] the judiciary of the United States" by
asserting that they had "acted in a manner ... clearly improper." ' 9
Although the dissenters disagreed with the majority's conclusion,
they apparently understood the import of the resolutions. The reso-
lutions implied that the Supreme Court had erred in its construction
of the Constitution, thus prompting the need for an amendment
that would restore the proper interpretation of Article III.
iii. Other States
Upon receiving the call from Massachusetts, state after state
fell into line and echoed the call for an amendment establishing
the proper construction of the Constitution, thus implying (and
sometimes declaring) the Court's decision in Chisholm erroneous.
The Connecticut General Assembly, for example, called for an
alteration or amendment to the article "on which the decision of the
said Supreme Court, [was] supposed to be founded so that in the
future no State [could] on any Construction be held liable to any
such Suit."51
South Carolina rejected Chief Justice Jay's "liberal" reading of
federal power and declared that the "sovereign States of America ...
[had] only surrendered so much of their respective rights, as [were]
fully and clearly expressed so to be by the federal constitution." '511
"[The power of compelling a State to appear, and answer to the plea
of an individual" was not one of these expressly delegated powers,
and so the assembly charged their federal representatives with
obtaining such amendments "as [would] remove any clause or
Article of the said Constitution, which [could] be construed to imply,
508. Proceedings of the Virginia Senate (Dec. 4, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 339.
509. Id.
510. Resolution of the Connecticut General Assembly (Oct. 29, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 609. The Connecticut Assembly started the process that resulted in the above
resolve upon their receipt of Samuel Adams's transmission of the Massachusetts resolves. See
id. at 609 n.1.
511. Proceedings of the South Carolina Senate (Dec. 17, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3,
at 610.
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or justify a decision that a State [was] compellable to answer in any
[such] suit. 5 12
In New York, the issue became caught up in state politics as the
pro-amendment Governor George Clinton battled a newly elected
Federalist majority who were intent on electing Chief Justice
John Jay to the governorship.513 Clinton's position, however, was
unequivocal: "[O]ur Convention, when deliberating on the Federal
Constitution, in order to prevent the Judiciary of the United States
from extending itself to questions of this nature, expressly guarded
against such a construction, by their instrument of ratification." '514
On January 24, a joint committee submitted a set of resolutions that
declared that judicial power to compel states to defend against suits
brought by individuals was "unnecessary and inexpedient, and in its
exercise [might] be dangerous to the peace, safety and independence
of the several states."5"5 The committee therefore recommended its
state's representatives seek amendments to the Constitution "as
[would] remove any clause or article of the said constitution, which
[could] be construed to imply or justify a decision, that a state is
compellable to answer to any suit by an individual or individuals in
any court of the United States."5"6 Although the New York legisla-
ture ultimately directed its attorney general to defend the state in
federal court against Oswald's suit, their decision does not appear
to have been due to the sense that states ought to be subject to such
suits. New York was the first to ratify the Eleventh Amendment,
one week after its submission to the states.5 7
512. Id. at 610-11.
513. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 60-67. Jay, in fact, would soon resign his position as
Chief Justice and take the helm as New York Governor, stating his belief that the position of
Chief Justice would "never amount to much." See id.
514. George Clinton's Address to the New York Legislature, supra note 252, at 93.
515. Proceedings of the New York Assembly (Jan. 24, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at
100.
516. Id. at 101. The resolves were submitted for the consideration of the whole House, but
ultimately were treated as moot as the federal Congress began consideration of the Eleventh
Amendment. Id. at 101 n.4.
517. See 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 625; see also Letter from Ezra L'Hommedieu to
Nathaniel Lawrence (Jan. 18, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 99 ("[W]hatever the
Resolution may be which you will receive from the Assembly, you may depend there is a
majority of the Senate who wish you to endeavor to avail yourself of the Sense of the
Convention contained in their Instrument of Ratification.").
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The Maryland House of Delegates adopted the Massachusetts
General Court's declaration that finding such power in Article III
was "repugnant to the first principles of a federal government," and
called for an amendment that would "remove any part of the
[c]onstitution which [could] be construed to justify a decision that a
state is compellable to answer in any suit by an individual or
individuals in any court of the United States. 518
North Carolina declared that the Supreme Court's claimed power
in Chisholm "was not generally conceived by the representatives
of this State in the Convention which adopted the Federal
Constitution as a power to be vested in the Judiciary," and called for
an amendment "as [would] remove or explain any clause or article
of the said Constitution which can be construed to imply or justify
a decision that a State is compellable to answer ... any [such] suit by
an individual. 5 9 Finally, a joint session of the New Hampshire
General Court tasked their federal representatives with obtaining
"such amendments in the Constitution of the United States, as to
prevent the possibility of a construction which may justify a decision
that a State is compellable to the suit of an individual or individuals
in the Courts of the United States. 52 °
iv. Pro-Chisholm Resolves
Amidst the flood of resolves calling for an amendment controlling
the construction of Article III were islands of dissent. In addition to
the minority in the Virginia Senate, a committee in the Delaware
Senate reported that they did not think "it would be proper for the
Legislature of this State, to adopt any Plan that might tend to
prevent the suability of a State."52
Pennsylvania adopted Hancock's third option which assumed that
the decision in Chisholm was correct, but nevertheless concluded
518. Proceedings of the Maryland House of Delegates (Dec. 27, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 611.
519. Resolution of the North Carolina General Assembly (Jan. 11, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 615.
520. Proceedings of a Joint Session of the New Hampshire General Court (Jan. 23, 1794),
in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 618.
521. Proceedings of the Delaware Senate (Jan. 10, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 614.
The Senate thought state suability was proper as a matter of equal justice. See id. They did
not address the original understanding of the Article. See id.
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that the exercise of such power was inexpedient and thus should be
removed from the Constitution.522 Presenting Samuel Adams's letter
to the state legislature, Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Mifflin
instructed the legislators:
The discussion of [this] question ... will unavoidably lead you to
consider, even, though the power, thus claimed (and supported,
indeed, by a decision in another cause of a similar nature) has
been legitimately delegated by the Constitution to the Supreme
Federal Tribunal; whether experience, the attributes of State
sovereignty, and the harmony of the Union, do not require that
it should be abolished.523
Following the Governor's lead, a legislative committee presented a
set of resolutions that avoided the language of proper judicial
construction, and instead proposed an amendment that assumed the
federal Court had been granted power under Article III to hear
individual suits against the states:
Resolved, That the Senators and Representatives of this state,
in the Congress of the United States, be requested to unite with
members of Congress representing other states, in taking
measures agreeably to the fifth article of the Constitution of
the United States, to obtain such amendments to the said
Constitution, as will abridge the general government of the
power of compelling a state to appear at the suit of an individual
citizen or foreigner, as a defendant, in the court of the United
States ....524
Although no other state followed this approach, the Pennsylvania
resolves are important in that they illustrate the preferred wording
of those who believed the Court had properly construed the
Constitution. The resolves did not call for a particular construction
(thus implying judicial error). Instead, the resolves called for an
amendment removing a previously granted power. This tracks the
522. Proceedings of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives (Dec. 30, 1793), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 3, at 612.
523. Id. at 613 n.3.
524. Id. at 612-13. The House never voted on the committee resolutions as the submission
of the proposed Eleventh Amendment preempted their efforts. See id. at 613 n.3.
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Governor's defense of the Court's decision in Chisholm by avoiding
any implied criticism of the Court. Indeed, the resolution implies
support for the Court's approach to interpreting the Constitution,
even as it supports removing an otherwise appropriately enforced
power. In rejecting the proposed language of proper judicial
construction, the Pennsylvania resolves thus point to a very
different view of the proper construction of federal power, one more
in keeping with fellow Pennsylvanian Justice James Wilson than
the dissenting view of James Iredell. The draft of the Eleventh
Amendment ultimately submitted to the states, however, embraced
the language of proper construction. Though other states quickly
ratified the Amendment, Pennsylvania did not.525
D. The Drafting and Adoption of the Eleventh Amendment
Only two days after the Court handed down its decision in
Chisholm, Massachusetts's federal representatives submitted draft
proposed amendments in both houses of the United States Congress.
In the House, Theodore Sedgwick proposed:
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant, in
any of the judicial courts, established, or which shall be estab-
lished under the authority of the United States, at the suit of
any person or persons, whether a citizen or citizens, foreigner or
foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate, whether within or
without the United States ....
The next day, Massachusetts Senator Caleb Strong proposed: 'The
Judicial Power of the United States shall not extend to any Suits in
Law or Equity commenced or prosecuted against any one of the
525. Of the existing states, neither Pennsylvania nor New Jersey took action on the
proposed Eleventh Amendment. Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment:
International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1027, 1042 (2002).
526. Proceedings of the United States House of Representatives, supra note 413, at 605-06.
There is no record of such a motion in either the House Legislative Journal or the Annals of
Congress. Id. at 606 n.2. In light of the fact that Sedgwick's motion was reported in two
different newspapers, including one recording a second to Sedgwick's motion to introduce the
amendment, however, the reports seem credible. See id.
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United States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects
of any foreign State. 527
Both amendments focused on suits against the states brought
by individuals, but neither proposal mentioned proper judicial
construction. Both proposals, in fact, could be construed to concede
the legitimacy of the Court's construction of Article III in Chisholm,
for they appeared to presume the amendment would remove a
power previously granted under the federal Constitution.
The proposals came late in the congressional session and the
matter was postponed, with some members hoping that the delay
would allow for a broader amendment.52 A year later, the debate
had crystalized opposition to state suability into a few fairly succinct
points. Opponents of such judicial power believed that federal power
must be construed in light of the fundamental principle of federal-
ism and the retained sovereignty of the people in the states. Narrow
construction of delegated power was an assumed law of sovereign
nations, and Federalists had promised the conventions that states
would be treated as sovereigns even after the adoption of the
constitution and that federal power would be construed accordingly.
Not only had this been promised as a general matter, this had been
specifically promised in regard to the judicial power and the issue
of state suability. The decision in Chisholm thus erred in its
approach and violated an express understanding of the ratifiers." 9
Finding the appropriate response required more than simply
removing a particular power. It was possible that a poorly worded
amendment would impliedly vindicate the Supreme Court's nat-
ionalist construction of federal power. Such would have been the
approach of the Pennsylvania resolves.53 ° The year long debate,
however, illustrated a broad and deeply held belief that not only was
the power wrong but the manner of construction was wrong as well.
Despite the obvious aspersion that such an amendment would cast
on the Court, the amendment had to address this problem, particu-
larly in light of what appeared to be a troubling series of broad
constructions of federal power.53'
527. Resolution in the United States Senate, supra note 21, at 607-08.
528. See supra notes 415-20 and accompanying text.
529. See supra Part I.B.
530. See supra note 524 and accompanying text.
531. Letters published in opposition to state suability often raised additional concerns
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Scholars have commonly characterized the response to Chisholm
as reflecting the state's self-interested attempt to avoid ruinous
judgments against them in the federal courts." 2 This was how Chief
Justice John Marshall famously characterized the call for the
Eleventh Amendment in his 1821 decision in Cohens v. Virginia.533
The precarious financial situation of states like Georgia did, in fact,
intensify the opposition to state suability.534 Whatever one makes,
however, of Marshall's reductionist argument in Cohens, or the
various personal and financial interests of advocates on both sides
of the debate,535 the original sources illustrate that preserving the
sovereign dignity of the states was the primary issue discussed in
public calls for an amendment to the Constitution.53 6 Even the
advocates of state suability seem to have conceded this point." 7
Thus, regardless of whatever self-interested motives individuals
may have had in pressing for a narrow construction of Article III,
the public debate focused on the nature of the federal system itself.
Attorney General Sullivan's early and extensive discussion of the
issue focused on the concept of retained sovereignty and the proper
construction of delegated power, as did the even more detailed
about the broad construction of federal power exhibited in Hamilton's Funding Program and
the creation of a National Bank. See supra Part I.B.5.
532. See, e.g., 1 WARREN, supra note 27, at 99 ("While this opposition to the Court's decision
was to some extent based on divergenc[e] of political theories as to State sovereignty, the real
source of the attack on the Chisholm Case was the very concrete fear of the numerous
prosecutions that will immediately issue from the various claims of refugees, Tories, etc., that
will introduce such a series of litigation as will throw every State in the Union into the
greatest confusion." (internal quotations omitted)); Pfander, supra note 34, at 1278 ('The
Chisholm decision ... [was a] shock .... [L]ess because it contemplated the suability of the
states as corporate bodies than because it threatened to require the states to honor old
obligations to individual suitors in specie, without regard to the states' traditional freedom
to adopt strategies of agrarian finance.").
533. 19 U.S. 264, 406 (1821). For a historical account that seeks to support Marshall's
assertion about the original purpose of the Eleventh Amendment, see Pfander, supra note 34,
at 1342-43 (quoting Marshall's passage in Cohens as supporting a financial interest-based
reading of the Eleventh Amendment).
534. See Edward Telfair's Address to the Georgia General Assembly, supra note 48, at 234-
35 (noting that, in addition to the infraction on state sovereignty, suits against the state
introduced serious "difficulties" in light of the depleted state coffers due to on going battles
with Native American tribes).
535. For evidence of Justice James Wilson's conflicts of interest in the state suability cases,
see 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 282 n.50.
536. See generally 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 597-99.
537. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
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response to Sullivan published by "Hortensius.'53 The general
thrust of the debate over the next year followed the general outlines
of these opening salvos: opponents of state suability stressed the
original understanding of the ratifiers and the "consolidating" effect
of broad constructions of federal power. Proponents stressed what
they saw as the plain meaning of the text and the simple justice of
holding states just as amenable to suit in federal court as private
individuals.539 The ultimate draft of the Eleventh Amendment and
its remarkably rapid ratification reflected the outcome of this
debate.
1. The New Draft
In the third Congress, on January 2, 1794, Caleb Strong again
submitted a proposed amendment, only this time, his proposal
focused on the issue of construction: 'The Judicial Power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any Suit in Law
or Equity commen[ced] or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
foreign State. 54° On January 14, Albert Gallatin moved to amend
the text to exclude suits "arising under [U.S.] treaties. '54' Gallatin's
proposal would have exempted the Vassal case and others like it. It
was rejected.5 42 One other attempted modification that would have
allowed suits against the states in future cases, but not those cases
arising before the ratification of the amendment, was also
rejected.5 43 Strong's original version was then approved (with only
two votes against).544 There was one final attempt to amend the
proposal in the House of Representatives and limit its application
to only those states that had made adequate provision for such suits
538. See HORTENSIUS, supra note 217, at 36; SULLIVAN, supra note 40, at 21.
539. See, e.g., Solon, supra note 458, at 421, 423 (stressing the plain language of Article III
and the policy of maintaining a government "of laws, which are equal and certain-laws,
which give a remedy to the weak, as well as the strong, to the single citizen as to the whole
people").
540. Resolution in the United States Senate (Jan. 2, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 613
(alteration in original).
541. Proceedings of the United States Senate (Jan. 14, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at
617.
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Id.
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in their own state courts-it too failed.545 Finally, on March 4, 1794,
the House voted eighty-one to nine to concur with the Senate's
acceptance (twenty-three to two) of Strong's proposal.546 Strong's
version of the Eleventh Amendment was thus adopted without a
single amendment and was submitted to the states for ratification
in March of 1794. 547 In less than a year, a sufficient number of
states had ratified the Eleventh Amendment to make it an official
part of the Constitution.548
Describing the drafting of the Eleventh Amendment as it
occurred, two members of Congress from the state of New York
produced almost identical descriptions of the proceedings in
Congress, one in a letter to a friend, the other in a circular letter to
his constituents. Both men explained that the House was engaged
in producing an amendment that would "prevent the learned Judges
of the federal judiciary, from extending its construction to the
suability of States by individuals. 549
E. Postadoption Commentary: The Eleventh Amendment as the
Voice of the People
In the Federalist Papers Madison argued that, should the federal
legislature extend its powers beyond that authorized in the
Constitution, the state legislatures could be counted on to "sound
the alarm to the people;" for every unconstitutional extension of
545. Proceedings of the United States House of Representatives (Mar. 4, 1794), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 3, at 620.
546. Id. at 621-22.
547. Resolution of the United States Congress (Mar. 12, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 3,
at 624-25.
548. See generally 5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 625-28 (noting ratification by New York, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Vermont, Virginia, Georgia, Kentucky,
Maryland, Delaware, and North Carolina). In this early period, the process by which states
notified the national government regarding ratification had not yet been codified, leading to
a delay in the official notice of the Eleventh Amendment's ratification. See 5 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 601 n.19. This fact has occasionally led historians to misstate the time states took
to act on the proposed amendment. See, e.g., GOEBEL, supra note 323, at 737 ("[I]t was close
to four years before a sufficient number of states had ratified to put the Eleventh Amendment
into effect."). The record indicates, however, that the Amendment was ratified in less than a
year.
549. Letter from Theodorus Bailey to His Constituents (Jan. 22, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra
note 3, at 618; see also Letter from Philip Van Cortlandt to David Gelston (Jan. 30, 1794), in
5 DHSC, supra note 3, at 618 n.1.
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power by the federal government necessarily invaded the rights of
the states.55 ° According to Madison, the people could then secure a
remedy by electing new federal representatives.5 ' Curing a usur-
pation by the unelected federal judiciary was a different matter;
even constitutional amendments are subject to judicial construction.
Faced with a widely perceived interpretive error by the Supreme
Federal Judiciary, the people chose one of the few tools at their
disposal that could adequately address the problem: Mandate the
proper construction of Article III. In taking this step, the people
exercised, for the first time under the new Constitution, their
sovereign right to control the operations of the federal government.
This, at least, is how the event was perceived in the years
immediately following the adoption of the Amendment. Materials
dealing with the Eleventh Amendment in the first decade of its
existence are scarce, but what we do have reflects the view that it
represented a movement of the people to secure the ratifiers'
original understanding of Article III. The most obvious example is
the Supreme Court's later dismissal of the suit against Virginia in
Hollingsworth, the Court apparently accepting the state's argument
that the Amendment was declaratory of the proper construction of
Article III and thus must apply retroactively against all pending
suits against the states.552
There are other examples, although less well known. Three
years after the amendment was ratified, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania heard a case involving whether a criminal defendant
could compel a state to remove his case to federal court.5 3 In its
oral argument, Pennsylvania raised the case of the Eleventh
Amendment in support of a broad reading of the sovereign power
of the state to refuse removal to federal court: '"The language of
the amendment, indeed, does not import an alteration of the
Constitution, but an authoritative declaration of its true construc-
tion. '5 4 The Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
Thomas McKean, agreed that the Eleventh Amendment repre-
550. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison), supra note 99, at 286.
551. Id.
552. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 378-82 (1798).
553. Respublica v. Cobbet, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 467 (Pa. 1798). Judge Spencer would rely rather
heavily on this opinion in Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (16 Va. Cas.) 1, 52-53 (1815).
554. Respublica, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 472.
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sented a movement by the people themselves to declare the true
meaning of Article III."'
A former member of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention,
Judge McKean, began his opinion by pointing out the pre-constitu-
tional states "had absolute and unlimited sovereignty within their
respective boundaries." '556 Under the current Constitution, the states
enjoy all "powers, legislative, executive, and judicial" except "such
as are granted to the government of the United States by the
present instrument and the adopted amendments." '557 The state and
federal governments thus combine to "form one complete govern-
ment." 8 Problems arose, however, in cases of "collision" between
state and federal power:
Should there be any defect in this form of government, or any
collision occur, it cannot be remedied by the sole act of the
Congress, or of a State; the people must be resorted to, for
enlargement or modification. If a State should differ with the
United States about the construction of them, there is no
common umpire but the people, who should adjust the affair by
making amendments in the constitutional way, or suffer from
the defect. In such a case the constitution of the United States
is federal; it is a league or treaty made by the individual States,
as one party, and all the States, as another party. When two
nations differ about the meaning of any clause, sentence, or
word in a treaty, neither has an exclusive right to decide it.... I
rather think the remedy must be found in an amendment of the
constitution. 59
McKean thus placed resolution of disputes over the interpretation
of delegated power in the hands of the people, who could remedy the
situation through the adoption of an amendment declaring the
proper understanding of the Constitution. This, to Judge McKean,
was precisely what occurred through the adoption of the "declara-
tive" Eleventh Amendment:
555. Id. at 473-74.
556. Id. at 473.
557. Id.
558. Id.
559. Id. at 473-74.
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It has been well observed by the attorney general, that by the
last amendment, or legislative declaration of the meaning of the
Constitution, respecting the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States over the causes of States, it is strongly implied,
that States shall not be drawn against their will directly or
indirectly before them, and that if the present application should
prevail this would be the case. The words of the declaration are:
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States, by citizens of another State, or
by citizens or subjects of any foreign State."56°
McKean read the Amendment as "declarative" of a preexisting
principle that "States shall not be drawn against their will" before
the federal courts.561 Indeed, McKean went so far as to refer to the
Eleventh Amendment as a 'legislative declaration" instead of an
Amendment, if only to underscore his agreement with the state that
the provision did not alter powers granted under the original
Constitution.562 Finally, McKean read the Amendment as "resolving"
a dispute between the federal and state governments regarding the
suability of the states-the very act of the people he earlier
suggested was the proper means of settling such disputes.563
In the first constitutional treatise, St. George Tucker presented
the same view of the Eleventh Amendment as representing an act
by the sovereign people themselves in response to an unconstitu-
560. Id. at 375.
561. Id.
562. Id. at 473.
563. Id. at 474. The dissent in Alden v. Maine cites only the final words of McKean on this
subject, and badly misstates their context:
It is interesting to note a case argued in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
1798, in which counsel for the Commonwealth urged a version of the point that
the Court makes here, and said that "[t]he language of the amendment, indeed,
does not import an alteration of the Constitution, but an authoritative
declaration of its true construction." [citing Respublica, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 472].
The court expressly repudiated the historical component of this claim in an
opinion by its Chief Justice: 'When the judicial law [i.e., the Judiciary Act of
1789] was passed, the opinion prevailed that States might be sued, which by this
amendment is settled otherwise." [citing Respublica, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 475
(opinion of M'Kean, C.J.)].
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 792-93 n.28 (1999). Obviously the full passage shows that
McKean viewed the amendment as declaratory and, in fact, expressly agreed with counsel for
the state. Id.
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tional act of the federal government. Published eight years after
the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, Tucker's View of the
Constitution served for decades as the authoritative work on the
federal Constitution, and remained influential throughout the
nineteenth century." In his discussion of the Eleventh Amendment,
Tucker linked the meaning of the clause to the principles underlying
the Tenth Amendment:
[The judicial power] does not extend to any case that may arise
between a state and its own citizens or subjects; nor to any case
between a state, and foreign citizens or subjects, or the citizens
of any other state* [here Tucker cites the Eleventh Amendment]
... so every such case, whether civil or criminal, and whether it
arise under the law of nations, the common law, or law of the
state, belongs exclusively, to the jurisdiction of the states,
respectively. And this, as well from the reason of the thing, as
from the express declarations contained in the twelfth and
thirteenth articles of the amendments to the constitution.565
To Tucker, the "reason of the thing" established the restrictions of
the Eleventh Amendment as much as the text itself.566 Tucker, of
course, insisted that courts could not divest states of their retained
sovereign rights by "implication," but only by the state's own written
consent given "in the most express terms."567 Elsewhere in his
treatise, Tucker addressed the question of "what would be the
consequences in case the federal government should [it] exercise
powers not warranted by the constitution."56 Tucker answered the
question by quoting James Madison and using the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment as an example of the people correcting the
errors of their government:
Where [the usurpation] may affect a state, the state legislature,
whose rights will be invaded by every such act, will be ready to
mark the innovation and sound the alarm to the people [here
Tucker cites the Federalist Papers]: and thereby either affect a
564. See generally TUCKER, supra note 368.
565. Id. at 422.
566. Id.
567. Id. at 423.
568. Id. at 153.
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change in the federal representation, or procure in the mode
prescribed by the constitution, further "declaratory and restric-
tive clauses", by way of amendment thereto. An instance of
which may be cited in the conduct of the Massachusetts legisla-
ture: who, as soon as that state was sued in the federal court, by
an individual, immediately proposed, and procured an amend-
ment to the constitution, declaring that the judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit brought
by an individual against a state.569
F. A Brief Textual-Historical Theory of the Eleventh Amendment
The historical debates which accompanied the passage of the
Eleventh Amendment seem to allow for some tentative conclusions
about the received meaning of the Amendment. Most critically,
there appears to have been widespread agreement among those who
supported the Amendment that the Supreme Court had erred in its
construction of Article III. New York, of course, had expressly
declared its understanding of that article when it adopted the
569. Id. (emphasis added). Madison appears to have agreed that the language of the
Eleventh Amendment suggests it was declaratory rather than a substantive removal of
delegated power. In a letter to Spencer Roane, James Madison shared Roane's criticism of
John Marshall's opinion in Cohens v. Virginia, writing:
On the question relating to involuntary submissions of the States to the
Tribunal of the Supreme Court, the Court seems not to have adverted at all to
the expository language when the Constitution was adopted; nor to that of the
Eleventh Amendment, which may as well import that it was declaratory, as that
it was restrictive of the meaning of the original text.... Nor is it less to be
wondered that it should have appeared to the Court that the dignity of a State
was not more compromitted by being made a party against a private person than
against a coordinate party.
The Judicial power of the U. S. over cases arising under the Constitution,
must be admitted to be a vital part of the System. But that there are limitations
and exceptions to its efficient character, is among the admissions of the Court
itself. The Eleventh Amendment introduces exceptions if there were none
before.... It is particularly incumbent, in taking cognizance of cases arising under
the Constitution, and in which the laws and rights of the States may be
involved, to let the proceedings touch individuals only. Prudence enjoins this if
there were no other motive, in consideration of the impracticability of applying
coercion to States.
The Marshall Court and the Virginia Opposition: Three Letters to Judge Roane, in MIND OF
THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITIcAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 357, 366-67 (Marvin
Myers ed., 1981) (1793) (emphasis added).
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Constitution. 7 ' Georgia just as expressly declared the Eleventh
Amendment to represent "the only just and true construction of the
said judicial power, by which the rights and dignity of the several
States can be effectually secured. ' s ' Other states expressed the
same view through their call for language controlling the construc-
tion of Article 111.572 Both proponents and opponents viewed the
language of construction as implicating the Supreme Court's
interpretation of Article III in Chisholm. This point is further
supported by the Pennsylvania Resolutions, which omit the
language of construction in an amendment that presumes the
Supreme Court did not err in Chisholm.57 ' Finally, although there
were some exceptions,7 4 the vast majority of supporters of a
"construction" amendment also declared their view that the
Supreme Court had wrongly interpreted Article III to authorize
federal courts to hear suits brought by individuals against
nonconsenting states.5 75 One of the major themes of oppositionist
literature was that such power ran against the understanding of the
ratifiers in the state ratifying conventions-an understanding
supported by the express claims of the Federalist advocates of the
Constitution.576
Scholars have repeatedly parsed the text of the Eleventh
Amendment, seeking clues regarding its scope and intended
meaning. One of the problems with much of this literature, however,
has been its assumption (expressly stated or tacitly assumed) that
the Amendment imposed a substantive change on the original scope
of federal power delegated under Article III. Under this assumption,
the textual scope of the Amendment becomes critical indeed, for it
570. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
571. See An Act to Ratify the Resolution of Congress, Explanatory of the Judicial Power of
the United States (Nov. 29, 1794), in 2 THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 537-38
(Michael Glazier, Inc., 1981) (1800).
572. See supra Part II.C.2.d.
573. See supra note 524 and accompanying text.
574. See, e.g., Letter from Zaphenia Swift to David Daggett (Mar. 5, 1794), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 3, at 624 ("A general opinion seemed to prevail that it was most prudent_ that the
States should not be subject to such inconvenience_ and that it was adviseable to remove a
ground of Jealousy which the States felt pretty strongly and which might have issued in some
bad consequences This does not seem to be owing to the exertion of any party unfriendly to
the Government.").
575. See supra Part II.C.2.
576. See supra Part I.B.
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leaves federal power otherwise untouched and subject to the same
broad construction of judicial authority generally granted to other
national powers.
The historical evidence presented in this Article, however,
suggests a very different meaning of, and different approach to, the
text of the Eleventh Amendment. The text itself is fairly clear-it
forbids any construction that extends federal judicial power to suits
brought by out-of-state individuals against a state.577 As neo-
revisionists have argued (persuasively in my mind), the text makes
no exception for suits based on so called "federal questions," whether
they involve domestic federal rights or rights established by
treaty.578 Given that everyone at the time knew the issue of state
suability involved the potential enforcement of federal treaties, and
given the express rejection of language that would have excepted
treaties from the text of the Amendment, it seems reasonable to
allow the text full value as applying to both federal questions and
diversity cases involving questions of state law.
One textual mystery involves why the Amendment refers only to
suits by out-of-state individuals, rather than asserting that states
were immune from suits by any individuals. This was the approach
of Theodore Sedgwick's original proposal, 9 though he seems to
have abandoned it by the time Caleb Strong submitted his revised
proposal in the next session of Congress.8" Although a mystery,
some answers are less likely than others. For example, it seems
quite unlikely that the omission was meant to preserve the right of
in-state individuals to sue their own states. To begin with, no one
thought states could be sued by their own residents without that
state's consent.581 Even if some states might have voluntarily
allowed such suits, 52 the debates reflect an assumption by partici-
pants that states were not subject to compelled suits in federal court
577. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
578. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 34.
579. See supra text accompanying note 413. Sedgwick's proposal was never debated. See
supra text accompanying note 415.
580. See supra note 414 and accompanying text.
581. See, e.g., William Widgery's Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives,
supra note 456, at 429.
582. See generally James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition:
Towards a First Amendment Right To Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91
NW. U. L. REv. 899 (1997).
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by their own citizens.588 Most obviously, of course, such an exception
would raise all of the same issues of retained sovereign immunity
that were raised by suits like Vassal's and Chisholm's. 4
Some scholars have suggested that the narrow language of the
Amendment suggests not only a narrow construction, but an
additional negative implication that the principles of state sovereign
immunity are to be excluded in all cases except those mentioned in
the language of the text.5 85 Had the Amendment said nothing about
judicial construction, this might be a plausible approach. The
language of the Amendment, however, does not say "[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not extend," but instead that
"[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend." 8' The former follows Caleb Strong's original proposal,
which he abandoned in favor of the latter.58 v Had the Amendment
followed its original formulation, it would have reversed the effects
of the Chisholm decision, but would have left in place its ratio
decidendi, its reasoning, and this could have had a far greater effect
on the people in the states than the single humiliating prospect of
being sued on a debt in federal court. As Senator of Massachusetts,
Strong had been instructed (not merely "requested" as was the case
for representatives) to secure an amendment which reflected the
conclusions of the Massachusetts General Court that Chisholm was
wrong as a matter of constitutional law, not just constitutional
583. See, for example, William Widgery's remarks in Massachusetts House of
Representatives:
[I]f an individual's property is taken to satisfy an execution against this State,
he has no remedy in either State or Federal Court. For the State being
completely Sovereign, as it respects its own Citizens, no action for damages will
he in his favour against the State .... And no man will pretend to say, that the
Federal Constitution authorizes any action in the Federal Court between a State
and its own citizens ....
William Widgery's Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, supra note 456, at
429.
584. An additional reason might involve the unresolved question of whether an individual
who proceeded against a state in state court with the state's permission, could appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Although the issue would be contested in coming years, see, e.g., Beers
v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857), the Eleventh Amendment does not foreclose this
possibility, nor are the sovereignty concerns underlying the Eleventh Amendment as deeply
implicated in cases involving voluntary state submission to a suit brought by an individual.
585. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 28, at 1671.
586. U.S. CONST. amend XI (emphasis added).
587. See supra text accompanying notes 527, 540.
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policy.5 8 The error, moreover, was one of construction-the need to
narrowly construe Article III in order to preserve the retained
sovereignty of the people in the states.589 Those scholars who
suggest the Amendment carries a negative implication that
preserving state sovereignty applies nowhere else except in the
narrow category of cases listed in the Eleventh Amendment have it
exactly backwards.5" The language of the Eleventh Amendment was
chosen in a manner that prevents exactly that kind of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius591 rule of construction.
A full theory of the Eleventh Amendment is beyond the scope of
this Article. Any theory based on the original understanding of the
Eleventh Amendment, however, must take into account four basic
characteristics, or four 'layers" '92 of constitutional meaning, which
inform the Amendment. First, the Constitution as a whole was
broadly understood to retain the independent sovereign existence
of the states. This understanding included the idea that federal
power had been delegated by the people in the states, with all
nondelegated power, jurisdiction, and rights, retained by the
delegators. This leads to the second layer of understanding: as a
matter of popular sovereignty and the applicable law of nations, all
delegated powers were to be strictly construed. This rule of strict
construction that applied to all powers delegated under the U.S.
Constitution were made an express part of the constitutional text
through the adoption of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. These
Amendments were declaratory, however, meaning that the rule
was broadly assumed to inform the Constitution even without
the addition of these two Amendments. Third, Article III, like all
delegated powers, was to be narrowly construed in a manner pre-
serving the retained powers, jurisdiction, and rights of the people in
the states. It was the failure of the Supreme Court to apply this
proper construction of Article III that led to the fourth layer: the
Eleventh Amendment itself. By adopting the language of construc-
588. See supra text accompanying notes 439-40.
589. See supra text accompanying note 439.
590. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 28, at 1671.
591. "'The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." JAMESA. BALLENTINE,A LAW
DICTIONARY 163 (2005).
592. I thank Professor Lawrence Solum for the suggestion of "four layers" in the original
understanding of the Eleventh Amendment.
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tion-language well debated prior to the drafting of the Eleventh
Amendment-the Framers of the Amendment signaled an agree-
ment with a broadly shared sentiment that the Supreme Court had
erred in failing to construe Article III in a manner preserving the
retained rights of sovereignty to the people in the states. This not
only suggests that a background rule of strict construction informs
the Eleventh Amendment, it also precludes any attempt to read the
Amendment in a manner that denies or disparages other aspects of
sovereignty retained by the people.593
Again, a full discussion of how the above theory of the Eleventh
Amendment applies across the range of cases involving state
suability is beyond this Article. At least two important conclusions
seem justified, however, in regard to the jurisprudence of the
Eleventh Amendment. To begin with, the original understanding of
the Eleventh Amendment appears to vindicate the Supreme Court's
conclusion in Hans v. Louisiana that the underlying principles
informing the Amendment extend beyond the narrow subject matter
of the text. Whatever the motivations of the Hans Court, their
conclusion that preserving sovereign immunity was an essential
limitation on the proper construction of Article III is in keeping with
the historical evidence canvassed in this Article. Much work needs
to be done regarding the parameters of this immunity, but the basic
insight of the Hans model seems appropriate as a matter of the
original understanding of Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.
For similar reasons, the modern Supreme Court's use of sovereign
immunity as a principle limiting the construction of Article I also
seems justified by the historical record. As Hancock put it, "[T]here
are certain inherent principles in the Constitution ... which can
never be surrendered, without essentially changing the nature, or
destroying the existence of the Government., 594 The principle of
retained sovereignty was promised by the Federalists and reason-
ably relied upon by the state conventions. Although the Eleventh
593. This reading of the Amendment implies a distinction between a grant of subject
matter jurisdiction and the concept of state sovereign immunity. Article III clearly grants
subject matter jurisdiction over suits involving states as a party and cases involving the
United States as a party. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The grant of subject matter juris-
diction over the United States was broadly understood as not abrogating the sovereign
immunity of the national government. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
594. John Hancock's Address, supra note 4, at 418.
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Amendment responded to an interpretation of Article III, the
principle that drove that Amendment applied to the construction of
federal power as a whole. Thus, when Justice Kennedy in Alden v.
Maine invoked the Tenth Amendment as justifying a limited
construction of Article I in order to preserve the sovereign immunity
of the states,595 he invoked a rule of construction that James
Madison believed both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments ex-
pressed.596 This is not a matter of stretching the Eleventh Amend-
ment beyond its text; it is a matter of construing texts containing
delegated power according to the original understanding of the state
ratifying conventions.
CONCLUSION: THE FOUR MYTHS OF THE MODERN ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT
By suggesting in the title to this piece that we "leave the
Chisholm trail," I do not mean to suggest that the decision is
unimportant. Chisholm was the first great constitutional case
issued by the Supreme Court, and the opinions in the case represent
important streams of thought regarding early understandings of the
Constitution. Nor has it been my intent to prove some kind of
unified public embrace of retained state sovereignty and strict
construction of federal power at the time of the founding. Obviously,
different Founders took different positions on both issues. The
opinions in Chisholm, again, reflect these divided views.
My point has been to descriptively broaden the historical record
and, in so doing, make the normative case that we ought to look
beyond Chisholm if we truly wish to understand how the Eleventh
Amendment came into being and what it was understood to signify.
The Eleventh Amendment was not the first rule of construction
added to the Constitution; its slightly older sibling, the Ninth
Amendment, was adopted as part of an effort to limit the construc-
tion of federal power in order to preserve the retained rights of the
people. These retained rights included all powers, jurisdiction, and
rights not expressly delegated to the federal government under the
Constitution. Too many leading Federalists had promised this strict
595. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713-14 (1999).
596. See supra text accompanying note 198.
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construction of federal power, and too little time had passed since
ratification, to expect suits like Oswald, Chisholm, and Vassal to
slip by unnoticed.
And too much was at stake. Scholars are right to point out the
contemporary concerns about a flood of suits and the burden of
financial claims on states already struggling with debt. There was
also the indignity of being compelled to defend a suit by someone
who most state citizens would view as having deserted their country
in its hour of need. But above and beyond all of this, there was the
ongoing concern that had fueled so much opposition to the original
Constitution-the threat of annihilation as an independent
sovereign. It is impossible to spend time in the original sources and
not come away with the sense that this was widely viewed as the
central problem with allowing individuals to sue a state. Whatever
the personal motive of the writers making the claim, it was appar-
ently well-understood throughout the country that this argument
would generate the widest support for a constitutional amendment.
The failure to focus on this central cause of public support for an
amendment to the Constitution has led to what I call the "Four
Myths of the Eleventh Amendment."
The first myth is that the Eleventh Amendment emerged from the
decision in Chisholm and is somehow uniquely tied to that case. The
evidence presented in this Article suggests otherwise. Chisholm
occurred midway down the road to the Eleventh Amendment, with
the first shot fired by Massachusetts's James Sullivan in his
published response to the Maryland Van Staphorst case.59 ' The
themes developed by Sullivan and his critics established the general
outlines of the arguments that would follow, in particular the idea
that a compelled suit by an individual reduced a state to a mere
nonsovereign corporation, implying that the Constitution had in fact
"consolidated" the states under a solely sovereign national govern-
ment.59 The Chisholm case showed the Supreme Court was willing
to embrace state suability, but neither the facts nor the opinions
had much influence on the debate. Indeed, they were generally
unknown until well into the next stage of the debate-the drafting
597. See supra Part I.C.1.
598. See supra notes 209-20 and accompanying text.
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of state resolutions calling for an amendment to the Constitution.599
Nor did Georgia respond with the immediate resolve one might
expect from a case that supposedly triggered the Eleventh Amend-
ment.600 Not until Massachusetts acted in response to the Vassal
case did Georgia join the bandwagon with the rest of the states
calling for a constitutional amendment.601 Finally, it was Massachu-
setts that laid out the options for the state assemblies and it was
representatives from Massachusetts that ultimately chose the form
of the Eleventh Amendment.6 2 Again, the point is not to make
Chisholm irrelevant; it was not. Had the Court chosen to follow the
reasoning of Justice Iredell, the issue would have disappeared (at
least until Chief Justice Marshall almost certainly would have
revived it at a later date). Despite the important status of Chisholm,
however, there is nothing about the facts of the case or the opinions
that played a particularly important role in the creation and
understanding of the Eleventh Amendment. A decision in Vassal,
Oswald, Hollingsworth, or any suit against the state would have led
to the same result. Indeed, unlike Chisholm, the Vassal case
involved a suit by a despised 'Tory," a fact well noted in the public
debates and that may well have served an important role in
generating such broad support for an amendment. In the end,
however, it was not the specific facts in any of these cases that
informed the Eleventh Amendment. It was the concept of state
suability and the implications for the construction of delegated
sovereign power.
The second modern myth about the Eleventh Amendment may
seem somewhat at odds with the first, but in fact illustrates the
importance of getting beyond Chisholm in our understanding of the
Eleventh Amendment. One of the most common assertions in
Eleventh Amendment scholarship is the claim that Supreme Court
Justice James Iredell did not present a constitutional case against
state suability in his Chisholm dissent. The assertion is generally
used as rhetorical support for the reasonableness of the majority's
construction of Article III." There are a number of problems with
599. See supra Part II.A.5.
600. See supra Part II.B.
601. See supra Part II.C.
602. See supra Part II.D.
603. See, e.g., Orth, supra note 331, at 1149.
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this myth, however. To begin with, we know that Iredell wrote at
least two separate essays on the constitutional problem of state
suability, one in conjunction with Oswald, the other for Chisholm
(which he may have delivered orally when the court issued its
ruling). °4 But even if we focus just on Iredell's published dissent,
his argument is based on a reading of the Constitution that is
critical to his ultimate conclusion that Congress has not authorized
suits against the states: if suits against corporations served as an
appropriate analogue to suits against states, then the procedures of
corporate law would fall under the "principles and usages" Congress
had authorized in the Judiciary Act. 615 It was because states as
sovereigns could not be treated as mere corporations that Iredell
concluded that this area of law did not apply. The issue of whether
states could be treated as corporations, of course, was the central
constitutional issue in the debate over state suability, and had been
treated as such since Sullivan first published his "Observations"
in the aftermath of the Van Staphorst case. The constitutional
importance of Iredell's decision is further highlighted by the fact
that the two major opinions of the majority, those of Justice Wilson
and Chief Justice Jay, were penned by men with significant conflicts
of interest. Jay had joined the court specifically hoping to move the
law in the direction of state accountability in terms of interna-
tional treaties, an interest obviously furthered by his opinion in
Chisholm."6 James Wilson was hopelessly conflicted due to his
financial investments. °7 James Iredell, on the other hand, spoke
against his political interest as a committed Federalist.0 8 This
makes his solo dissent in Chisholm all the more persuasive, for it
shows the depth of support for state sovereign immunity. Indeed,
the fact that a Federalist like Iredell would go against his colleagues
in the first major Supreme Court opinion helps to explain the
604. See supra Parts I.C.2, IIA.4.d.
605. See supra Part II.A.4.c.
606. See Gibbons, supra note 29, at 1920-26 (discussing Jay's efforts to ensure federal
treaties were enforceable against the states in federal courts).
607. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
608. Iredell was no Antifederalist. He supported the Constitution and the Federalist
Party's Alien and Sedition Acts. See Lash & Harrison, supra note 269, at 446 & nn.36-37
(suggesting Iredell's support for the Act after hearing John Marshall speak).
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remarkably broad-based reaction to the decision by both Federalists
and Antifederalists. 60 9
The third modern myth about the Eleventh Amendment is that
Hans v. Louisiana established a doctrine of state sovereign
immunity that cannot be derived from the text of the Eleventh
Amendment. This basic objection to Hans has been phrased in
different ways, but the essence of the argument is that the Eleventh
Amendment refers only to suits against a state by out-of-state
citizens. By extending the Eleventh Amendment to suits brought
against the state by the states' own residents, the Court in Hans
made a fatal break from the language of the Amendment. As the
Court has long noted, however, Hans was not about construing the
text of the Eleventh Amendment, it was about construing Article
111.610 Hans read the Eleventh Amendment as suggesting that the
Chisholm Court had erroneously construed Article III, and that the
error was a failure to construe the Constitution in a manner that
preserved the retained sovereignty of the states.6 ' The language of
the Eleventh Amendment, of course, makes precisely this sugges-
tion by declaring how the Court should have construed Article
III.6"2 The language of construction was specifically added to the
Amendment in the face of claims that doing so would amount to an
official censure of the new Supreme Court.613 Putting aside the fact
that a significant number of people believed the Court ought to be
censored, the purpose of adding the language was to signal that the
problem was not merely one of result, but one of interpretive
method. Had the Amendment done nothing more than reverse the
result in Chisholm, this would have left in place the reasoning of the
court-indeed, it could be understood as a tacit acceptance of the
reasoning of the Chisholm majority. In such a case the cure would
be worse than the disease, for absent a statement about proper
construction, the Amendment could be read to carry the negative
609. Theodore Sedgwick and Caleb Strong were both Massachusetts Federalists. See Anuj
C. Desai, The Transformation of Statutes into Constitutional Law: How Early Post Office
Policy Shaped Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 671, 701 (2006-07);
Pfander, supra note 34, at 1278.
610. See, e.g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,328 (1934); see also Manning, supra note
28, at 1726.
611. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1889).
612. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
613. See supra note 509 and accompanying text.
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implication that in all cases except this one, the Court's broad
construction of federal power was appropriate. 14 As the public and
legislative debates make clear, however, there was much more at
stake than liability on a claimed debt. Any construction of Article III
that threatened the very existence of the people as independent
entities in the states could not be correct. As John Hancock put it in
his address, "[T]here are certain inherent principles in the Constitu-
tion ... which can never be surrendered, without essentially
changing the nature, or destroying the existence of the Govern-
ment. 615 In his Chisholm essay, Justice Iredell echoed the same
point, declaring that "when consequences ensue from one construc-
tion, inconsistent with the known basis on which the Constitution
was formed & adopted, that construction shall not be received." '616
Or, as James Madison succinctly put it, "An interpretation that
destroys the very characteristic of the government cannot be just."'17
This brings us to the fourth and final myth: the sovereign
immunity doctrine of the modern Supreme Court, like other federal-
ist doctrines of limited federal power, departs from the text and
original understanding of the Constitution. James Madison believed
that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments would sufficiently secure a
narrow construction of all delegated federal power. These Amend-
ments declared the broad principles of enumerated federal power
and the retained rights and powers of the people in the states.18
The very concept of popular sovereignty, as articulated by all sides
in the ratification debates, demanded that the sovereign people
retain all powers and rights not expressly delivered into the hands
of the federal government. Compelling the people's state govern-
ments to defend themselves against individual suits in federal court,
while declaring the immunity of the federal government in regard
to the same class of suit, violated the very basis for believing that
federal power would be narrowly construed as promised. Thus,
614. John Manning has recently argued that the Eleventh Amendment should be read to
carry this kind of negative implication. See Manning, supra note 28, at 1740. The historical
evidence presented in this paper suggests the Amendment was meant to prevent just this
kind of negative implication.
615. John Hancock's Address, supra note 4, at 418.
616. James Iredell's Observations on "This Great Constitutional Question," supra note 335,
at 187.
617. Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank, supra note 176.
618. U.S. CONST. amends. IX-X.
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"[n]otwithstanding" the addition of "certain amendments" like the
Ninth and Tenth, it was clear an amendment regarding the
construction of Article III was required "so as to make it more
definite." '619 These three Amendments-the Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh-all stand as textual declarations of the need to
narrowly construe federal power in order to preserve the sovereign
independence of the people in the states. Together, they retain all
nondelegated powers, jurisdiction, and rights to the people.
Accordingly, as discussed above, Justice Kennedy followed the
original understanding of the Constitution when he linked preser-
vation of state sovereign immunity to the text of the Tenth
Amendment in Alden v. Maine.62 ° Indeed, the historical case is much
stronger than he apparently realized, for it finds support in the
original understanding of Article I, Article III, the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, and the Eleventh Amendment.
Today, when we think of state sovereign immunity, we tend to
view the term in opposition to the people's retained rights. This is
because we have largely moved away from the founding period
concerns about centralized national authority, and view states'
rights as having more to do with violating individual rights than
protecting them. Even today, however, there remains a remnant
understanding that sometimes local immunity from federal control
can be a good thing. For its part, the Supreme Court continues to
patrol the boundary between state and federal governments,
ensuring, if only in a limited and sporadic way, the separation of
powers between the state and federal governments. The idea is pure
Madison-distributed powers better secure liberty.
What we forget, however, is that the federal separation of powers
is itself premised on the existence of independent sovereign
people(s) in the states. Without this independent sovereign exis-
tence, state and local governments would be no more autonomous
from federal control than the District of Columbia. Perhaps this
would be a good thing. Perhaps not. The point is that avoiding this
result is exactly what was understood to be at stake in the debates
over state suability, for such a precedent called into question the
very idea of autonomous states, which in turn called into question
619. Edward Telfair's Address to the Georgia General Assembly, supra note 48, at 234.
620. See supra notes 595-96 and accompanying text.
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the concept of limited federal power. Without the counter-pressure
of individual local sovereigns, the only limits to the construction of
federal authority are those limits expressly listed in the Constitu-
tion, for example in the Bill of Rights. This reading of federal power,
of course, is precisely what the Ninth Amendment was supposed to
prevent. Just because the Constitution enumerated certain limits on
federal power, this does not mean there are no other constraints on
federal power.
It is in this way that the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Amendments fit together. As Madison put it, the Tenth Amendment
declares Congress has only enumerated powers, and the Ninth
declares that these enumerated powers must have a limited
construction. 621 For example, "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.' 62
2
621. See supra text accompanying notes 196-97.
622. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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